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
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*E***DITORIAL**

As a unique institution by age, structure and organization, "Carol I" National Defense University has always been a landmark at the level of the Romanian military education organizations through the scope of its information activities, in the service of national security, but also through collaboration with similar institutions from Europe.

The moment when this Bulletin issue appears has a special significance for our magazine, in the sense that we mark in 2017 the achievement of 80 years of existence, a period commenced on January 23, 1937, when the Romanian Army General Staff approved the Order number 2872 which sanctioned the establishment of the Upper School Bulletin.

The eight decades that time has marked its value means not just a bridge over time, but also a vivid, step-by-step testimony of a school that has assumed the specialization and training of the military at a high level of professionalism, and at the same time giving the possibility of many generations of soldiers, actively participating in important events and with a significant impact on the existence of the Romanian nation, to present in the pages of the magazine, in a special way, the thoughts, reflections, perceptions and results of the scientific researches specific to the military phenomenon.

The predominant scientific act in recent appearances has led to accumulations of experiences that build the military academic environment in an absolutely necessary way for these times. The principles underlying the editing of articles are scientific value and innovation, aspects that organically fulfill the evolution of a military career. Today, the Bulletin is both a barometer of scientific level analysis and an insight into the future that we decide together in the choices we make. Parts of the history and evolution of the magazine are brought to the attention of the reader in the pages of this issue through the article: **80 years in the service of the military academic community: "Carol I" National Defense University Newsletter between tradition and modernity.**

Making an arc over time, we pay tribute to all those who have devoted their time, attention and passion to respond to concrete needs in the military academic field and to maintain the level of publication of major importance in Romanian higher education and military scientific research.

Also, being accustomed to briefly presenting the most important events at a geopolitical level in the previous editions, we firmly believe that, in terms of Romania's foreign policy, President Klaus Iohannis' visit to the United States marks such an event. This visit was due to the 20th anniversary of the signing, in 1997, of the Romanian-American Strategic Partnership, a partnership that allowed the consolidation of relations in areas of mutual interest for both countries and at the same time it was an important factor to support peace and stability in Southeast Europe.



Military cooperation was an essential element in this bilateral partnership process, with the Romanian Army participating, alongside US troops, with important troops at the military operations in the theaters of operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Romania is and will remain a trustworthy ally of the United States within the North Atlantic Alliance and a faithful ally within the Strategic Partnership between the two countries.

Romania's decision to allocate 2% of GDP for defense, the implementation of the anti-missile shield from Deveselu that protects the NATO member states from possible air strikes and the ways in which our country develops its defense capabilities are some other elements that make Romania an indisputable ally of United States in the current geopolitical conditions.

In this context, the visit of the President of Romania is the result of a natural process of well-established partnership and mutual support of the regional and global interests of the two strategic partners.

The Editorial Board





THE PLACE AND THE ROLE OF INTERNAL AUDIT IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

*Lieutenant-Colonel Radu-Viorel MARCU, PhD student**

Abstract: *The paper presents some aspects regarding the regulation of the internal public audit, both at national and departmental level. There are detailed some aspects regarding the stages of development of public internal audit in the Ministry of National Defense. The regulatory framework underlying the operation of the Internal Audit Directorate is briefly addressed. The vision and objectives of the Internal Audit Directorate are presented and evaluated.*

Keywords: *public internal audit; Internal Audit Directorate; Ministry of National Defense.*

1. Development stages of public internal audit in the ministry of national defense

In order to establish the evolution of public internal audit function in the Ministry of National Defense (MoND) and in the Internal Audit Directorate (IAD), in the particular, there was conducted a parallel analysis of the specific regulatory framework, both at the national level, and at the departmental level, as well as of the degree of development and awareness of the public institution management regarding the necessity and the value which the public internal audit brings to the military organization. Thus, in our opinion, the following stages of development were mainly identified:

- The pioneering stage (1999-2002);
- The development stage (2002 - 2014);
- The maturity stage (2014 - present).

In order to facilitate the understanding and the support of the arguments regarding the identified stages of the development of the public internal audit, as shown in Fig. 1, we tried to explain the representative moments of the evolution of the public internal audit and of the internal control, for the levels previously detailed (global, national, departmental), taking into account the inter dependability between the two systems.

1.1. The pioneering stage (1999-2002) – our evaluation regarding the period of 2000-2002 as the pioneering stage takes into account the fact that the specific legislation for the public internal audit was set in Romania in 1999 by Government Ordinance (OG) no. 119/1999 regarding the *internal audit and preventive control*, a normative document which contained only a few provisions regarding the internal audit, including in this respect only one chapter, “*Provisions regarding the internal audit*”, which contained four articles referring, concisely and mainly, to the objective, responsibilities, the manner of organizing the public internal audit compartment (PIACp), to the way the public internal audit is carried on, and to its methodological guidance.

Subsequently, modifications/additions were made regarding the responsibilities of PIACp, the objectives of the public internal audit and the contraventions. Also, in 2009, on the basis of art. 9, paragraph (1) of GO no 119/1999, the minister of public finances sanctioned by the means of Order of Minister of Public Finance (OMPF) no 332/2000, *The General Methodological Norms for the Internal Audit Organization and Functioning on the basis of GO no 119/1999 regarding the internal audit and financial control*.

At the departmental level, on the basis of the provisions of article 6 paragraph (1) and article 32 letter a) from GO no 119/1999, as well as point 2 of OMPF no 332/2000, *The Methodological Norms regarding Internal Audit Organization and Functioning within the Ministry of National Defense* were sanctioned by Order of Minister of

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National Defense (OMoND) no M.81/2000. We mention that, until its abrogation, this order was modified and supplemented once by OMoND no M.60/2002. Subsequently, in 2002, the minister has sanctioned *The Methodology of Auditing the Acquisition Proceedings, Asset Revaluation, Services Offered by the Military Units, as Well as Renting and Transferring the Goods in Charge of the Ministry Of National Defense*, by OMoND no M.6/2002.

a control structure dealing exclusively with the financial-economic activity and the accounting system.

Last, but not least, the methodology of conducting the audit activities was not very far from the activity of the Administrative Financial Control, under the circumstances where the internal auditors were able to conduct administrative investigations and, also, to administer contraventions.

Evolution at global level ¹	INTERNAL CONTROL																	
Evolution at national level ¹																		
Evolution at global level ¹	CHALLENGING STAGE						DEVELOPMENT STAGE						ABSOLUTE NECESSITY STAGE					
Evolution at national level ¹																		
Evolution within MoND																		
Evolution at global level ¹	INTERNAL AUDIT																	
Evolution at national level ¹																		
Evolution within MoND																		
Evolution at global level ¹	PIONEER'S WORK STAGE						DEVELOPMENT STAGE						MATURITY STAGE					
Evolution at national level ¹																		
Evolution within MoND																		
	1941	1985	1992	1999	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016

Fig. 1. Comparative evolution of the public internal audit and the internal control

Thus, taking into account the fact that during this period the regulating framework for public internal audit was elaborated, as well as the fact that the IAD was established within the structure of the General Inspectorate of the MoND, it was essential to “reset” the staff of this structure which, previously, has exclusively conducted activities of control and administrative investigation.

Besides the necessity of transforming the staff into internal auditors, the audit structure has met some problems while assuming the audit role within the MoND, under the circumstances where the majority of the managers viewed the IAD as

1.2. The development stage (2002 - 2014)

– we consider that the 2002-2014 period of time can be considered a development stage of the public internal audit on the basis of the fact that in 2002, as a first step, a specific legislation was set for the internal audit by the means of sanctioning the Law no 672/2002 regarding the public internal audit, republished, with further modifications and additions.

We consider that this law is the starting point of the “development” of the public internal audit in Romania, implementing fundamental concepts such as the definition of the audit, of the audit charter, of the organization structures of the public internal audit at the national level (PIAC, CHUPIA, PIACp³), of the audit types (regularity, system and

¹ Taken and adapted from Internal audit in Ministry of National Defence (Auditul intern în Ministerul Apărării Naționale), Tomoioagă Marius-Gabriel, 2013, p. 112.

² Scietifical Research Report no. 1 Foundations of the public internal audit. Regulation and current structures at national level, Marcu Radu-Viorel, p. 11.

³ Public Internal Audit Committee – PIAC, Central Harmonization Unit for Public Internal Audit – CHUPIA, PIAC – Public Internal Audit Compartment – PIACp.



performance), of the risk-based planning, of the description of audit techniques and tools, as well, but not least, of the conciliation meeting (a phase when it was possible to discuss the findings and the conclusions recorded in the audit report draft in order to agree to the auditors' recommendations).

At the level of the military organization, taking into account the provisions of the article 11 letter a) of Law no 672/2002 and of the OMPF no 38/2003, "P.I.A -I, Norms Regarding the Conduct of Public Internal Audit Activity within the Ministry of National Defense" were sanctioned by OMoND no M.87/2003. Until its abrogation, the order stood three modifications/additions⁴ concerning the explanation of several aspects regarding the evolution of the national legislation, as well as the insertion of a new annex (no 25) regarding the acquisition proceedings (through the abrogation of OMoND no M.6/2002), asset revaluation, as well as renting and transferring the goods in charge of the MoND (another two legislative modifications concerned only with the modification/addition to the annex no 25).

Thus, we appreciate that the 2002-2014 period of time implied the revision of the specific regulating framework, by sanctioning a law designed for the public internal audit, and the removal of the activities which were maintaining it within the limits of administrative financial control (conducting administrative investigations, administrating contraventions, etc.).

Also, it is ascertained the removal of the ex-ante activities which were significantly burdening the public internal audit activity, and the authentication of the balance sheet and of the budget draft, activities which, although useful, were considerably time consuming. Starting with 2002, the financial status and the budget draft are conducted ex-post.

1.3. The maturity stage (2014 - present) – this stage also includes the legal provisions which completed the regulating framework during 2011-2013 as a result of the significant modification/addition to Law 672/2002. These modifications were included into the *maturity stage* because they have effects both at the level of the Ministry of National Defense, and at the level of other public institution's PIACp, starting with 2014. We motivate

⁴ OMoND no. M.93/2004, OMoND no. M.93/2007, and OMoND no. M209/2007.

this because, although the Law no 191/2011 was sanctioned on 27.11.2011 and stipulated that the methodological norms were to be published within 90 days, they were sanctioned by GR no 1086 on 11.12.2013, approximately two years later. Another example in this respect is the compulsoriness of establishing internal audit committees (IAC) starting with 01.01.2012, at the level of public institutions which have organized PIACp, and have a budget of over 2 billion lei. However, *The Norms Regarding the Establishment of the Internal Audit Committees* were only sanctioned in 2014 by GR no 554/03.07.2014. Moreover, although the certification of the auditors should have been completed in six years after Law 191/2011 came into force (the deadline being October 2017), this activity has not "started" until this date, no public internal auditor actually being certified yet. In actual fact, in all these situations, it can be ascertained a slow reaction speed of the field "methodologist", namely CHUPIA.

With respect to the methodology, the CHUPIA's activity the during 2014-2015 consisted in a significant number (21⁵) of *Practical Guides*, *General Guides* and *Guide-books*. Among these we mention the general guides regarding the specific methodology for conducting the formalized advisory tasks (2015)⁶, the public internal audit evaluation tasks⁷, the system public internal audit tasks (2015)⁸, the practical guide for conducting the public internal audit tasks regarding the improvement of the continuous professional training of the personnel (2014), as well as the guide-book for the approval of the methodological norms specific to the conduct of public internal audit (2016).

Within the MoND, we take into account the provisions of art. 13 of Law no. 672/2002, art. III and IV of Law no. 191/2011, art. 2 of GR no. 1086/2013, and art. 2 of GR no 1259/2012, the

⁵ According to <http://www.mfinante.gov.ro/ghiduriucaapi.html?pagina=domenii>, accessed on 28.03.2017.

⁶ The General Guide for the Specific Methodology for Conducting Formalized Advisory Tasks, sanctioned by Order no 13/2015 of the minister of public finances.

⁷ The General Guide for the Specific Methodology for Conducting Public Intern Audit Evaluation Tasks, sanctioned by Order no 14/2015 of the minister of public finances.

⁸ The General Guide for the Specific Methodology for Conducting System Public Intern Audit Tasks, sanctioned by Order no 758/2014 of the minister of public finances.



minister of national defense has sanctioned, by Order no. M.67/2014, *The Methodological Norms for Conducting the Public Internal Audit within the Ministry of National Defense*. The regulating framework has been completed by the Order no. M.110/2015 according to which, on 11.11.2015 the Internal Audit Committee was established, being composed of five members. The order was modified in 2016 by OMoND no M.41, and it concerned the composition of the IAC.

Taking into account the above analysis, we consider that, starting with the year 2014, both the national/departmental regulating framework, and the human resources and the organizational structure of the public internal audit have mostly aligned to the requirements of the *General Framework for Professional Practices* promoted by IIA.

The actual establishment of IAC represents a step further with respect to supporting the activity of the PIACp and to ensuring the independence and the efficient conduct of the internal audit activity, and also it promotes the continuing open communication with the leadership team of PIAC and of the public institution (as a recognition of the value of the public internal audit structure within the MoND, we mention the fact that out of the three highly qualified specialists on public internal audit who compose the PIAC in the initial structure, one of them was designated on behalf of IAD).

The methodology for conducting the public internal audit has seen significant evolutions, but important improvement possibilities in this field are to be found. It is noteworthy, in our opinion – aspect which is at the basis of the present research – the fact that the guides compiled by CHUPIA are, in certain situations, formal and, at the same time, the majority of the described techniques/tools concern rather the regularity audit, and not the system or the performance audit.

2. The public internal audit department within the romanian army

The public internal audit was introduced in the Romanian Army with the sanctioning of EGO no 74/2000 *regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense*, where DAI was nominated as a central structure of the ministry.

One of the first definition of the position/role of the IAD is to be found in EGO no 14/2001

regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense, where, at art. 20 it is stipulated that the IAD “is the specialized structure designated for conducting the endogen and ex post verifications on the administration of the patrimony and on the public good usage using criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and degree of economy”⁹.

At present, Law 346/2006 *regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense*, states that IAD “conducts the auditing of the patrimony management and the public funds usage within the Ministry of National Defense according to the legal regulations”¹⁰.

Thus, on the whole, it is noted an evolution of the responsibilities of the reference structure, from, eminently, responsibilities of control and evaluation of the manner of observing the regulatory framework and the order and discipline within the military units (responsibilities of the General Inspectorate of the MoND) towards a structure which conducts tasks of inspecting the manner of patrimony management and of public good usage, on the basis of the 3 Es¹¹, so that, later on, to be noted that IAD conducts tasks of **auditing** the manner of patrimony management and public funds usage according to the legal regulatory framework.

We mention that, to this date¹², on the website of the Department for Parliament Liaison and Public Information within the MoND, under the section “*Decisional Transparency/Projects for Normative Documents under Public Debate*”, it is posted a draft for modifying the Law no 346/2006 which is on the legislative sanctioning route in the Parliament. This draft includes some modifications to the public internal audit activity within the military organization, the most important one concerning the explanation of the position of IAD within this ministry. Thus, according to the draft, “*The Internal Audit Directorate assures, according to the law, the organization of public internal audit and fulfills the auditing of all activities run by the central structures, by their subordinated structures and forces within the Ministry of National Defense, as well as by the structures which are coordinated*

⁹ Art. 20 of EGO no 14/2001 regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense.

¹⁰ Art. 19 of Law no 346/2006 regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense.

¹¹ 3Es – degree of economy, efficiency, effectiveness.

¹² <http://dlaj.mapn.ro/arhiva2016.php>, accesed on 10.03.2017.



by it or under its authority, in order to accomplish the established objectives, including the evaluation of the internal control system.”

It can be noted that this new definition harmonizes the responsibilities of IAD with the provisions of Law no. 672/2002 and of the *General Norms* sanctioned by GR no 1086/2014, and with the provisions of the *Methodological Norms* sanctioned by OMoND no M.67/2014, respectively.

It is our opinion that the present regulation contained in Law no 346/2006 regarding the IAD responsibilities is not in concordance with the legal provisions applicable in the field of public internal audit, with the international standards for internal audit professional practice promoted by the Institute of Internal Auditors from USA and/or the good practice in this field, and the precise application of these provisions would limit the field of activity only to auditing the patrimony managed by the military organization, and the manner of using the public funds respectively.

3. Responsibilities and limitations to the public internal audit activity

Competencies – in accordance with the public internal audit activity, according to Law no 346/2005 regarding the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defense, with the subsequent modifications and additions, to the *Rules of Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense* and to the *Methodological Norms for Conducting the Public Internal Audit within the Ministry of National Defense*, IAD has the main competencies regarding the following:

- To set up the specific functional and organizational framework for conducting the public internal audit within the MoND;
- To manage the public internal audit activity within the MoND;
- To conduct the public internal audit within the central structures, their subordinated structures and forces within the MoND, as well as within the structures which are coordinated by it or under its authority;
- To evaluate the activity of public internal audit conducted by the subordinated structures and by the internal audit compartments within the structures which are coordinated by it or under its authority;

- To elaborate the drafts of the specific normative documents.

Responsibilities – in accordance to the legal provisions previously mentioned, the main responsibilities are:

- Elaborates/updates the specific norms for conducting the internal audit activity;
- Elaborates the draft of the Multiannual plan for public internal audit within the MoND and, on its basis, elaborates the draft of the Annual plan for public internal audit, which are to be submitted to the minister for sanctioning;
- Conducts public internal audit activities in order to evaluate if the control and financial management systems of the central structures, their subordinated structures and forces, as well as of the structures which are coordinated by it or under its authority, are transparent and in accordance with the norms of lawfulness, regularity, degree of economy, efficiency and effectiveness;
- Informs the CHUPIA about the recommendations which were not assimilated by the minister;
- Reports to the minister, to the CHUPIA and to the RCC¹³ in due time, the findings, conclusions and recommendations as resulted from the public internal audit activity;
- Makes capital out of the results of the public internal audit activity and reports annually to the minister and to the CHUPIA about the achievement of IAD’s objectives;
- In the case of identifying irregularities or possible prejudices, it reports them to the minister of national defense and to the authorized structure of internal control;
- Elaborates the Charter of public internal audit;
- Verifies and evaluates the manner of observing the norms, directions, as well as the Code of ethics of the internal auditor within the territorial subordinated structures and internal audit compartments within the autonomous administrations and national companies coordinated/under the authority of the MoND.

Internal audit committee – in order to improve the public internal audit activity, according to the *Norms for Establishing the Internal Audit Committees*, elaborated by the MPF and sanctioned by the Government, at the MoND level,

¹³ RCC – Romanian Court of Accounts.

it is established and functions the Internal Audit Committee (IAC), a consultative body whose purpose is to facilitate the relationship between IAD and the management of the MoND. In order to accomplish its objectives, IAC has the following main responsibilities:

- Discusses and approves the annual and multiannual plan for public internal audit activity;
- Analyzes and issues an opinion on the recommendations expressed by the internal auditors, including on those recommendations which were not assimilated by the minister, if in case;
- Approves the Charter of the public internal audit;
- Analyzes the notifications regarding the inobservance of the *Code of Ethics of the Internal Auditor* and proposes the necessary measures to the minister of national defense;
- Analyzes and approves the Annual report on the public internal audit activity.

Organization – the current organization of the Internal audit directorate is described in Figure 2.

relations are established:

- Hierarchical relations:
 - It is subordinated to the minister of national defense;
 - The territorial internal audit departments are subordinated to it;
- Functional co-operation relations:
 - With specialized structures within the Ministry of National Defense: DDPP; DPLPI; GS; DIGD; HRMD; FAD; DPICF; CIC; MPO¹⁴;
 - With structures outside the ministry: RCA; CHUPIA; Internal audit structures within the defense, public order and national security system;
- Audit relations:
 - With the internal audit committee;
 - With central structures within the MoND through the central structure;
 - With other credit release authorities within the MoND through the territorial departments.

Tasks conducted – according to Law 672/2002 and to the OMoND no M.67/2014, the audit tasks conducted by the IAD are:

- Assurance tasks – they are impartial




Fig. 2. The organizational structure of the Internal Audit Directorate

Functional relationships – according to the provisions of Law 346/2005, of the *Rules for Organization and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defense*, of the *General Norms for Conducting the Public Internal Audit* and of the *Methodological Norms for Conducting the Public Internal Audit within the Ministry of National Defense*, IAD functions as a central structure being directly subordinated to the minister of national defense. At the level of this structure, the following

investigations of the probative elements, conducted with the purpose of providing the central structures, and their subordinated structures and forces

¹⁴ DDPP – Department for Defence Policy and Planning; DPLPI – Department for Parliament Liaison and Public Information; GS – General Staff; GS – General Secretariat; DIGD – Defence Intelligence General Directorate; HRMD – Human Resources Management Directorate; FAD – Financial-Accounting Directorate; DPICF – Directorate for the Prevention and Investigation of Corruption and Fraud; CIC – Control and Inspection Corps; MPO - Military Prosecutor's Office.



within the MoND an independent evaluation of the processes of risk, control and governance management. The assurance tasks can be tasks of regularity, performance and system.

- Advisory tasks – counseling is the activity conducted by the internal auditors in order to add value and improve the governance processes within the MoND without the internal auditors having to assume managerial responsibilities.

- Evaluation tasks for public internal audit activities - these tasks imply the conduct of periodical investigations, at least once in 5 years, under circumstances of independence, with the purpose of impartial investigation of public internal audit activity conducted within the MoND from the points of view of conformity and performance.

4. Vision and perspectives

IAD within the MoND is the first PIACp which intended and, according to the available data, has elaborated and approved a vision and long term (10 years) strategic objectives. Thus, with respect to the development perspective for public internal audit within the MoND, we mention the fact that a program document was elaborated – *The 2026 Vision and Objectives for the Public Internal Audit within the Romanian Army*, which consists in assuring and counseling the management of the MoND and its composing structures on the basis of, mainly, counseling, system and performance audit tasks.

The vision consists in assuring and counseling the management team of the MoND and its composing structures on the basis of, mainly, counseling, system and performance audit tasks. In order to accomplish this desideratum, at the level of the IAD there were set **strategic objectives**¹⁵, which are presented in table no 1. Although “bold”, the objectives proposed to be implemented by 2026 are feasible under the circumstances that, to this date, IAD will have a valuable corpus of internal auditors. It is our opinion that the only limitations in accomplishing these targets are the material and financial resources, as well as the degree of openness of the management of entities towards the audit act.

In the following part we shall try to present, concisely, the elements regarding the outcomes

(targets) associated with each objective and their respective implementation strategies, and to identify the stage of their implementation (Table no 1).

Taking into account what has been previously stated, we appreciate that the stage of implementation of the strategic objectives assumed by the *2026 Vision and Objectives for the Public Internal Audit within the Romanian Army* has partly outrun the deadlines assumed by the management of the IAD. To this effect, it is significant the fact that, in respect to the system audit tasks, the assumed objective for 2020 has been accomplished even since 2015 (the system audit represents approximately 12,5% out of the total amount of time, compared to minimum 10% which was planned).

One of the tools which led to the increased improvement of the public internal audit is the *Work Group of the Chief of Internal Audit Directorate for the Guidance of the Internal Audit Activity*, at which level, some “divergent” opinion trends regarding the conduct of internal audit were approached, discussed and harmonized and, at the same time, the main directions for development within the field were set.

CONCLUSIONS

The public internal audit, both at the national level, and at the level of the Ministry of National Defense, has gone, beginning with 1999 (the year the law was issued) over several stages of development, at the present being, in our opinion, in the maturity stage.

In respect to the implementation of the public internal audit at the level of the Ministry of National Defense, we consider that this function is given its proper importance since a unique, independent and central structure has been created. Thus, in accordance with the internal regulations, the internal audit is independently organized and objectively conducted at the level of the Romanian Army by the Internal Audit Directorate (a unique, independent, central structure), a structure which is directly and immediately subordinated to the minister, being composed of a central nucleus and territorial departments.

¹⁵ <http://dai.mapn.ro/pages/view/96>, accessed on 17.04.2017.



Tab. 1. Implementation stage – Vision and objectives

Strategic Objectives	Outcomes (targets)	Implementation Strategies	Stage
Increase of the degree of economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the activities conducted by the military units within MoND by conducting performance audit tasks	- performance audit should represent at least 15% of the amount of time	- to elaborate case studies and practical examples - to gradually increase this type of audit and to conduct it at the level of all important MoND structures	- 1,8% in 2015 - 3,6% in 2016
Support to the army leadership team in the decisional process by focusing the tasks on activities and fields which are a priority for the military organization	- system audit should represent at least 10% of the amount of time - within a 5 year cycle, the most important systems should be audited - annual planning of 4 system tasks	- training a nuclei of valuable auditors with competencies in different fields necessary to conduct system tasks; - identifying the main systems within MoND and prioritizing them for audit tasks.	- 12,5% in 2015; - 14,6% in 2016
Increase of the value brought to the Internal Audit Directorate so that the audit should become a function of strategic importance for the army;	- implementing an evaluation program for the audit's added value; - at least 10% of the audit amount should represent topics required by the leadership team of the MoND.	- recognizing the real value brought by the audit ; - raising awareness of the manner the internal audit is perceived by the audited bodies; - answering to the real needs of MoND.	- it was approved the questionnaire of evaluating the internal audit activity by the audited bodies.
Reducing the period of time of the audit tasks by using computer technologies	- local intervention should be reduced by approximately 10% compared to 2015 as a reference year ; - data collection stage should be conducted mainly at the IAD headquarters by using computer technologies	- using predominantly computer technologies and the INTRAMAN network for data transmission.	- for the system tasks the majority of data and information is collected using computer technologies.
Improving the information flow within the Internal Audit Directorate;	- implementing an information system to generate automatically documents with repetitive features.	- developing a software in accordance with the legal provisions for this field.	- at project stage
Training a valuable corps of auditors by certifying and authenticating the internal auditors ;	- training the auditors within the Internal Audit Directorate in the sight of certification ; - certifying at least 3 people in the field of audit - 2 CGAPs ¹⁶ and 1 CISA ¹⁷	- specializing the auditors within the "Carol I" National Defense University - providing the institution's budget with the necessary amounts for the acquisition of the teaching aids needed for auditor's training and certification.	- to a big percent, the auditors have the needed competencies as a result of attending a postgraduate course in auditing at the "Carol I" National Defense University
Improving the competencies of internal auditors in order to enable the conduct of various types of tasks;	- training at least 2 auditors in the field of internal audit of the environment management system, as well as the quality system ; - each auditor should be able to conduct tasks at least in three distinct fields ; - developing a training program within the military education – subject "internal audit"; - accomplishing a centralized training system at the level of IAD and TIAB ¹⁸	- including in the institution's budget the necessary amounts for training the internal auditors; - in order to avoid being dependent upon a single auditor, our strategy regards the auditors' training at least in three fields, through a program coordinated at the central level; - improving the curricula and elaborating specific handbooks for the lectures held under the subject "internal audit";	- under planning
Increasing the presence and visibility of the Internal Audit Directorate within the Romanian Army.	- issuing, on a quarterly basis, in the military press, an article on the subject; - the auditors should take part as observers to the main committees, commissions, professional meetings etc.	- communicating key-messages to the beneficiaries of audit activities within the army, and establishing communication relations with the main structures within the military organization.	- articles on the subject have been published in the military press, significant ones being published in "Observatorul militar"

¹⁶ CGAP – Certified Government Audit Professional.

¹⁷ CISA – Certified Information Systems Auditor.

¹⁸ TIAB – Territorial Internal Audit Branches.



Although "bold", the strategic objectives of the Internal Audit Directorate, proposed to be implemented by 2026, are feasible under the circumstances that, to this date, the audit structure will have a valuable corpus of internal auditors. It is our opinion that the only limitations in accomplishing these targets are the material and financial resources, as well as the degree of openness of the management of military units towards the audit act.

The internal audit tasks planned and conducted within the military structures have as a priority objective the investigation of executing the standards of internal control, because projecting, adapting, improving and/or implementing an internal control system, on the basis of these standards, will lead to the transformation of the entire organization in its own nature. IAD within the MoND has assured a pioneer's work with respect to the conduct of the system and performance tasks, conducting on an annual basis this type of tasks under the circumstances that, according to the *Annual Reports of the Central Unit for Harmonization of the Public Internal Audit Regarding the Public Internal Audit* during 2004-2015, only a few public internal audit divisions conduct this kind of activities.

Starting with 2014, both the national/departmental regulating framework, and the human resources and the organizational structure of the public internal audit have been harmonized with the requirements of the *General Framework for Professional Practices* promoted by the Institute for Internal Auditors from the USA (the reference in the field). The establishment of IAC has represented a step further with respect to supporting the activity of the public internal audit divisions and to assuring the independence and the efficient functioning of the internal audit activity and, at the same time, has promoted a continuing open communication with the management of the public internal audit divisions and with the management of the public institution.

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THE AXIOMATIC CHARACTER OF DECISION

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Abstract: *The decision is an act of authority in the military field, and this approach is supported by an axiomatic theory that gives it a logical, rational character.*

Keywords: *axiomatic theory; decision theory.*

Accumulating knowledge, information, data, ideas and experience in relation to nature and society, with himself, the individual has shaped and cultivated throughout history a certain way of being, behaving and manifesting both in family and in collectivity, a set of values and norms, criteria and judgments that helped him to examine and solve multiple daily problems, significantly improving his quality of life and work.

In this evolution, the solving of socio-economic problems at the level of the individual and the society in which he was integrated, of the communities and of the country as a whole, with a strong impact on the consciousness and the existence of man, became acute and became a priority in the concern of the theorists (researchers) and practitioners (politicians) alike. As it has been expected, slowly but surely, scientific research has become more systematic and pragmatic, being institutionalized, and the results (the discovery of some methods and techniques, modern theories and principles) have facilitated the viable, optimal solution of critical issues, the increase of efficiency at micro- or macro-social level and, implicitly, have facilitated lowering the uncertainties and risks that inevitably accompany the implementation of strategies, plans and programs of development, meaning the transition from the present moment to the future time horizon. As decision-making

practice takes two forms: *decision-making* (situations with reduced complexity, with repetitive character, where the variables involved are well known by the manager) and the *decision-making process* (complex situations involving a significant consumption of time, days and even weeks to collect and analyze the information, but also to consult specialists in the field), the formation of a professional, competent point of view of value judgments obliges the decision-maker to go through several stages, in a logical succession, capable of ensuring scientific rigor in the preparation, adoption, implementation and evaluation of the results obtained.

An important role in decision-making is also played by the evaluation of the determinant factors, which are grouped into two distinct categories:

- *Internal factors*, from their own environment (technical, economic, social), expressing the level of technical endowment, the influence of the discoveries in science and technology, the training of the employees, the working climate, the quality of the information system and the logistics. The most important are: the professional (and managerial) training and experience of the decision makers, the motivation of those involved in the act and the decision-making process, the attitude and responsibility towards the content and consequences of decisions, the amount of information available and their actuality, the level of the formal and informal authority of the decision;

- *External factors*, coming from the environment in which the activity takes place, such as: the meaning and rhythm of the branch

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or field development; information and data on the valorization of technological, economic, sociological research; functional and structural, normative, legislative restrictions; the relational framework with other institutions and bodies, from suppliers to customers or direct beneficiaries.

As the managerial act is confused with a relational process between leaders and employees, it means that the decision also appears as a socio-human system with three variables: *the decision-maker, the performers and the environment or the external environment* in which the activity is carried out. The changes in the evolution of the variables and the relations between them influence the whole decisional process, generating a contradictory state of ambiguity. On the one hand, it increases the value of decision-making, its degree of certainty and precision. On the other hand, the complexity of the environment and the homogenization of the professional training of the contractors incite a larger number of variables, complicating the decision making process.

From this perspective, there are some

is the possibility of achieving the ultimate goal, the volume and structure of the data at the disposal of the decision-maker do not, however, allow the evaluation of the chances to achieve them; there are doubts when choosing the appropriate solution); decisions in *ambiguous universe*.

It is obvious that uncertain and risky situations can not be avoided, as a result of the rapid pace of scientific and technological breakthroughs, of political, social and economic circumstances, as well as of the behavior of suppliers and customers. Hence, the current and the most complete information requirement, in order to be able to define clearly and rigorously the problems to be solved and the objectives pursued, as well as to reduce the uncertainties and, consequently, the risks.

The decision is mainly a deliberate act of authority that is binding on organizational structures and subordinates, with the stated aim of achieving common goals (fig.1).

In the terms of the theory of decision, this approach circumscribes all the imperative and




Fig. 1. The decision in the managerial process¹

emblematic decision situations, namely: decisions in *a certain universe* (in which the events that make up the personal network, especially the final one – the object of the decision – have a maximum probability of realization); decisions in *a risky universe* (where part or all of the events that make up the personal network to the final one have a lower probability of realization, some of them even escape control, hence the difficulty of being anticipated); decisions in *the uncertain universe* (although there

conscious actions dedicated to solving the management problems, organized on three levels: *organizational* (data preparation and analysis, identification and elaboration of the alternatives, foundation, adoption and choice of the optimal variant), *informational* (collecting, storing, processing and evaluating valuable data and ideas) and *methodological* (homogeneous activities,

¹ O. Lange, *Decizii optime. Bazele programării*, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1970.



logical procedures, algorithmic, heuristic and logistic operations).

The evoked operations or activities are finalized (materialized) in: *random decisions*, specific to the leadership factors that rely only on their own experience and intuition; *routine decisions* based on the experience gained in previous solving of similar problems; *learning-oriented decisions*, preferred by managers concerned to constantly explore new and innovative techniques that they can use to solve problems, under increasingly demanding conditions; *paradigmatic decisions*, based on realities and unquestionable truths, on *axiomatic* logic and rationality, on analogy and qualitative requirements, with the chances of becoming reference models for others; *ideological, theoretical decisions* based solely on systemic and prospective, rigorous and scientific analysis.

Since some events, phenomena and processes in nature and society trigger decision-making processes and others do not, there is a requirement to classify them into distinct typologies according to predictable criteria, such as:

- *Safe events* (maximum possibility of occurrence and, in the majority of cases, without new decisions);

- *Probable events* that occur with a certain probability that can be estimated;

- *Possible events* – that occur with a certain probability impossible to measure and estimate.

After the possible alternatives have been identified and defined and the optimal one is chosen with the help of the normative theory, we continue to decipher the general and particular laws that underlie the human behavior, in which case the descriptive theory is used.

Even though such an analysis does not allow the design of a viable modeling and decision-making model that encompasses the stages of the decision-making process, however, the methods and techniques used and also the knowledge present an important methodological value.

The decision is defined as the conscious the act of setting out the objectives to be achieved, the directions of action and the modalities of their implementation, as well as the allocated resources, capable of ensuring the economic and financial self-regulation of the organization as a whole and, of course, the level of profitability. The managerial decision is regarded as a socio-human relationship

with two parameters or action poles. One is the forum or the court empowered to make decisions, and the other, the staff of employees hired to put into action the expected measures.

The logical, rational nature of the decision-making process

The decision-making process consists of several components, the most important being: the decision maker, the multitude of the decisional variants, the many decisional criteria; the environment, the multitude of consequences and, last but not least, the goal pursued. Among the rationality requirements of the decision we could list: scientific substantiation, according to the realities within the organization; the authority of the decision-maker, namely his / her ability and the level of specialized knowledge and assimilated skills; clarity and precision in the formulation of the objectives to be achieved and the decision-making problem to be solved; the opportunity or the best time to substantiate and operationalize the optimal action line; maximizing efficiency or achieving a maximum effect with minimum effort.

The decisional rationality is defined mainly by²:

- a) the correct use of the theoretical concepts of the logical structures - the notion (the elementary logical form representing, in the plan of rational knowledge, different classes of objects, each of them characterized by a multitude of attributes that appear as a totality), the proposition (the logical form that uses notions as constitutive parts in order to express a relation between notions or a property related to a notion) and the reasoning (the more complex logical form within which valuable judgments are used to underlie the movement from one judgment to another);

- b) The observation of certain general principles specific to the logic of decision-making. Among the sentence classes, a particular methodological importance in the decision-making process is given to the categorical judgments, which are logical judgments expressing, under only one of its sides, a single relationship between two absolute notions, without conditioning it in any way. The aim is to correctly construct the „architecture” of the sentence and to formulate the admission criteria or, on the contrary, to reject it, the logical shift from

² O. Lange, *Decizii optime. Bazele programării*, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1970.



one sentence to another. There are logical links between these structures, and their relationship aims at creating the premises for accepting or rejecting the respective sentences. More synthetically, they are subordinated to the overall purpose of the decision, to solve the multitude of problems faced by the organization, from the current ones, on which its normal functioning depends, to those of perspective, deriving from the laws of competition and profitability. In these conditions, logical reasoning is divided into three classes (*deductive*, *reductive* and *nuanced*), and the reasoning involves the use of logical operations, such as: definition, classification, deduction, induction and demonstration, all being connected with each other by relational links.

The *deductive* reasoning, formulated by Aristotle, seeks, by using formal logic, from true propositions to deduce similar ones. Although it is a powerful tool of knowledge, this method is not sufficient, the difficulty being that there is no certainty that the sentence from which it starts is well or erroneously formulated. From this perspective, the substantiation and decision-making, based solely on rationality, depend on the lucidity and ability of the decision maker in the process of thinking.

The *reductive* reasoning, based on inferences (the transition from one concept to another, where the latter is deduced from the first one) is based, first of all, on the inductive method, i.e. from single, particular cases to general ones.

The *nuanced* reasoning is based on the logic that replaces the discrete character of bivalent logic with one of continuous nature.

In the real economy, simultaneously with the logical decisions, there are also *infralogical decisional* forms, claiming the research of some specific value categories, such as: *value*, *criteria* and *objectives*, *conditioning*, *concentration*, suffering a complementary and mutual influence with a particular significance in the decision-making process. We further analyze the content and the role of each concept:

A. *The value*, like psychological theories, expresses the "functional relationship between a subject and an object, the latter having a psychic predisposition towards value, which is always updated in the relationship", emphasized the

Romanian philosopher Petre Andrei³. In decision theory, value is an essential informational-decision category, being associated with *utility*. As such, the concept of value is closely related to the possible alternatives for action, which the decision-maker compares to determine the optimal action line.

In strictly decision-making sense, there are several concepts related to value, namely: a_1) *preference*, a_2) *utility* and a_3) *efficiency*.

a_1) *Preference* expresses the ability of empowered or empowered people to choose from a variety of possibilities (variants) the optimal one. For example, from the set of decisional alternatives $D = \{d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n\}$ the manager considers that, from his point of view, the alternative d_2 is better than d_3 , which allows to express mathematically in the following form: $d_2 > d_3$, then „ d_2 is strictly preferred to d_3 ”. For each pair of d_2 and d_3 variants compared in the same way, four situations are possible: the decident asserts that d_2 is better than d_3 , but not vice versa; d_3 is better than d_2 but not vice versa; neither of the alternatives d_2 and d_3 is good and consequently, no one is preferred; d_2 is better than d_3 , d_3 is better than d_2 , depending on certain criteria. In order to remove possible inconveniences, we assume that the preferences of the decision-maker are given by the relation “ $>$ ”, showing two other relations between the pairs of the alternatives that compose the set D , and: $d_2 \geq d_3$, i.e. “ d_2 is poorly preferred to d_3 ” if it is not the case as $d_2 > d_3$ or $d_3 > d_2$. Therefore, the weak preference highlights its absence for a certain alternative, and the indifference indicates the absence of strict preference in both directions. As a rule, the decision-making process involuntarily operates with both categories of value, preference and indifference;

a_2) *Utility* expresses the option in favor of one or another of the decisional alternatives, based on quantitative or qualitative criteria, reality requiring numerical representation of the decision-maker's preferences. Being given the preference relation “ $>$ ” of the set D , this means that its numerical

³ Apud, O. Nicolaescu, *Sistemul decizional al organizației*, Economic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 28.



representation is an algebraic function of the form $u: D \rightarrow R$, and $d_2 \succ d_3$ is valid only if $u(d_2) \succ u(d_3)$. The representation is called *function of utility*, with the help of it being measured the alternatives of the set D on a certain numerical scale; the higher value always indicates the decision of the decision-maker in favor of it. In the event that the utility function is increasing, it means that the numeric representations for the preference relation „ \succ ” are unique. Of course, the level of utility is not observable, but it plays an essential role in constructing the theoretical model of the optimal variant.

The concept of utility, as a strictly analytical convention, has three main meanings, in the sense of Bernoulli's⁴ conception of mathematical hope:

1. *the probable utility*, according to which the decisional alternative will be preferred to ensure a maximum average gain. Demonstrating the difference between the value (V) and utility (u), it approximates the logarithmic relation between the two categories or concepts: $u(V) = \log V$.

2. *the marginal utility*, which gives indications that, once chosen, the optimal alternative changes the satisfaction of the decision-maker expressed through a utility function.

3. *the uniqueness and multi-criteria utility* has a more general character, resulting from the multiplication of the criteria according to which the optimal line of action is chosen, as well as the consequences that it propagates not so immediately, but especially on the medium and long term.

The multi-criteria utility, analyzed by Neumann and Morgenstern, starts from the hypothesis that preference can be quantified or measured, evaluated by means of *axioms*, reflecting the rational behavior of the decision-maker throughout the process.

From a purely mathematical point of view, besides the possible alternative set $D = \{d_a, d_b, \dots, d_i\}$, the decision maker can also analyze probabilistic mixes of other alternatives such as df and dg of the following type:

$d' = [\alpha d_f, (1-\alpha)d_g]$, where $\alpha \in [0,1]$ in which the probability is represented. In this situation, they become credible, that is, they are perfectly valid, the following axioms⁵.

⁴ A. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper and Row Press, New York, 1987.

⁵ A. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, Harper and Row Press, New York, 1987.

Axiom 1.1: If $d_f \succ d_g$, then $d_f \succ d' = [\alpha d_f, (1-\alpha)d_g]$ which $\alpha \in [0,1]$. In the event that $dg \succ d_f$ that and $d' \succ d_f$ for $\alpha \in [0,1]$.

Axiom 1.2: If $d_f \succ d_h \succ d_g$, then $(\exists)d' = [\beta d_f, (1-\beta)d_g]$ such $d' \succ d_f$ for $\alpha \in [0,1]$.

Axiom 1.3: If $d_h \succ d_f \succ d_g$ then $(\exists)d'' = [\alpha d_f, (1-\beta)d_h]$ such $d' \succ d''$.

Axiom 1.4: If the decision maker, having three alternatives d_h, d_f, d_g , supports the relation $d_f \succ d_g$, it also accepts $[\alpha d_f, (1-\alpha)d_h] \succ [\alpha d_g, (1-\alpha)d_h]$. It follows that if the alternative d_f is preferred to d_g , then the combinations of d_f with d_h will be preferred to the combination of d_g with d_h .

Axiom 1.5: If there is $d' = [\alpha d_f, (1-\alpha)d_g]$ then the identity of $[\beta d', (1-\beta)d_g] \equiv [\alpha d_f, (1-\alpha)d_g]$ is obtained, and it can be stated that compound alternatives can be decomposed in simple alternatives, by resorting to probability operations without affecting preferences.

Axiom 1.6: If $d_f \approx d_g$ then exists the equivalence $[\alpha d_f, (1-\alpha)d_h] \equiv [\alpha d_g, (1-\alpha)d_h]$. In synthesis, the axioms specific to preference relations and indifference reflect the rational behavior of the decision maker, but also the truth that utility is a function of real values defined by the D set which has the properties:

(1) Utility is a rising monotone function in relation to preference, according to the relation:

$$d_f \succ d_g \Leftrightarrow u(d_f) \succ u(d_g)$$

(2) When d_h is a probabilistic mixture of alternatives between d_f and d_g , then it comes to the relation: $u(d_h) = \alpha u(d_f) + (1-\alpha)u(d_g)$; the utility of one alternative is equal to the average value of the utilities of the possible results of the alternatives.

When the function u holds properties (1) and (2), when there are two functions of utility u and u' , defined by the set D , then $u'(d_f) = pu(d_f) + q$, where $p > 0$, $(\forall)d_f \in D$, p and q are constant, which means that the utility function is unique to a positive linear transformation.

The function $u(d_f)$ is determined by considering the utilities of two alternatives $u(d_1)$ and $u(d_0)$ where $d_1 \succ d_0$. In case that $u(d_1) = 1$ and $u(d_0) = 0$, we are in one of the situations in which we know the quantitative decision-making consequences and using the linear interpolation method in the interval $[0,1]$, we come to this relation:



The optimal criterion is maximum if:

$$u_{f_g} = \frac{c_{f_g} - c_g^{\min}}{c_g^{\max} - c_g^{\min}}$$

,where u^g is utility and d^f in relation to criterion c_g , and c_g the consequence of the choice d_f by criterion c_g .

In utility estimation, it will be taken into account that the maximum utility is 1, corresponding to the maximum value of the criterion, and the minimum utility is 0, corresponding to the minimum value of the consequence.

The optimal criterion is minimum if:

In this case, the maximum utility with

$$u_{f_g} = \frac{c_g^{\max} - c_{f_g}}{c_g^{\max} - c_g^{\min}}$$

the value 1 corresponds to the minimum value consequence and the minimum utility with the value 0 the maximum value consequence the chosen criterion. Therefore, the reduction of subjectivism calls for the use of specialists to assess the utility of different alternatives to social restrictions influencing the decision-maker's behavior;

a₃) *Efficient decision-making* equivalent in this case is defined as the maximizing of the usefulness of an explicit decision depending on the concrete conditions.

Considering the three elements presented a₁) preference a₂) utility and a₃) efficiency, it can be stated that the *value*, in the decisional sense, is an infralogical form resulting from the estimation by the decision-makers of the preference for an alternative to the other, out of the family or the crowd that are possible. From this statement it follows that the operation with the notion of *value* constitutes, in the decisional practice, a step towards rationalization, the logic of the respective process.

B. *Criteria* (points of view of the decision maker, which isolate aspects of reality for analysis) and *the objectives* (level to be achieved according to strict criteria) considered within the organization, which can be quantitative or qualitative. Each criterion corresponds to several possible values,

called levels, representing as many goals. In relation to the levels, the criteria and the objectives are discrete and continuous, which gives them the property to be divided into sub-criteria and sub-objectives respectively, or, on the contrary, aggregates. For example, the division is done to determine each entity in the organization, and the aggregation or synthesis is done to make a global overview.

Also, the decisional criteria are dependent or independent, having different importance to the relative importance: one of axiological nature (judgment of the decision-maker's value, based on economic, social, political or psychological considerations) and another of an ecart type (the possibility that the levels of a certain criteria vary within close or more distant limits.) As far as it can be easily ascertained, the criteria and objectives are time-dependent, in most cases the time factor modifying their objectives and their relative importance.

C. *The cause-effect relational conditioning*, which is specific to systemic analysis and prospective thinking, whose essence lies in the fact that, in nature and in society, any event, process or phenomenon has a cause, and the same causes produce similar effects. In the conception of J. Stuart Mill⁶, the most important inductive methods, based on the causality principle, are the following:

c₁ – The method of concordance, according to which the phenomenon which always precedes the effect is the presumed cause thereof;

c₂ – The method of differences, according to which, if the disappearance of a previous phenomenon results in the disappearance of the phenomenon then surely the antecedent phenomenon (x) is the cause of the successor one (s);

c₃ – The method of concomitant variations, i.e. whether two phenomena x and y always show the same trend of variation, regardless of the association with other phenomena, it means that there are causal links between them;

c₄ – The method of the remnant, in the sense of the combination of deduction and induction, possibly synthesized as follows: it is assumed the known causal (x → y) and the concrete situation in

⁶ Apud, O. Nicolaescu, *Sistemul decizional al organizației*, Economic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998.



which the series of phenomena (x_1, y_1) are in the antecedent of the couple (x_2, y_2) ; eliminating the effect y_1 , whose cause is x_1 , it is deduced that y_1 is the cause of the y_2 effect;

c_5 – The combined method, of concordance and difference, based on the reasoning: if any y_1 has together with other phenomena as y_1, x and y_2 , x does not appear together with y_1, y_2 , then it can be said that x is the cause of y . Consequently, the meaning of conditionality in the decision-making process is the following: if two sets of entities X and Y are analyzed, then the conditioning between them determines the correspondence between the components x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m and, respectively, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n . In order to preserve its general character, no restrictions are imposed on the two sets and on the correspondence between the component elements x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m and respectively, y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n .

D. Concentration, an infra-red decisional form specific only to group decision-making, which is based on two essential characteristics:

d₁) The spirit of collaboration between the decision-making structures, without which concentration becomes impossible.

d₂) The diversity of opinions, in the absence of which the concentration would be devoid of logical support. Concerning the specific approach, the concentration is: formal (collaboration according to group decision-making methods) and informal (spontaneous, unorganized collaboration deriving from the professional training and the information and documentation).

CONCLUSIONS

Given that there are certain difficulties - especially psychological ones – in the way of adopting and enforcing decisions, it is imperative to strictly observe some fundamental principles, such as: *the principle of definition*, which ensures the logical character of the decision; *the principle of justification*, which enshrines the truth that decisions are being sued for well-founded reasons; *the principle of identity*, requiring careful

verification of the facts and circumstances of the moment; *the principle of accountability*, given that some of the employees try to delay the decision to get as much information as possible and others get precipitated and take the decision before the appropriate time, without the data and information necessary for the thorough and pertinent analysis, sufficient preparation of the prerequisites.

The specialized literature highlights some general principles of decisional logic, the fundamental ones being: the identity of the proposition that designates the decisional problem, in the conditions of unchanged state of nature and decisional criteria, of its duration over time; non-contradiction, which gives the decision-maker the opportunity to rule on the choice or rejection of an alternative; the sufficient reason that, in obtaining the truth of a reasoning, it is not enough to leave the indisputable, axiomatic premises.

The importance of the decision lies in the fact that it is found in all the functions or attributes of the managerial process. Thus, in the field of forecasting, this is reflected in variants of strategy, plans or programs.

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DISCIPLINE AND ITS SUBSEQUENT BENEFITS FOR TEACHING ENGLISH IN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

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Abstract: *Discipline, understood as people's acceptance to abide by certain rules or code of behavior; either out of conviction, or of fear of punishment, seems to have lost the significance it had in the past in a lot of domains, starting from parenting and education and ending who knows where. On the other hand, discipline has always been considered – next to professionalism, honor, loyalty – one of the most important traits of the military environment, maybe a key factor that gives consistency and coherence to military action. Without it, how would one make sure that the decisions made at strategic level are carried out and put into practice all the way down to tactical level? Furthermore, what would lack of discipline mean – be it understood at least as self-discipline, maybe – for any professional working in any field, but all the more so for those working in the military? The article is a plea for the extremely important role that discipline plays in this specific environment, showing subsequent benefits for language learning and the English class management.*

Keywords: *discipline; military environment; adult education; English teaching; mutual respect.*

Motto: „For every person wishing to teach, there are thirty persons not wishing to be taught.”
(anonymous)¹

The idea behind this article was inspired from some discussions with fellow teachers (of foreign languages but not only) related to the differences of approach and teaching techniques that should be taken into consideration when oscillating between undergraduate students (those enrolled in the Bachelor degree programs) and the graduate students (those following the Command Master in "Carol I" National Defense University). Obviously, these differences should be based first and foremost on the previous knowledge students have or do not have regarding the respective subjects to be taught, on the goals and objectives set in the curricula and on the level each type of educational program addresses. However, a key aspect that should be taken into consideration is, in our opinion, that of discipline which graduate and post-graduate students seem to have largely internalized as compared to the lack of rules younger students

¹ <https://eltguide.wordpress.com/tag/discipline-problems/>, accessed 13.05.2017.

had previously been accustomed to in the civilian environment. Discipline has a bad name among young people generally speaking because it is associated with old and strict teachers who teach in an autocratic manner, dealing with their students with an iron hand. Also, discipline is believed to be hampering creativity and freedom of opinion that is the complete opposite of nowadays concepts of self-development.

Given all these assumptions, the aim of this article is to advocate in favor of discipline, bringing arguments related to the specificity of our field of work – the military – and to show, therefore, the aspects that the language teacher/any teacher should be aware of and put to good use to the benefit of everyone involved in the military educational environment. Also, younger readers (students or teachers) could understand from this article that discipline should by no means be associated with a rigid behavior, a stiff attitude or teacher's master-like treatment of students, but rather with a set of mutually agreed on rules, limits and guidelines that must be set from the beginning and obeyed by everybody. All these represent an opinion statement rather based on observation and experience than on facts and figures written by others.

First of all, our intention is to make it very clear that we strongly believe that the military does represent an out of ordinary if not an exceptional environment in which teaching (language teaching

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included) can be approached in a highly professional way. Teaching foreign languages in general and English in particular have specific aspects that cannot be learned at school or in teacher-training seminars outside this environment – and we are not necessarily talking about terminology, operational language, or acronyms. The simple reason standing for this is an evident combination of the following traits, always proven and manifested by the overwhelming majority of the National Defense University (NDU henceforth) students involved in studying English language, respectively: professional conduct, strong motivation, non-simulated interest, reliability, commitment, punctuality, responsibility, professionally-driven servitude and respect. Due to this, English language can be both taught and learned at indisputably high standards of efficiency and proficiency, through a very elaborated and complex process designed to address and meet all students' needs regarding this domain. Also, this completely accessible, not so sophisticated process is meant to literally assure the desired level of satisfaction and that kind of self-confidence given by the nature and multitude of the accumulated knowledge, which can be easily translated into the visible progress most students make in both vocabulary improvement and grammatical accuracy fields, not to mention the most significant one, that of being able to use functional English at all levels of interoperability.

Secondly, this opinion is not just a biased judgment, coming from an English teacher proudly working in a top educational military outlet, but a fundamental one, repeatedly demonstrated by facts and reality, based on long years of experience in this field. Those years – over sixteen in fact – had been preceded by other a few of still working in adult education, but in a civilian university. We may say, therefore that we had the chance to judge the differences between students and environments in what could be defined as a dedicated strive for improvement and a devoted struggle for perfection, forged by an active interaction with all those involved in teaching-learning process and legitimized by a continuous focus on the matter itself.

Our endeavor does not come out of blue since, nowadays, there has been identified an entire spectrum of distinctive reasons that make English such an important language, with an incontestable

role in the military. Definitely, in today's globalized world, knowing any language is a great asset and the more languages one "masters", the better chances of success he/she has in any domain, including the military one. English knowledge, though, and a certain level of proficiency are a real must for any military career trajectory, no matter the specific age, gender, rank, service, branch, civilian or military background, qualifications, active duty length of service, etc. of the military personnel. This can be translated, among others, in a more consistent and profound interest in personal development, a multi-layer professional education and training, a more eloquent written and oral communication ability, an improved level of understanding, a more convincing way of expressing opinions and a superior, dynamic way of interacting, manifesting intentions, and acting accordingly.

On the one hand, from a purely domestic, national perspective, in this line of work, an adequate level of English knowledge seems to be one of those mandatory eligibility criteria for being initially selected and finally assigned to a variety of relevant leading or executive positions – no matter the targeted specific level of military art: strategic, operational or tactical. And by this, we mean a robust and well-defined set of skills in terms of speaking, listening, reading and writing, in accordance with STANAG 6001 provisions and objectives. No matter when and how one manages to acquire these skills, at the end of the day, they are supposed to be materialized and reflected in a standardized English language competence certificate. Obviously, this assumption is made in a direct correlation with a normal military career, built and consolidated in a "by the book", step-by-step manner. Moreover – maybe unjustly so, but still true – anyone's promoting ambitions and the promotion itself can be facilitated or impeded by the above mentioned criterion, since the English knowledge competence level required is jotted down in most job descriptions.

On the other hand, from an international perspective, this is also an inevitable must for all military personnel taking part in missions and operations abroad under North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and/or Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mandates. In addition, that is also the case for those



working in multinational headquarters as national representatives, staff personnel, embedded officers, liaison officers, action officers, planners, analysts, experts, and so on and so forth. As a consequence, it is clear that by actively working in this kind of combined/multinational environment, willy-nilly, beyond the cultural survival situations related or not to somebody's status, all military and civilian personnel are exposed, on a daily basis, to spoken and written English in terms of direct, face-to-face or indirect communication, elaboration of a multitude of specific documents (daily/weekly/monthly/quarterly/biannual assessments, reports, estimations, analyses, a variety of strategic papers and event-driven snapshots, comparing matrices, supportive notes and comments for various presentations briefings and speeches, different memoranda and agreements, subordinates' appraisals, etc.), development and execution of military orders, conceptions, plans and their annexes and appendixes, etc.

Obviously, once again, the aim of the present paper is not necessarily to emphasize the importance of the English language and to show up its omnipresence, necessity, role and impact for our modern society, in an era of globalization and global communication, but we cannot ignore this successful, unavoidable story. Therefore, first of all, we have to admit that English has been one of the two official languages of the NATO/OTAN for so many decades. Secondly, nowadays, English really looks like a trend with a global dimension just because it is an internationally expanded, recognized and agreed language, used not only in military, but also in a completely generous spectrum of domains and their subsequent specific activities. Moreover, because we have just brought into discussion the military, one of the four state's instruments of power, for the sake of inclusion and balance, also, we do have to insist on the importance and relevance of the English language for the three others - diplomatic, information, and economic ones. Furthermore, we have to admit this incontestable reality, that all around the world, English is encountered and used in so many other different realms and/or branches of activity as media, tourism, education, culture, science, movie industry, entertainment, IT products and the list could be infinitely continued because it really looks like an endless one. The last, but not the least, on

the list, is Internet and the social media, the latest and the greatest components of our modern and dynamic way of living, so dependable on high and smart technology.

Consequently, beyond being a valuable vector and vehicle of spoken and written communication, of mutual understanding, English has irreversibly become part of our life, with a self-explanatory role. Apparently, at least in military, beyond the bigger and bigger need and eagerness for interoperability and operational common language both in training/exercises and missions/operations, anybody needs to be familiar with a unique, specialized military vocabulary. This continuously updated and upgraded specialized vocabulary, which can sound like an alien language or encrypted code for an outsider who is not so accustomed with or not regularly exposed to military language style and originality, has a very clear role. That is avoiding errors, misunderstandings and misinterpretations, by implementing standard expressions, brevity and code words for the sake of simplifying an already complicated and hard to digest environment for any civilian.

On the other hand, this cannot be developed instantly, and undoubtedly its basic foundation is assured by a more common, not so specialized spoken and written day-by-day language. And since our native language is definitely not English and since there are people who have not studied English in school, we suppose that there is no question mark about the necessity and the benefit of being enrolled in some English classes/courses. Only this sort of organized and institutionalized foreign languages teaching-learning framework can assure a dynamic interaction with other students and of course with its professional core element – the English teacher – for a real and visible enhancement of English proficiency. In conjunction with this, we have to highlight that only in this educational formula can a student spend his/her time, in some adequate conditions and in some of the best circumstances of practicing and improving all the skills: speaking, listening, reading and writing. For being able to do that, beyond other mandatory ingredients of a successful "recipe" – just as it happens with all the other aspects of life to some extent – what is needed is a degree of imposed discipline and self-discipline.

Thus after a prolonged introduction, preparing



and advocating the narrative and rational of this paper, we are coming back to discipline, trying to make the case for it. In accordance with our perception, as a fundament of this endeavor, we have to put forth a sort of primary and extremely inspired way of defining and depicting the notion of discipline and its relevance for any teaching-learning mechanisms, as it was portrayed by Jim Rohn, an American entrepreneur, author, and motivational speaker: "*Discipline is the bridge between goals and accomplishments.*"² Additionally, we also can use other relevant cite of Abraham Joshua Heschel, one of the leading Jewish theologians and philosophers of the 20th century, "*Self-respect is the fruit of discipline.*"³ Going further, by paraphrasing the late and put it on the other way around, we can extend the discussion to respect itself and its alignment with discipline and strongly affirm that by respecting the others – in this case fellow students and teachers – you just prove and practice your self-discipline.

Actually, when it comes to military, without discipline at all, we can just imagine a catastrophic and grotesque picture of a so-called equivalent of the military system and, generally speaking, of the armed forces which do represent the core of values and traditions, and the quintessence of the existence of the nation itself. Without the sense of belonging to a well-defined and organized structural entity, self-described and identified by its own uniform and coat of arms, without obeying rules in a voluntary way, without sensing a high degree of responsibility, without actively being part of a clear chain of command, without self-imposing control, without practicing and respecting the power of authority, without these multitude of defining and vital pillars of the armed forces, the military as we know it today would be completely different. Without all these, we could simply imagine a bunch of heavily armed individuals, a pack of mercenaries, with a primitive way of thinking and acting, with mercantile interests, so eager to use their different types of weapons just for satisfying their own survival needs, simply driven by some pure basic instincts. And even so, this pack of so-

called fighters would certainly be involved in a myriad of violent acts of any type, performed in a chaotic way, out of different, confusing, even totally opposed, incoherent and inconsistent reasons, starting from getting and putting bread on table for their families, and ending with imposing whatever type of ideology, pledging allegiance to whomever "butcher"-style leader and killing in the name of their absurd cause just for the sake of doing that. Not to mention that even in those extreme cases a certain type of (primitive) discipline would still exist!

By using this apocalyptic image, we have just tried to say in other words that discipline is an organic part of the military, is a sort of "DNA" of military organization and has been part of its tradition, and why not even of its evolution, perpetual existence and survival. In the same way, we can assume that that beyond cohesion, morale and motivation, discipline itself does represent the real glue of a successful military organization. Definitely, it resonates and works hand in hand with playing by the rules, with esprit de corps, mutual respect, common sense, maturity, seriousness. In the specific case of military education, this also reflects an increased degree of consciousness regarding the moral boundaries and behavioral limits of any military and/or civilian personnel involved in English teaching-learning programs under NDU umbrella.

As a consequence, the reasoning behind our connection between the good results obtained by our students language-wise and the discipline they are accustomed to is quite apparent, since we do perceive discipline and the above mentioned "accompanying" package as a game changer and real multiplier of the English language teaching-learning techniques. We could even say that there is a unanimously accepted evidence in this regard, based on its instrumental role in smoothing, facilitating and improving the way of normal communication and civilized interaction between all the "actors" involved, in creating equilibrium and maintaining the balance during the teaching-learning sessions. In this context, we are referring to an appropriate, non-disturbing conduct which, down the road, is equivalent with exploiting to the maximum the time allocated to the teaching-learning process and, also, in sticking to the plan and classroom agenda for fully extended benefits.

² https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/jimrohn_109882.html, accessed 12.05.2017.

³ <http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/49576-self-respect-is-the-root-of-discipline-the-sense-of-dignity>, accessed 12.05.2017.



And by gaining this valuable efficiency, by smartly saving and exploiting this precious time for their collective and individual benefit, by avoiding any useless waste of time and energy due to some disturbing reasons or factors during classes, at the end of the course, all the students will be more than happy with the final outcome and overall efficiency of the educational process.

In these circumstances, we do believe in the vital role of discipline in assuring a decent, a more than acceptable level of coherence, consistence and continuity of the English classes. What would they be in the presence of various kinds of disturbance, annoying interruptions or noisy interference caused by an acute lack of discipline and self-discipline, and implicitly of mutual respect and self-respect? Obviously, the desired result is a more articulated and productive classroom session, with an increased level of participation, involvement and efficiency, without any kind of "smart" remarks, addressed to the teacher or other colleagues. Here we can keep in mind any series of offensive words directly addressed to someone or generally concerning some sensitive issues like gender, race, religion, sexuality, disabilities or reduced abilities to do something. On the other hand, this less than less than desirable atmosphere could be generated and manifested by some less motivated or totally "bored" students, openly displaying a lack of interest and appeal to what is going on in the classroom or over-reacting by showing an inappropriate, problematic, or even conflictual conduct. Moreover, the image can be completed by an annoying way of denying the obvious, of making diminishing or uncomfortable remarks over the content or timing of activities, over the knowledge and English proficiency of his/her colleagues, of the quality of support materials, etc.

Generally speaking, in these circumstances, the "smart guy" is a person revealing an arrogant, bossy, cocky attitude over his/her colleagues, peer students, and counterparts of discussion, attitude that could escalate anytime from some bravado irritating remarks to purely verbal aggression. Additionally, this kind of person likes to portray himself/herself as an "I-know-everything-officer", not interested at all in anything going on around him/her, as having absolutely no relevance, at least comparing with his/her unique, precious, peerless personal experience and expertise. One such

student per group and is still detrimental both for the students and for quality of the teaching-learning process itself.

Altogether, this worst-case scenario, which no school prepares you for as a teacher, must be managed in a conciliatory manner by who else than the teacher himself/herself. Thus, instead of being focused on the lesson agenda, on the quality of the knowledge conveyed to and absorbed by the students, the teacher has to manage the overall disturbance and to mitigate the possible escalating conflictual situation. So, for avoiding the position of master of disaster, the teacher does have to put himself/herself in the shoes of an ad-hoc referee, to be an impartial mediator with an unbiased, non-partisan, conciliatory approach, in order to restore and maintain order and decency in classroom. Why? Because everything could easily get out of control and those unwanted deviant symptoms could be contagious and spread out with a tsunami speed and effect.

So, the teacher will need a substantial effort to approach in a diplomatic and conciliatory way both parts, to make it clear that the classroom is not a fighting arena and cannot and should not be transformed in friend or foe battleground or engagement-type situation. It is after all vital to de-escalate the entire situation, to calm down the "perpetrator", to smoothly and peacefully reintegrate him/her. By this, nobody would be labeled as "the most wanted" and there would no room for any exclusion or isolation of the respective person, but just the premises that finally everybody is on the same page.

It must be clear, though, that only discipline itself would not solve the case by default. For being able to manage this small "turmoil" and to play this settling and managing role, beyond his/her non-disputed abilities, consolidated and long-practiced teaching techniques and methods, the teacher has to show and make it clear, from the beginning, that he/she is in charge. Moreover, it is essential to delineate a minimum set of rules and to emphasize that the only constructive challenges, intellectual and educational in nature, are accepted in the class and not the confrontational ones. On a case by case basis, any necessary verbal correction is more than welcome for getting everybody back on track, in case of any tendencies or attempts to disturb, interfere, and spoil the classes in any way.



So, besides identifying the causes, varying tasks, changing the approach, re-setting priorities and increasing motivation⁴ – first of all by reminding everyone why they are there – we must insist on the importance of setting these rules and sticking to them. Besides being a facilitator of knowledge and a mentor, a teacher still has to be a teacher, that is, a figure of authority.

This does not at all mean being rigid or bossy, the genuine old-school "tyrant" showing no flexibility and openness, but on the contrary. After all, students' respect does not come as a prerequisite from one's position in the classroom, respect has to be gained. By emotional intelligence and professional knowledge, by simultaneously being friendly and maintaining a seeable distance, by being a likeable presence in terms of inspiring both admiration and respect, and concurrently demonstrating diplomacy and patience, any teacher can be successful in something that may look sometime like an impossible mission. By this set of entwined human and professional traits, the English teacher will always be able to put the entire process back on track, and to maintain the focus on teaching-learning purposes and objectives, following the assumed planning and timeline.

Instead of conclusions, we can overtly appreciate that discipline is a really mandatory, even essential, factor on the battlefield, but also in English classes and courses, with a direct impact upon their efficiency, with some clear, direct and unquestionable effects on their overall quality and effectiveness. Just by promoting and assuring a climate of normality and decency, that combination of both mental and intellectual comfort, that sort

of motivating and appealing atmosphere, easily enjoyed and digested by everyone, could English teachers and their students meet their goals, reach the desired level of competency, fulfill the planned objectives and specific curricula. Making a long story short, based on what we portrayed above as possible scenarios generated by totally unconstructive and negative attitudes and behaviors, it is obvious that discipline is instrumental for a healthy, productive, positive, comfortable and normal teaching-learning environment.

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DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES: REGIONAL EVOLUTION TRENDS OF DEFENSE BUDGETS

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Abstract: *The effects of the recent economic crisis have been felt in several fields, including also the military sector. In most European countries, the defense budget has been used to reduce deficits, through the dramatic spending cuts. Thus, despite the efforts to make the armies more efficient, many European states have postponed or even canceled important programs of endowment and modernization. This was happening at a time when the economic crisis, generating poverty and social insecurity, would pave the way for other crises and new types of threats. In this context, the trends in the distribution of defense budgets can help us to observe the priorities of the security policies and to understand the direction of the defense strategies.*

Keywords: *economic crisis; defense expenditures; military endowment.*

The 2007 financial crisis has affected the defense budgets, even for the most important military and economic powers in the world, and it had a serious impact on changing the medium- and long-term defense policies. According to some statistics published by SIPRI¹ and the World Bank, the defense spending grew between 2005 and 2011 in all regions of the world (US, Saudi Arabia, China, etc.), excepting Europe. At a global level, most governments have considered that spending for the national security should be a priority. In Europe, the effects of the economic crisis have been felt quite profoundly in the defense sector. Here, the military investments have been cut in order to reduce the public deficit. The strategic position on defense spending at the European level was clearly different from that in the US or other areas. In order to decrease the excessive debts, the European countries have reduced their defense funds, being forced to revise the conditions for the already approved acquisitions programs, to delay the execution of new programs, but also to cancel some of those and to stimulate the mutual production between several countries. In 2008-

2009, at the moment of maximum intensity of the economic crisis, the NATO allies, such as the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Turkey or France maintained a high level of the defense spending. Greece has spent a lot for military equipment, 3% of GDP between 2008 and 2009, but it currently faces major debt issues, with the expenditure falling considerably. Indeed, the military purchases have been reduced as a result of the economic crisis, but most countries still have a high level of spending, similar or higher than ten years ago.

In the post-crisis period, 2012-2015, while European states spent less on defense, in Arab States and Russia, the military spending has reached a higher level. The exception in Europe is Poland, which allocated 2.2% for defense in 2015, compared to 1.9% in 2014. Romania is making efforts to maintain the level of trust among the military alliances and to keep its commitments, by increasing the military expenditures to 1.4% of GDP in 2014 and 2015, and achieving the goal of 2% in 2017. These increases, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, have been influenced by the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Budgetary changes have been positive in Europe between 2015 and 2016. Investment in equipment has begun to grow, but the cooperation between states remained one of the basic defense tools for developing and upgrading the military equipment.

The distribution of the defense budget represents another important indicator for assessing

¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, site accessed la 13.02.2017, <https://www.sipri.org>

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the trends in regards with defense policies. In order to align the armies to the NATO standards and to adapt their mechanisms of response to the current types of threats, the states should focus on investment in military equipment and technology but also on research and development. In order to better understand the direction of the defense strategies in the East and Central Europe states and to anticipate their weaknesses, we made a brief comparative analysis between Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland. This comparison and the analysis of the capabilities' development programs are relevant because the economic and geopolitical conditions of the four states are similar, all of them being NATO members and in Russia's area of interest. We tried to observe, in the context of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the tendencies of these four states to evolve in terms of defense capabilities and the efforts they made in order to maintain their role of serious partners within NATO.

Prior to the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, Bulgaria allocated 2.3% of GDP for defense in 2007, while Romania allocated 1.4% of GDP, Poland - 1.8% and Hungary - 1.2% of GDP². Between 2008 and 2011, the defense budgets have been cut, with the exception of Poland, whose budget has remained at the same level. In the post-crisis period, 2012-2016, the defense budgets have been maintained at a constant level with slight

fallen to 1.3% in 2015 and 1.4% in 2016. The percentage of Romania's GDP allocated to defense has increased from 1.2 % in 2012 to 1.4% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015 and 2016 and 2%. 2017.

The investments in defense equipment are a relevant unit of measure allowing us to analyze the efforts that states are making in order to cope with the current threats and to fulfill their military commitments within alliances. Also, the spending on research and development in the military field demonstrates the interest and the ability of the state to evolve and develop itself effectively from a military point of view.

In 2001 **Romania** allocated 1.95% of GDP for defense, being closer to the target of 2% of GDP than most of other NATO member states at that time. This fact allowed us at that moment to have positive and very ambitious perspectives for our country. Joining NATO in 2004, Romania's defense budget has steadily increased but this trend suddenly stopped in 2008. The significant budget cuts have affected the procurement plans and the existing programs. Due to second-hand acquisition programs, a big part of Romania's equipment will not be useful on long term, or it will require some very high costs for maintenance. At the same time, as it can be seen in the table below, the R&D spending comprised in the 'Other' category remains at a very low level, compared to other regional actors such as Poland.

Table 1. The evolution of the defense budgets, as a percentage of GDP, in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland, 2009-2016³

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Romania	1,3%	1,2%	1,3%	1,2%	1,3%	1,4%	1,5%	1,5%
Bulgaria	1,8%	1,7%	1,3%	1,4%	1,5%	1,3%	1,3%	1,4%
Hungary	1,1%	1,0%	1,1%	1,0%	1,0%	0,9%	0,9%	1,0%
Poland	1,7%	1,8%	1,7%	1,7%	1,7%	1,9%	2,2%	2,0%

trends of growing.

Poland has honored its NATO commitment to allocate 2% of GDP to military spending, reaching this objective since 2014. On the opposite side, Hungary did not exceed 1% of GDP for defense spending. Bulgaria's defense budget has been constant, but from 1.5% of GDP in 2013 it has

The biggest part of the defense budget is allocated to the military personnel. The transition from the compulsory military service to professional armed forces has definitely affected the budget allocation, a large part of the funds being allocated to pensions and to support an additional reserve force. Starting 2013, the personnel costs have started to decrease, from 84% in 2012 to 64% in 2016. At the same time, the expenditures on

² World Bank, <http://www.worldbank.org/>

³ NATO, www.nato.int



Table 2. Distribution of defense expenditures (in %) by category in Romania

Category	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Personnel	69,1	79,8	79,1	79,1	84,0	79,0	71,2	66,4	64,3
Equipment	16,7	8,7	8,8	7,6	4,1	10,7	15,8	14,6	20,4
Infrastructure	1,1	1,4	1,8	1,5	1,2	1,2	1,1	1,5	2,8
Other	13,1	10,1	10,3	11,8	10,7	9,1	12,0	17,5	12,5

equipment have increased considerably, from 4% in 2012 to 20% in 2016. The lowest amounts are directed to the infrastructure, but even in this sector there was an increase of almost 50% in 2016. The research and development category is not treated separately in NATO analyzes, the expenditures in this area being comprised in the „Other” category, along with maintenance costs. In this sector, the spending represents an average of 11% of the total funds and there is no noticeable increase in these values. The main tendency we can observe in the case of Romania is the major discrepancy between the personnel costs and the equipment expenditures. Although our country is making visible efforts to distribute more funds for equipment acquisition, the difference between the two categories of

in equipment are not considerable. From 2011 to 2015, an average of 3.7 percent from total defense budget was allocated to the equipment. Since 2016, this amount has started to grow, reaching 12.55%. However, the percentage allocated to the research and maintenance category did not fall below 20%, remaining fairly constant over the last nine years.

At the end of 2008, **Hungary** was unable to pay its debts and borrowed European funds, but the government has imposed however severe austerity measures in order to reduce the budget deficit (from 9% of GDP in 2006, it has reached 3.3% in 2008, falling below 3% in 2013)⁴. The drastic budget cuts have affected the army by reducing the defense funds and putting on hold the procurement programs. By comparing Hungary’s annual defense

Table 3. Distribution of defense expenditures (in %) by category in Bulgaria

Category	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Personnel	44,9	59,2	64,3	67,4	64,7	65,4	72,8	71,8	64,3
Equipment	21,4	14,2	15,4	6,3	3,7	4,5	1,0	3,2	12,6
Infrastructure	4,3	6,1	2,4	1,5	0,8	0,5	0,6	1,7	0,6
Other	29,3	20,5	17,9	24,8	30,8	29,6	25,5	23,2	22,6

expenditures is more than double.

Like most Eastern European countries, **Bulgaria** has also encountered difficulties in

budgets with those of similar regional actors, we noticed that our neighbors have experienced real difficulties in fulfilling NATO obligations, and

Table 4. Distribution of defense expenditures (in %) by category in Hungary

Category	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Personnel	48,1	50,4	56,4	50,6	47,7	49,0	49,8	54,4	50,2
Equipment	14,8	12,7	12,1	12,3	5,8	11,1	7,8	10,9	13,0
Infrastructure	2,6	3,9	2,1	1,3	2,1	2,3	1,1	0,9	2,3
Other	34,6	33,0	29,5	35,8	44,4	37,6	41,4	33,9	34,5

meeting the endowment objectives in the context of the economic crisis. As it could be seen in the budget allocations chart, the spending for equipment has only begun to significantly increase in 2016.

On average, about 70% of Bulgaria’s total defense budget is directed to personnel costs. In the recent years, less than 1% has been allocated to the infrastructure. Unlike Romania, the investments

Hungary is one of the countries that have severely reduced the budgets, failing in exceeding 1% of GDP for defense over the last four years. With regards to the distribution of defense spending, we can observe the same tendency as in Romania and Bulgaria, with the personnel category that absorbs

⁴ Central Intelligence Agency Country Fatbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html>



the biggest part of the funds. Unlike the other two states, the budget allocated to other expenditures (research and maintenance) is higher than the one allocated to the equipment.

The level of investment in defense is very low, and the maintenance costs are definitely a priority. The Prime Minister Viktor Orbán told the press at the end of 2015 that taking into consideration the crisis in Ukraine and the migration, the government's goal is to be able to reach the 2% of GDP for defense in 2026⁵. In 2016, the defense budget increased by 20%.

Poland is considered to have one of the most robust economic powers in Eastern Europe, with considerable performance in terms of GDP and economic growth. Regarding the defense budget, Poland also faced some financial cuts, but the percentage of GDP allocated did not fall below 1.7%, reaching 1.9% in 2014 and 2.2% in 2015. Poland adhered to NATO in 1999 and its strong emphasis on the territorial defense represents a prominent indicator of its engagement within the alliance. Regarding its defense doctrine, Poland is trying to maintain a strong territorial position in order to counter Russia's regional influence but it also seeks to keep its assertive role in NATO missions outside the country, in particular by increasing its capabilities of interoperability.

sector, followed by Romania. Hungary is making the lowest effort to strengthen its position as a guarantor of security in the area. Poland's situation can be explained by a better economic situation, but also by the necessity of strengthening the eastern flank of NATO under Russia's threat. Romania, although adhering to NATO later than Poland and Hungary and its economic situation experiencing not such significant improvements, has made great efforts to move closer to the 2% target and to continue to be a credible partner within the Alliance in the new geopolitical context. All these four states have been affected by the economic crisis and their budgets, including those for defense, have been diminished. Taking into consideration this background and the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the security and defense strategies have been reviewed and the regional actors have been forced to make efforts to maintain their NATO's commitments. One of these efforts was the objective of improving their capabilities in order to ensure an optimal interoperability.

Although we can observe a certain variance, the four analyzed states are trying to reform and make their armies more effective, cutting significantly the personnel. However, the personnel costs remain extremely high. The case of Poland is a notable exception, this country making one of the highest investments in equipment. However, even Hungary

Table 5. Distribution of defense expenditures (in %) by category in Poland

Category	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Personnel	63,2	61,1	56,8	57,8	57,3	57,7	51,4	43,4	46,8
Equipment	13,9	15,9	18,1	16,1	15,2	13,9	18,8	31,1	25,8
Infrastructure	4,7	5,0	4,0	4,8	4,8	5,6	5,5	5,1	5,2
Other	18,2	18,1	21,1	21,3	22,7	22,8	24,2	20,4	22,2

As we can see in the table below, the distribution of defense expenditures is another distinct feature of Poland. A consistent part of the funds are directed to personnel in this case too. But, unlike the other three states, the percentage of personnel spending is less than 50% of the total spending. We can see a balance between the funds for equipment and the ones for maintenance and research.

According to the analyzed data, Poland allocates the biggest amount of found to the defense

doesn't allocate many funds to the military sector, the discrepancy between personnel and equipment is not so extensive.

In Romania and Bulgaria, the situation is different, the personnel costs being very high. This fact is due to the profound process of reforming the armed forces. Regarding the equipment, a lot of funds are allocated to maintenance operations, the research and development sector being not so well developed. Although Romania is situated on the second position in terms of funds allocated to defense expenditures, our country records the greatest difference between personnel and

⁵ *Budapest Business Journal*, articol accesed 29.03.2017, http://bbj.hu/politics/orban-hungary-to-increase-defense-budget-to-protect-region_107512



equipment costs, with an average of 75% of the budget directed to personnel and 25% to the equipment. Taking into consideration the analyzed countries, Poland has the highest rates of investment in equipment procurement and R & D. This indicates also an ambition in terms of developing new capabilities, but also the existence of an internal defense industrial base. So far, in Eastern Europe, very few industries have been able to compete against the already existing defense producers in the markets. Again, Poland has made the most visible progress by privatizing several state-owned companies. In Romania and Bulgaria, this process stagnates because of the state-owned companies, but also due to high production costs and uncompetitive equipment. Given the fact that Romania has focused its efforts over the past years on second-hand equipment purchases, the maintenance and repairs costs will continue to represent a high percentage of the total defense budget. The ineffective policies of endowment will negatively impact the modernization process and the investment in new technology and capabilities.

The development strategies for the national defense industries need to take into account the new probable threats (hybrid, asymmetric, cybernetics). During the last NATO Summits from 2008 to 2016, the main topics on the governments' agenda were: cyber security, energy security, the tensions between Russia and NATO, Middle East conflicts, anti-missile defense system, ISIS, the Ukraine crisis, the crisis of migrants, or the presence of allied military troops in the countries of Eastern Europe. In order to achieve the optimal level of interoperability, the NATO member states, which are already experiencing transformation and modernization processes, must take into consideration these new priorities and areas of interest. In this context, the military expenditures are not the only relevant indicator and it would be wrong to assume that

smaller budgets hinder future developments in the defense sector. We consider that the ability of states to find current and modern mechanisms of response and to develop niche capabilities is very important nowadays. For example, Romania tried to expand its intelligence capabilities by developing several special units for intelligence gathering and information analysis. Central and Eastern European state still need an effective military development and they have to identify the capabilities to be adapted to NATO and EU requirements; the states also need to review their procurement plans and to identify potential strategic partnerships (related to the defense industry). The effective cuts of personnel and maintenance costs, as well as a re-prioritization of the investment areas are other two current necessities that we have concluded from our analysis.

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THE ROLE OF INTERETHNIC COMMUNICATION IN THE INTERNAL STABILITY OF STATES AND THE AVOIDANCE OF EXTERNAL THREATS. A CASE STUDY ON THE SAXONS OF VALEA VIILOR (WURMLOCH) – SIBIU COUNTY

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Abstract: *In a context where mastering intercultural communication strategies and competences is a sine qua non of a diplomacy adapted to the current dynamic security environment, the internal stability of states plays a key role in defining and strengthening foreign policies. Most of the time, the cultural conflicts between the majority and the minority populations that co-exist in a country weaken not only the coherence of that country's domestic policies, but also its security, which, internationally, results in a lack of credibility of the respective state. Thus, by analyzing how communication takes place within the Saxon community of Valea Viilor, with a focus on its traditions, this article sets out to emphasize that a first step towards a coherent foreign policy is the knowledge and acceptance of the ethnic minority's culture by the majority population and permanent dialogue.*

Keywords: *security; interethnic communication; internal stability; Saxons; foreign policy.*

In recent years, both the German-language newspapers published in Romania: *Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung, Banater Zeitung, Karpatenrundschau*, and the TV programs dedicated to the German minority, namely *Akzente* on TVR1¹, have increasingly spoken about the rich and fascinating culture of the Transylvanian Saxons. A concrete example in this respect is the *Haferland Week*, which has always been organized for five years by Michael Schmidt Foundation as a festival meant to promote the values of the Saxon community of Transylvania: The "*Haferland Week*" not only wants to attract Transylvanian Saxons to come to their homeland every year, but also the tourists who wish to discover the region and hear the story of a community which left an

unforgettable mark on this land. It is one of the largest festivals dedicated to the cultural heritage of the Transylvanian Saxons."²

In this context, the question arises more and more often as to how the German minority of Transylvania has managed to survive 850 years, since the earliest written evidence of their existence on the Romanian territory as a linguistic enclave³: "The Transylvanian Saxons founded their first settlements in the mid-twelfth century [...]"⁴. Considering that this year we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Friendship Treaty between Romania and Germany, the existence of the German minority within the Romanian borders is a strong argument of the close cooperation between Romania and the Federal Republic of Germany in recognized domains: "[...] since its signature on 21st April 1992, our bilateral relations have known a very dynamic evolution in all the domains, thanks to numerous private and state initiatives, in economy,

¹ The Department for Interethnic Relationship (DIR) within the Romanian Government is a structure at the central level of public administration, through which interethnic dialogue is promoted. At the same time, DIR maintains permanent communication with the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, which supervises the publications mentioned in the above mentioned TV program, as part of the active support provided to the presence of the German minority in the public life of Romania.

² <http://www.haferland.ro/saptamana-haferland/> (Consulted on the 8th of May 2017).

³ It should be mentioned that the German spoken by the Saxons of Transylvania, known as Siebenbürgerisches Deutsch, is different from the Standard German, known as Deutsches Deutsch.

⁴ George Guțu, *Abriß der Geschichte der rumäniendeutschen Literatur*, Tipografia Universității din București, București, 1986, p. 2 (the author's own translation from German language).

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culture, education, science, in all the social spheres, with a central role of the German minority as a bridge between Germany and Romania.”⁵

Thus, the close knowledge and acceptance of the culture of a minority by the majority population is not only the expression of fostering interethnic dialogue as part of intercultural communication, but also a good opportunity to assert a strong domestic policy based on the respect of democratic values, which gives the state stability and security. Internationally, the internal stability confers credibility and facilitates the achievement of the foreign policy, making the respective state a trustworthy partner for the other states. Actually, according to *Government Decision no. 111/2005 on the establishment and functioning of the Department for Interethnic Relations*, the main goal of the department is to develop and implement strategies and policies intended to support the ethnic minorities of Romania: “[...] (it) elaborates and submits strategies and policies for preserving, promoting and developing the ethnic identity of those individuals belonging to national minorities [...]”⁶. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the interethnic dialogue developed at internal level totally reduces the chances of occurrence of ethnic nationalism. As a European Union member state, Romania aligns itself with the states whose scientific and political discourse reflects a Western vision and has to fight more than ever against Euroscepticism, demonstrating its internal stability by the respect of democratic values and the culture of ethnic minorities: “We spoke earlier [...] about the irreducible Manichaeism that both civic liberals and ethnic conservatives have fallen prey to. [...] Elie Kedourie protests against ethnic nationalism, supposedly a privilege of the non-Western world [...]”⁷.

The interethnic dialogue developed domestically between the majority population and the ethnic minority, first manifested by the knowledge of the minority’s culture, then by

communication, is the main “weapon” to fight external rivals whose aim is to destabilize the state and weaken its security: internal stability, coherent internal policies and strong democratic values annihilate external threats. In order to have a strong domestic policy concerning ethnic minorities, the first important thing is to study and know how communication takes place within the respective ethnic community, that is, the most significant traditions and customs or, in other words, cultural knowledge. It is not only the study of the language, of the purely linguistic dimension of an ethnic minority that decodes communication, but also the attention given to the cultural dimension of that minority: traditions, customs, monuments, institutions.

It should be stressed that communication within the Saxon community of Transylvania, in this particular case the Saxons of Valea Viilor, is closely linked to the aspects of daily life and, especially, to those traditions and customs that have been passed from one generation to another and scrupulously respected. In order to understand the culture of the Saxons of Valea Viilor and, implicitly, the culture of Transylvanian Saxons, it is essential to study some of their most characteristic traditions and customs, their representative monuments and institutions which allow capturing communication in daily-life circumstances.

Between orality and scriptuality, communication within the Saxon community of Valea Viilor occurs between emitters and receivers who share the awareness of their solid moral values and ancient customs, reflected in the survival strategies they have developed over the centuries. The following paragraphs seek to emphasize, starting from Wolfgang Knappe’s research, the most significant aspects of the daily life of the Saxons of Valea Viilor, thus perceiving the interdependence between communication and customs. On the other hand, the intercultural spirit developed by the Saxons can be seen in the friendship relations they have established with the Szeklers, another minority of Romania. The cooperation between the Saxons and the Romanian majority is very good. This is proved by the excellent integration of the Saxons even in the towns and villages inhabited mostly by Romanians; most often, cultural conflicts have opposed the Hungarian minority and the Romanian majority precisely because both sides lack the

⁵ http://www.bukarest.diplo.de/Vertretung/bukarest/ro/seiten/00-Startseite/seite_25Jahre_freundschaftsvertrag2017.html (Consulted on the 9th of May 2017).

⁶ *Hotărârea de Guvern nr. 111/ 2005 privind organizarea și funcționarea Departamentului pentru Relații Interetnice*, Art. 2 (1) b.

⁷ Bogdan Ștefănescu, *Patrii din cuvinte. O tropologie a discursurilor identității naționale*, București, Editura Universității din București, 2015, p. 14.



control of intercultural dialogue and the knowledge of the other's culture and daily habits.

The description of several elements of the Saxon folk costume of Valea Viilor is the object of vast research conducted by Knappe and reflects the mentality of the local community. The traditional costume works as a cultural label and a self-image of the Saxons. Speaking about the history of the Saxon sheepskin coat, the man's in particular, the author emphasizes the Saxons' pragmatism and inventive spirit: after long consultations and through effective communication and understanding, they concluded that in order to obtain a woman's sheepskin coat it would be financially profitable to simply transform the man's coat; thus, they modified "[...] the width of the coat piece by piece".⁸

The fortified church as the *axis mundi* of the Transylvanian Saxon community, analyzed in detail by Knappe, is a leitmotiv of the daily life. For the Saxons of Valea Viilor, this is not only a religious symbol but also a historically meaningful place, owing to its strategic position and its role of defense against the Turkish threats. Both the central position of the fortified church and the scrupulous attention with which the Saxons of Valea Viilor occupy the right place in the church as prescribed by the ancient rules demonstrate their respect for the church service and the existence of a very well consolidated oral communication within the community, which continues a centuries-old religious scripturality: "... (people) entered the church according to ancient traditions: first the children, then the young girls wearing headscarves, followed by the young women [...]. The men were the last to enter – as prescribed by the ancient order – full of dignity [...]"⁹. The fortified church plays a double role: it is both a religious and a cultural institution. The sheepskin coat worn by men at church and the priest's garment emphasize the Saxons' belonging to a community, to a "regional awareness"¹⁰ made up of ancient rules. The strong point of the fortified church would be the fact that it is perceived as "the most visible symbol of the

Saxons' existence in Transylvania"¹¹. Speaking about the survival of the fortified church over the centuries, Roth states that the Evangelical Churches of Transylvania constitute a genuine cultural heritage.

The father of the neighbourhood – another tradition of the Saxon community of Valea Viilor – best reflects the importance of internal communication within a minority population, in this case the Transylvanian Saxons. It is at this level that the Saxons' social organization is best perceived. The father of the neighbourhood has clearly defined tasks in the community he manages and he uses his communication skills in mobilizing the Saxons to fulfill their civic duties: "Within one or two years, the community elects its representative, the father of the neighbourhood. He is helped by eight advisors, he praises but he also criticizes, [...] he is the person everybody refers to for questions and urgent situations"¹². He also sees to it that all the members of the community maintains cleanliness both inside and outside their property. Taxes also fell within his remit.

So far, emphasis has been laid on the way the Saxons of Valea Viilor communicate within their community, in close relation with ancient customs and daily aspects, but also with significant monuments. However, we should point out that the Saxons master not only the cultural dimension of communication, but also the pragmatic one. The moment the urban influence penetrated into the Saxon community of Valea Viilor is key in stressing how quickly the Saxons adapt to the evolution of the society, their pragmatism being a proof of both their mutual communicability and their mastery of well defined tactics of survival, even when the ancient traditions are threatened by modernity: "A lot of fashion pieces were brought from the fair held in the neighbouring town and integrated into the local costume"¹³. This is why a lot of Saxons decided to "dress fashionably"¹⁴ and, thanks to the Saxon inventive spirit and the "various personal creations"¹⁵ they succeeded in lending the ancient

⁸ Wolfgang Knappe, *In Siebenbürgen. Speck im Turm oder Geschichten aus der Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen*, Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1982, p. 113 (the author's own translation from German language).

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 114.

¹⁰ Harald Roth, *Kleine Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, Köln, Editura Böhlau, 2012, p. 152 (the author's own translation from German language).

¹¹ Konrad Gündisch, *Siebenbürgen und die Siebenbürger Sachsen*, München, Editura Langen Müller, 1998, p. 260 (the author's own translation from German language).

¹² W. Knappe, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

¹⁵ K. Gündisch, *op. cit.*, p. 266.



traditional costume an urban appearance: "In Valea Viilor (Wurmloch), authenticity is still there, even today, when men wear their urban shirt under their sheepskin coat, tucked in according to the urban fashion [...]"¹⁶.

Step by step, these urban influences have become a "mark of modernity and progress"¹⁷. This coexistence of ancient customs and urban influences in the traditional costume actually reflects a kind of "strategies of coexistence"¹⁸ which the Saxons of Valea Viilor master without any doubt: their pragmatism is a proof that, within this community, communication is highly applied and internal cohesion is crucial in coping with external challenges and imposing credibility on potential enemies.

The folk costume of the Saxons in Valea Viilor, their fortified church and the way in which they relate to it, as both a religious and a cultural institution, the father of the neighbourhood as the Saxons' representative, the urban influences on the Saxon community are a few of the most characteristic elements, not only of the Saxons of Valea Viilor, but of all Transylvanian Saxons. One can thus remark a strong internal communication within the community, which relies on the respect toward each other, toward the father of the neighbourhood and toward the ancient traditions and customs. The Saxons' pragmatism and inventiveness, which made them adapt their traditional costume to the urban influences, their integration, even in villages inhabited mostly by Romanians, all this shows the Saxons' openness to interethnic dialogue.

Since interethnic dialogue is an important component of intercultural communication, being based, in its turn, on intercultural strategies and techniques, this article, drawing on the observations made by Viorica-Aura Păuș in *Comunicare interetnică și interculturală*, considers that the mastery of the operational concepts in the field ensures a deeper understanding of the role of interethnic dialogue in strengthening internal stability and fighting external threats. Therefore, we will provide below the definitions of the relevant concepts, mentioning that, in some cases, we omitted the details provided by the author, precisely in order to have a direct view of the respective notion.

¹⁶ W. Knappe, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 116.

¹⁸ K. Gündisch, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

1. Civilization: a set of features that characterize the intellectual, artistic, moral and material life of a country or society (*Petit Larousse Encyclopedic Dictionary*).

2. Culture: the set of social, religious, etc. structures, of the intellectual, artistic, etc. manifestations that characterize a society (*Petit Larousse Encyclopedic Dictionary*).

It should be stressed that in the 19th century German, Kultur was a synonym of Zivilisation.

We should also emphasize that, according to Păuș, intercultural communication is not established among cultures but among individuals who participate in different significant cultural systems.

3. Value(s): what a person or a thing is worth (*Petit Larousse Dictionary*).

4. Collective identity: the capacity of a collectivity to recognize itself as a group; an attribute of the cohesion principle (ethnic, local, professional identity); a resource of life in a society, and a resource of collective action (*Larousse Dictionary of Sociology*).

5. Nation: a human community, most often living on the same territory, with a more or less strong historical, linguistic, religious, economic unity (*Petit Larousse Dictionary*). Tămaș's *Political Dictionary*, to which Păuș makes reference, stresses that nationality is sometimes obtained by the granting of citizenship, not as a result of one's national origin.

6. Ethnic group: a population that demarcates itself by a common origin, common physical and cultural features (race, language, culture, religion, history, economy) within geographical limits (Tămaș S., *Dicționarul Politic*, pp. 108-109).

7. Identity: the central dimension of an individual's self-concept, representing his/her generalized position in society and deriving from his/her belonging to social groups and categories.

8. Minority: a subgroup which forms less than half of the population and, as a rule, is outnumbered by at least another subgroup, not necessarily of the majority (Tămaș Sergiu, *Dicționarul Politic*, 1993). The concept of **minority rights** refers to the set of legal standards (international public law or international humanitarian law) concerning the rights of people who belong to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities.



9. Multicultural society: different cultures and national, ethnic and religious groups who live on the same territory but do not necessarily have mutual contacts.

10. Intercultural society: different cultures and national, ethnic and religious groups who live on the same territory and have open relationships of interaction, with exchanges and the mutual recognition of their respective life-styles and values.

11. Intercultural education: involves a positive approach of differences.

To conclude, it should be said that, from this level of understanding and accepting the manner in which communication within the Saxon community – as representatives of the German minority of Romania – is organized and works, the majority Romanians having attributions in developing and applying strategies for the protection of ethnic minorities should find the most appropriate formula to strengthen the interethnic dialogue, stability and cooperation at domestic level, and, internationally, to support Romania's status as a credible dialogue partner. Internal stability, also conferred by the interethnic dialogue, by the avoidance of cultural conflicts among the ethnic minority and the majority population, reduces the risk of external threats and annihilates the possibility of weakening the state security. All this facilitates the achievement of the foreign policy and fights Euroscepticism. Thus, the state is prepared to establish its own strategies

in an increasingly dynamic security environment, promoting its national interests abroad.

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THE CROSS-BORDER CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (CII) AND THE OPERATOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES. CASE STUDY

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Abstract: Threats to our critical services nowadays are likely to emerge from the connected information infrastructure, and also include critical services located outside national borders. These systems must be protected. This article discusses the role of the operator of a critical service in securing our information systems, focusing on the legal obligations and responsibilities. It outlines the list of duties of critical infrastructure operators and points out the cross-border aspects, thus far little explored in the literature. It begins by discussing the risks attached to cross-border critical information infrastructure (CII). It then provides an overview on the duties which the operator has to comply with in order to keep the systems safe. The costs of securing these systems are also addressed. The article (case of study) firstly argues for the benefit of raising awareness among citizens of who safeguards our daily lives, and secondly, urges the main actors to look at the legal aspects before connecting to cross-border infrastructure. Finally, it provides stimulus for policymakers in the field of cyber security.

Keywords: cyber-attacks; critical information infrastructure (CII); prevent disruption; national border; armed attack; cross-border dependencies; information itself; of critical infrastructures (CI); protecting critical systems; denial of service (DoS); and cyber-power.

1. INTRODUCTION

Electricity grids, gas and water pipelines, and road, rail, air and waterway transportation are among the most important sectors which enable our everyday lives, making them more comfortable. These sectors form part of the so-called *critical infrastructure (CI)*. *Dependencies* and *interdependencies* with them can oftentimes only be realized once things do not work the way they are expected to work. All of a sudden, society experiences a blackout¹, forcing most of

the population to stop working on their computers, or the sewage system breaks down, leading to the contamination of the surrounding environment².

Today, more than eighty percent of our critical activities are run by private operators and not by the state itself³. Rather than concerns about safety issues, the aspects which rule daily business life are first of all efficiency and also oftentimes competitiveness. This will need to change in times when society fears *cyber-attacks* against critical infrastructure assets⁴.

Globalization has led to the intertwining of our networks, including information infrastructure

¹ A major blackout happened in December 2015 in Ukraine which is believed to be the first known case where a cyber attack takes down the energy network, see: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/12082758/Ukrainian-blackout-blamed-on-cyber-attack-in-world-first.html> and a U.S.-report <https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01> accessed 29 February 2016. There are other large blackouts to remember such as in 2014 in Bangladesh, the Philippines, Malta, Egypt, New Zealand and South Africa or in 2015 in Pakistan, The Netherlands and Turkey.

² In 2001 a former employee hacked into the sewage system of an Australian city, causing 800,000 litres of raw sewage to spill out into the local environment, contaminating to parks and rivers. See also http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/ics/documents/Maroochy-Water-Services-Case-Study_report.pdf, accessed 26th January 2017.

³ NATO, The World in 2020 – Can NATO Protect Us? The Challenges to Critical Infrastructure, Conference Report, Brussels 2012, p. 11, available at http://www.natolibguides.info/ld.php?content_id=1675627, accessed 25 March 2017.

⁴ See also Vytautas Butrimas, Thoughts on Possible Cyber security Misconceptions over the Security of the Energy Sector, 21st January 2017, http://www.hazar.org/analisdetail/analis/thoughts_on_possible_cybersecurity_misconceptions_over_the_security_of_the_energy_sector_1276.aspx, accessed 24 March 2017.

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which may be located outside the national border. But while the systems become more and more efficient by being interconnecting, at the same time they become more dependent upon the information infrastructure and the threat level increases significantly.⁵

Safeguarding the information system behind the critical infrastructure is of vital importance, and a great number of regulatory schemes therefore place obligations on operators. These obligations might differ slightly depending on which country the operator is executing the tasks from. At the same time, incentives for the operator to fulfill the set of obligations can seldom be found in national laws.

This article aims to address how states safeguard their *critical information infrastructure (CII)* and *prevent disruption*. In particular, it will examine the obligations placed on the operator of CII, and the role of *financial investment in securing the systems*. Finally, it will ask whether more state action, including incentives, is needed to support operators in safeguarding our *information systems*.

The article serves to raise awareness among citizens of the challenges that the operators of critical information infrastructure face in their daily business. In addition to this, it addresses policymakers by presenting *thought-provoking information*. However, it does not attempt to deal with the questions of whether or when a cyber-attack against CII is considered an *armed attack*, or when self-defense according to Article 51 of the UN Charter applies.⁶

⁵ See for example statement of US NSA Chief M. Rogers who says that it is only a matter of when, not if, a nation will experience destructive acts against critical infrastructure: <http://www.securityweek.com/nsa-chief-worries-about-cyber-attack-us-infrastructure>, accessed 24 March 2017.

⁶ For more information on this question see Melzer, *Cyber warfare and International Law*, 2011, UNIDIR Resources, pp. 14-16, available at <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf>, accessed 26th January 2017; Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, vol. 37, 1998-99; Condon, Getting it right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in Cyberspace, *Harvard Journal of Law & Technology*, Vol. 20, no. 2, spring 2007; Terry, *The War on Terror*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, UK 2013, p. 139 ff.; Schaller, *Internationale Sicherheit und Völkerrecht im Cyberspace*, SWP-Studie, Oktober 2014, Berlin, p. 18.

2. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII)

The term CII must have only evolved at about the same time that computers started to revolutionize our mechanical systems only a few decades ago. The meaning might oftentimes not be clear, and sometimes *critical information infrastructure (CII)* is not always approached as a distinct critical sector but rather as an integral part of a critical service.⁷ National legal definitions of the term CII are few, but can be found, for example, in the Czech Act on Cyber Security and Change of Related Acts.⁸

Generally speaking, CII can be understood as a broad concept that designates both the *information itself (data flow)* and the channels through which information is created and conveyed (the computer networks).⁹ According to this definition, examples of CII can be the telecommunication networks, the internet, or satellites, and examples of *critical infrastructures (CI)* are the financial sector (e.g. online banking, involving servers which are located cross-border), the transportation sector (aviation, rail, road, water), and the energy sector.

2.1. The known risks to cross-border critical information infrastructure (CII)

CII is a product of our competitive world, urging us to act faster, more efficiently and more precisely. But it is not the result of a wish to make our infrastructure safer. Today, most CI is computer controlled, and CI that is free or unaffected from interconnected systems is almost unimaginable.¹⁰

⁷ K. Kaska and L. Trinberg, *Regulating Cross-Border Dependencies of Critical Information Infrastructure*, NATO CCD COE, Tallinn 2016, p. 10f., available at <https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/regulating-cross-border-dependencies-critical-information-infrastructure.html>, accessed 25 March 2017.

⁸ §2 b) of the Czech Act on Cyber Security and Change of Related Acts (Act No. 181/2014 Coll., entry into force on 01 January 2015) defines CII as follows: 'Critical information infrastructure means an element or system of elements of the critical infrastructure in the sector of communication and information system within the field of cyber security.'

⁹ NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The Protection of Critical Infrastructures, doc. no. 162 CDS 07 E REV 1, para. 72, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1165>, accessed 25 March 2017.

¹⁰ See also Brunner, E. and M. Suter, *International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009*, p. 35, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CIIP-HB-08-09.pdf>, accessed 22 February 2017.



Free trade agreements have played a defining role in interconnecting our critical services across borders. Common open markets like the EU have facilitated the interconnection of communication networks. In order to promote, for example, the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital, the necessary infrastructure like road, rail and airways, servers, and undersea cables need to be interconnected, meaning that they will go beyond a state's border. These activities come at a price, and safety issues in particular consequently become much more challenging.¹¹

The majority of risks that arise when locating a critical asset like information infrastructure within another state's territory are largely comparable to those risks faced by nationally hosted CI. The risks are mainly threefold: technological, financial and social.¹²

Effects reaching across borders can cause disruption of a system, as happened for example in 2014 in Bangladesh.¹³ In this case, the electrical grid supplying Bangladesh with power from India failed due to a technical problem. This led to the failure of pumps in Bangladesh which were supposed to lift groundwater.¹⁴ Given this, surprisingly little research has so far been done in the field of *cross-border dependencies* of CII. There is analysis of the interdependencies of infrastructures, but it mostly refers to those located within the same state, focusing on different regions within the same borders.¹⁵

¹¹ Recent naval activity by Russian submarines near vital undersea cables is worrying because if Russia is planning to disrupt the global internet, repairing the undersea cyber infrastructure will be a challenging task; <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html>, accessed 04 March 2017.

¹² Kaska, Trinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 17f.

¹³ See also <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/11/01/360656591/national-blackout-bangladesh-in-massive-power-outage>, accessed 24 March 2017.

¹⁴ Note, that the Bangladesh incident is not believed to be a cyber attack but a failure of the transmission lines, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-29869272>, accessed 22 February 2017.

¹⁵ See for example Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, *State of the Region Infrastructure Report 2015*; B. Graves, 'The Critical Interdependence of Our Infrastructure', 28th January 2017, <http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/gov-critical-interdependence-regional-infrastructure.html>, accessed 29th January 2017; P. Cheng et al., *Managing critical Infrastructure Interdependence through Economic Input-Output Methods*, *Journal of Infrastructure*

This is striking given the age of globalization and in times when countries join crucial projects, for example, on cross-border electricity supply.¹⁶ The lack of literature concerning these aspects could also be a sign that many people, both from the public and private sectors, work in walled-off structures where they deal with security issues as though they would not concern their neighbors or other countries. A study by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), *Regulating Cross-Border Dependencies of Critical Information Infrastructure*,¹⁷ revealed that there are no discernible examples of legal and regulatory remedies to mitigate the risks arising from *cross-border CII*.

Determining which pieces of infrastructure are essential assets that are connected to an information infrastructure helps to forecast the potential impact of an incident, such as a *cyber-attack* targeting cross-border located information infrastructure. Kaska and Trinberg¹⁸ found that there is a predominantly high degree of dependence on such cross-border information infrastructure, which can be highlighted as a critical weakness for the ICT and telecommunications sectors, the finance sector, and the energy supply, traffic and transportation sectors.¹⁹ The media (print and broadcast) is substantially dependent on cross-border information infrastructure,²⁰ and other sectors including healthcare, water supply, government and administration, public and public order, and agriculture have been assessed as being dependent to some extent. Only a very small percentage of the participants of the study reported that some of

Systems, 2009, pp. 200-210; T.D. O'Rourke, *Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies and Resilience*, *The Bridge*, vol. 37 no. 1, 2007, pp. 22-29.

¹⁶ The Black Sea Transmission Line is one example which allows electricity to flow freely between Georgia and Turkey.

¹⁷ K. Kaska and L. Trinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ These sectors were also assessed through the above mentioned study by Kaska, Trinberg, p. 16 and remarkably they showed the highest dependence degree on a scale between "none to critical".

²⁰ For example the French television channel TV5 was the victim of a cyber-attack in April 2015, see 'TV5 Monde hack: "Jihadist" cyber attack on French TV station could have Russian link', 10th June 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/tv5monde-hack-jihadist-cyber-attack-on-french-tv-station-could-have-russian-link-10311213.html>, accessed 27 January 2017.



the sectors were *not* dependent on *cross-border information infrastructure*.²¹ The healthcare and water supply sectors were each estimated by only 18.18 per cent of respondents to be dependent of cross-border information infrastructure. In the traffic and transportation, public security and public order, nutrition/agriculture, and the media sector, 9.09% of participants assessed them as being non-dependent at all. Notable is that none of the sectors in this "*non-dependent category*" refer to the energy supply, ICT and telecommunications, finances, or government and administration sectors, meaning that all participants agreed that these sectors are very likely to show a cross-border dependency. This leads to the conclusion that these latter sectors are those in which a state should take a keen interest in comparing the operator's duties of the state in which the information infrastructure might be located, with its own regulatory norms.²² If the operator's obligations of the other state do not meet security expectations, the owner or operator of critical infrastructure which is dependent on the cross-border information infrastructure would be well advised to take additional measures to ensure the desired security standards, such as security agreements with the foreign CII operator.

Protecting vital systems oftentimes means interacting across borders, and *protecting critical systems* means protecting them from cyber-attack. Within the military, cyber has therefore also become an additional dimension alongside the land, sea, air and space domains. At the national level, governments are tackling this challenge by developing National Cyber Security Strategies (NCSS), most likely prompted by the 2007 *denial of service (DoS)* and *distributed denial of service (DDoS)* attacks in Estonia.²³ The Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, for instance, officially recognized cyber-attacks against Information and Communication Technology

(ICT) as a national security threat.²⁴ The 2008 French White Paper on Defense and National Security emphasizes cyber-attacks, considering them a reason to shift national security thinking.²⁵ However, very few NCSS have addressed the cross-border dependencies aspect yet. Among the analyzed documents, the Estonian Cyber Security Strategy is one example of a yet very rare national document which addresses the topic of cross-border dependencies.²⁶

2.2. Tackling the cyber risk – operators are the key players

2.2.1. The operator's list of duties

So far, very limited information is available in the existing international literature regarding the role of the operators in protecting cross-border located CII. This is striking since operators are the main players when it comes to cross-border safety. Therefore, while states are responsible for homeland security, operators are the main actors when it comes to securing infrastructure, and so it is important to know the legal obligations on the CII operator before deciding to connect across a border, something which might have undesirable safety implications. Scrutinizing the operator's obligations imposed by other nations will shed more light on how states deal with the threats concerning their own CII. How and to what extent states oblige their operators to mitigate risks and prevent vulnerabilities depends on the level of security that the state wants. In general, the operator's responsibilities can be determined either by enacting new laws, amending existing laws, or having self-imposed rules of conduct.

Operator's responsibilities can be divided into two categories: obligations of general nature and those concerning more specific situations.

²¹ Kaska, Trinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

²² Research could not reveal any publication on a comparative legal view.

²³ See also Czosseck, Ottis, Talihärm: Estonia after the 2007 Cyber Attacks: Legal, Strategic and Organisational Changes in Cyber Security, http://www.ccdcoe.org/articles/2011/Czosseck_Ottis_Taliharm_Estonia_After_the_2007_Cyber_Attacks.PDF; accessed 22 February 2017; An overview of the Cyber Security Strategies of NATO nations and their partners can be viewed at <https://ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html>, accessed 30 January 2017.

²⁴ Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, 2013, p.8, <https://ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html>, accessed 30 January 2017.

²⁵ The French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 2008, p. 48, ff., <http://www.mocr.army.cz/images/Bilakniha/ZSD/French%20White%20Paper%20on%20Defence%20and%20N%20ational%20Security%202008.pdf> accessed 30 July 2016.

²⁶ Estonian Cyber Security Strategy, https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/cyber_security_strategy_2014-2017_public_version.pdf, p.6, accessed 30 January 2017.



2.2.2. General obligations

General obligations can be summarized into the four following categories:

- Implementing security measures;
- Maintaining security documentation;
- Notifying and reporting obligations and
- Monitoring obligations.

Implementing security measures can be regarded as the most important task for an operator. This requires implementing both organizational and technical measures. Organizational measures can include producing a risk management plan, managing cyber security incidents, taking care of CII control and audit, as well as taking care of personnel security and ensuring that only the designated group of people can gain access to the *CII system*. Organizing training and raising awareness about security risks among employees is another measure, requiring an increasing amount of time and effort for correspondence and communication. Technical measures include, among many others implementing *counter malicious code protection* and *user identity verification tools*, and using *cryptographic devices* and *cyber security incident detection tools*.²⁷

Implementing security measures can involve network providers contacting affected users of the incident and providing them with patch tools for disruptive behavior originating from a consumer's computer. The latter, though, is more a matter of good practice.

Maintaining security documentation serves the operator primarily to support his own risk mitigation and service continuity. It includes the documentation of his risk assessment, the risk mitigation plan, and measures taken so far. Secondly, it serves supervisory aspects. Maintaining security documentation further proves the fulfillment of the set of obligations the operator has to carry out. It allows the controlling authority to keep track of what the operator has done to ensure the functioning of the vital service.

Notifying and reporting obligations are general obligations of an informational nature. In some national security acts they already include the reporting of an incident to the national authority.²⁸

²⁷ More examples are listed in chapter II, §5 of the Czech Act on Cyber Security, <https://www.govcert.cz/en/legislation/legislation/>, accessed 28th January 2017.

²⁸ For example the Czech Act on Cyber Security, §8 I, <https://www.govcert.cz/en/legislation/legislation/>, the

The notification of a security breach or loss of integrity which has had a *significant* impact on the operation of networks or services must, under the EU Electronic Communications Framework Directive,²⁹ be reported to the competent national regulatory authority for companies providing public communications networks or publicly available communications services, and therefore constitutes common practice among EU member states. The upcoming EU network and *information security directive (NIS)* will contain a reporting duty in case of significant incidents for operators of certain sectors such as for the financial services, transport, energy and health.³⁰ However, the aspect of notifying the consumer is not a requirement placed on the companies, but rather a matter of good practice.³¹

Reporting an event to the national authority is of the utmost importance, since by this knowledge about new methods of attack or critical incidents with cross-sectoral or even cross-border impact can be gained. Reporting also serves a short-term objective of providing situational awareness about significant incidents in national networks. Awareness of these incidents is they of bigger or smaller impact helps to promote the analysis of attacks, early recognition of a new threat, and

2015 German IT Security Act also included this obligation in § 8b (4), https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetzestexte/it-sicherheitsgesetz.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, accessed 28th January 2017. The EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS) which still needs to be approved by the European Parliament contains this reporting duty as well, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/17-wide-cybersecurity-rule-adopted/>, accessed 30 January 2017.

²⁹ Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), Article 13a, para. 3, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02002L0021-20091219&from=EN>, accessed 30 January 2017.

³⁰ The EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS) recently got approval by the EU Council, approval by the European Parliament is expected in summer 2016 and will probably enter into force in August 2016, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/05/17-wide-cybersecurity-rule-adopted/>, accessed 30 January 2017.

³¹ Art. 13 a para. 3 of the Directive 2002/21/EC states that the national authority concerned may inform the public where it determines that disclosure of the breach is in the public interest.



the early development of preventive tools from which a wide circle of addressees could profit. Yet, it requires additional administrative work and organization.

The operator might feel tempted not to report any incident, in particular not when there was just a short interruption of the service and little damage which the operator was able to manage alone. Unless it is a significant incident, a notification has not been required by law yet.

Announcing to a national coordinating authority that someone has exploited vulnerability within their systems and managed to disrupt the service, thus affecting the functioning of the asset, might have an unexpected high-cost impact. It might lead to loss of customer trust or damage to business reputation. Therefore, one could argue that private operators do not necessarily want to reveal that they have been the target of a cyber-attack. Yet, confidentiality provisions like §10 of the Czech Cyber Security Act, ensuring the non-disclosure of cyber security incident data are not integrated in every Security Act.³² Aside from trying to avoid the incident becoming public, an additional administrative burden might lead to a negative attitude towards this obligation. And if the operator is neither obliged by law to notify the national authority, nor is there an effective controlling system being capable of overseeing compliance, there might be another argument for some operators not to proceed this way.

Finally, *monitoring obligations* means that the operator has to monitor his own network activity and ensure that the list of mandatory activities is fulfilled. It goes without saying that monitoring obligations are expected to be followed anyway by an operator who operates in accordance with due diligence standards.

2.2.3. Specific obligations

Specific obligations may result from specific legal acts which are meant to regulate a specific sector. This could be a Telecommunications

³² Although most countries do not have a Cyber Security Act, and despite the fact that general confidentiality obligations may derive from other legal acts – e.g. § 102 of the Estonian Electronic Communications Act, 01 January 2005, clear provisions like §10 of the Czech Cyber Security Act, referring to the non-disclosure of the company's name having suffered an incident cannot be detected on a widespread basis among those countries which adopted such an Act.

Act, like for example the German Telekommunikationsgesetz, and paragraph 109 subparagraphs IV of which obliges the operator of a public telecommunications network to nominate a Safety Officer and to produce a safety policy that includes a variety of specified information. Among this detailed information, specifications are required on the kinds of threats expected, and the technical measures being taken in order to prevent potential disturbances.^{33, 34}

Many of the generic and specific duties are permanent security measures, meaning that they have to be taken care of constantly. A smaller number refer to graduated security measures which need to be taken according to the current threat challenge.

3. Different safety cultures cause different obligations cross-border

Besides an individual threat picture, each state has an individual safety culture determined by its individual focus on security when developing information systems and networks. Therefore states differ in the way they adopt innovations and show different styles of behavior when using and interconnecting information systems.³⁵ Thus the list of responsibilities for operators in one country might be more comprehensive or stricter than that in another.

There are no internationally binding rules for protecting CII. Initiating a worldwide common approach which seeks a common high security standard seems to be impossible, as countries with a lower security standard probably do not see

³³ German Telecommunications Act, 'Telekommunikationsgesetz' (TKG), 22 June 2004, last amended 19 February 2016, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tkg_2004/BJNR119000004.html, accessed 05th March 2017.

³⁴ For example also the Belgian Act 'Loi relative à la sécurité et la protection des infrastructures critiques' from 1st July 2011 obliges in its section 3, Art. 13 the operator to elaborate a security plan and provides a list of requirements for its content, <http://centredecrise.be/fr/legislation/loi-01072011-securite-et-protection-des-infrastructures-critiques>, accessed 05th March 2017.

³⁵ See also OECD, 'Guidelines for the Security of Information and Systems and Networks', <http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/15582260.pdf>, p. 8, or EU Commission doc. on CIIP: COM(2009) 149 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0149:FIN:EN:PDF>, both accessed 09th March 2017.



the necessity to burden their operators with more tasks if the threat picture for their country does not require it. EC Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure (ECI) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection is an attempt to reach a common standard at least EU wide. It was meant in its first stage for the energy and transport sector, but the information and communication technology sectors were already identified as future priority sectors during the draft period.³⁶ The topic on cross-border located critical infrastructures is addressed in the Directive by an information obligation and engagement request,³⁷ meaning that each member state has to notify any other which may be affected by ECI. With regard to the operator's obligation, it details the content of the operator's security plans which should include, inter alia, the selection of counter-measures.³⁸

Different national approaches to implementing the Directive can form an unclear picture, in particular because translations of the implementation acts into other than the national language are oftentimes not provided.³⁹ Sometimes an unknown number of generic and specific obligations have to be detected in a patchwork of regulatory regimes and legal elements because such schemes relate to the operator's obligations. Thus, operators have to face an increasing complicated regulatory environment. Unfortunately, a study on the global picture of the operator's obligations which would highlight the differences of certain countries unfortunately is also lacking.

3.1. Operators bear the costs for CII safety measures

The increase of the operator's obligations comes with an increase of the costs of security measures, and who should meet these costs might become more and more of an issue. So far it seems that operators are the ones bearing first and foremost the costs of the required implementation of security measures.⁴⁰ Estimating the costs in advance is a formidable task, and depends in particular on the unknown number of sophisticated attacks, whose impact also remains unknown.⁴¹ According to the president of Germany's Federal Office for Information Security, eighty percent of the standard attacks against security systems could be warded off if today's available security technology was implemented.⁴² When asked how much a small company of about fifty employees should spend annually on cyber security the president of an IT security company replied \$57,600, breaking it down into, amongst other things, secure email hosting for each employee, an antivirus service, and online backups.⁴³ A 2016 Ponemon Institute study involving 630 IT security practitioners revealed that the costs of malware containment for organizations to prevent malware-driven threats from stealing data and disrupting their systems amounts to an average of \$1.3 million annually.⁴⁴ The legislative history of the new German IT Act reveals that the costs which each of the estimated 2,000 operators has to bear for reporting one single incident could add up to €660, estimating that the average number

³⁶ The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union, COM(2013) 48 final (the 'NIS-Directive') is currently at this point of research in its final steps: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/ENG/2013_27, accessed 09 March 2017.

³⁷ EU Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures (ECI) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection, 08th December 2008, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF>, Articles 3-4, accessed 09th March 2017.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, see Article 5 and Annex II.

³⁹ See list of implementation http://eur-lex.europa.eu/search.html?qid=1429180435917&or0=DN%3D72008L0114*,DN-oid%3D72008L0114*&type=advanced&SUBDOM_INIT=MNE&DTS_SUBDOM=MNE&page=1, accessed 09th March 2017.

⁴⁰ See also N. A. Sales, *Regulating Cyber Security*, *Northwestern University Law Review*, vol. 107 no. 4, 2013, p. 1506.

⁴¹ See for more information on the economic cost of cybersecurity: T. A. Johnson in T. A. Johnson, *Cybersecurity Protecting Critical Infrastructures from Cyber Attack and Cyber Warfare*, CRC Press, 2015, p. 255 ff. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/regierung-will-it-sicherheit-mit-gesetzentwurf-verbessern-13326788.html> accessed 09th March 2017.

⁴² <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/regierung-will-it-sicherheit-mit-gesetzentwurf-verbessern-13326788.html>, accessed 09th March 2017.

⁴³ P. Clark, *The Bill for Cybersecurity*, <http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-10-31/cybersecurity-how-much-should-it-cost-your-small-business>, accessed 09th March 2017.

⁴⁴ Ponemon Institute, *The cost of malware containment*, <http://www.ponemon.org/library/the-cost-of-malware-containment>, p. 1, accessed 09 March 2017.



of significant incidents per year was up to seven.⁴⁵ Studies of the average annual cost of implementing security measures seem non-existent, and this has led to a call to national authorities to find out and clarify the financial impact for operators. Figures may vary from country to country, but investing in cyber security and providing personnel for the implementation of mandated measures seems to be one of the major expenses for the operators.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions are that designed by *cyber-power* refers to the exercise by a state which launches attacks on another state. Unit for cyber power, it seems, in this case study, the credibility of the threat coming from a state to engage in cyber-attacks. The more close to certainty, the better shape seems to be the nature of cyber power. Sufficiently diffuse this reason deprives the reader of Corel certainty commitment and ability to lead him in the end with a considerable impact. The mere intention or threats operationalization of employment in attacks shows itself not a risk factor, but rather a measure on a scale of (i) morality. The power is in this sense a deficiency that want highlighted.

Cyber-power in NATO methodology is used exclusively outside the theater of war. Total employment in the event of conflict kinetic is a truism. If military engagement, cyberspace is a part of the theater of war, going alongside PsyOps and propaganda attribution secondary units, with support functions. Cyber power and associated components, cyber war and cyber espionage, shall be exclusively periods of disengagement military: in times of peace. Army makes so even at the level of discourse, to ensure a permanent state of war, at least its cadres. Securitization issues by NATO perspective become corrosive when applied civilian models for periods of non-military employment. If contexts of military engagement, security of communication networks

is one of the last components of the risk being assaulted fellow perpetrator or agent. Intervention components kinetics communications networks are secure. During periods of non-employment are components subject to securitization.

Reasons for securitization is accelerated can only be speculated: budget increased substantially to meet employment in *cyber-space* assumed the plot revealed by the possibility to explore a new environment for the study of conflict, the gain political capital from private corporations interested control the business model in which it performs or civil society component charmed by the idea of absolute order to enrich the vocabulary of political rhetoric and speculation politicking.

We can say that this terminology cyber power includes another term joint military thinking: *cyber-weapons*. It's really just a reconception term exploit, or tactics to exploit a vulnerability, which can be defined as constructs software that addresses one or more defects (vulnerabilities) in order to induce executable effect chosen by the attacker the limits imposed by the context of vulnerability presented in this article.

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5. The EU Network and Information Security Directive (NIS) recently got approval by the EU Council, approval by the European Parliament is expected in summer 2016 and will probably enter into force in August 2016, <http://www.consilium>.

⁴⁵ Reasoning of the draft of the new German IT Security Act, Drs. 18/4096 from 25th February 2017, <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/040/1804096.pdf>, p.5, the Act itself (German only) is available at: http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&start=//**%255B@attr_id=%27bgbl1115s1324.pdf%27%255D#__bgbl_%2F%2F**%5B%40attr_id%3D%27bgbl1115s1324.pdf%27%5D_1456916731_187, both accessed 09 March 2017.



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GERHARD MALETZKE'S MODEL OF MASS COMMUNICATION FROM THE SOCIAL COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE

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Veronica PĂSTAE**

Abstract: The German researcher Gerhard Maletzke developed a Model of Mass Communication from the social communication perspective in his study *The Psychology of Mass Communication* (1963). The novelty of his approach resides in viewing the mass-media as a transmission relay for communication among social actors, and not as a communicator. This article provides a synthesis of the original theoretical model and an inventory of its possible uses in online communication.

Keywords: Maletzke's model; online; communication; mass-media; information.

INTRODUCTION

The present paper investigates Gerhard Maletzke's Model of Mass Communication (1963) at length as we consider that the majority of communication studies offer only limited analyses of this influential academic work. We shall present the original theoretical approach in order to prove the usability of the model for online communication.

To begin with, the critical difference between Maletzke's model of mass communication and other earlier theories is that the German researcher presents mass-media as a transmission relay for various social agents, involved in communication. In many Romanian scientific papers dealing with mass communication, the sender is viewed as a professional and powerful agent (usually a media institution), whereas the receiver is viewed as an amorphous and dispersed public, able to give para-feedback only. As a result, most researchers interpret Maletzke's model within this framework.

However, Maletzke believes that mass media actors are only intermediaries for the messages of the social communicators in the public sphere. This means that mass media retransmit the messages of social actors and only rarely do media actors transmit their own messages, when they become social actors themselves.

Maletzke claims that, in fact, the social actors are those who communicate among themselves, and mass media are the mere instrument which allows message spreading through institutionalization, professionalism and technical facilities. This theory was fully presented by Maletzke in his study, *The Psychology of Mass Communication* (1963).¹

Mass communication

Maletzke's definition of mass communication reads as follows: Mass communication is that form of communication in which messages are transmitted to a dispersed audience, indirectly and in one way, by technical means of dissemination.²

We would like to emphasize the fact that one key word which differentiates between Maletzke's definition and others, is exactly the one missing from later citations, namely *indirectly*. This term does not refer to the fact that the communication process is made possible through technical means. It means that the relationship between the sender and the receiver is mediated by media actors, which further means that mass communication is social communication done indirectly (*i.e.* mediated by mass-media).³ The German researcher defines mass communication in opposition with interpersonal communication. In his view, the latter is direct (face-to-face), personal, mutual, symmetrical, private and

¹ Gerhard Maletzke, *Psychologie der Massenkommunikation*, Verlag Hans Bredow Institut, Hamburg, 1963.

² *Idem*, p.32.

³ Heinz Bonfadelli, (ed.), *Einführung in die Publizistikwissenschaft*, Haupt UTB, Bern, 2001, p.35.

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carried out in the presence of both communicators. By contrast, mass communication is indirect, technologically mediated, asymmetrical, public and directed towards a spatially and temporally dispersed audience. Nonetheless, some questions remain for both types of communication: who are we? who is the receiver? what is the context of communication? how are we supposed to act and react? by what norms? All these factors were integrated into the Model of Mass Communication developed by Gerhard Maletzke.

Precursors and inspiration sources

Maletzke designed his Model of Mass Communication (which is the translation of the German phrase "Feldschema der Massenkommunikation") starting from the general model of communication developed by Harold Lasswell in 1948.

Who?→ Says what?→In which channel?→To whom?→
With what effect?
(Sender) (Message) (Medium) (Receiver)
(Effect)

Model of Communication (Harold Lasswell, 1948)

In developing his model, Maletzke has only taken into consideration the first four elements in Lasswell's scheme. In an interview given in 2002, the German researcher confessed that he did not include the fifth element, namely the effect, as he believes this represents the fundamental issue in mass communication. Maletzke took over the cybernetics category of interdependence and its principles: 1. Parameters control, correct and adjust each other; 2. The study of specific variables is relevant only if you consider the functioning of the entire system.

Maletzke's Model of Mass Communication

Maletzke's scheme (1963) is based on Harold Lasswell's general model of communication from 1948, as declared by the author. So we find in Maletzke, Lasswell's classic scheme, with one difference in terminology: the *Sender* is called *Communicator*.

Lasswell: Sender ----- MESSAGE ----- Receiver

Maletzke: Communicator ----- MESSAGE ----- Receiver

Maletzke introduces the term *communicator* in his discourse on mass communication, inspired by the American society, but not the term *consumer*, also commonly used in American research, with reference to the consumer society. Hitherto nothing new. The more interesting part comes when Maletzke explains what he means by *communicator*.

A. Elements of mass communication

In Maletzke's view, the communicator is not mass-media, as we could expect, given other mass communication approaches. For the German researcher, the communicator is that social actor who has something to say to the public, who wants at some point to convey a message to a social dialogue partner. Both partners can be people or organizations, formal or informal groups that have become distinct voices in the public discourse.

The message can be conveyed by its author or by an intermediary, a spokesperson who may belong to the issuing agency or may be authorized by delegation of power; in his endeavor to deliver the message to the public, this intermediary may be driven by other interests than those of the issuer. For Maletzke, mass media are the intermediary in the communication among social actors. Mass media take over the messages of social actors in order to disseminate them in the public sphere, using communications technology to cover an area as large as possible. In general, media transmit information about people and institutions from a given society. They rarely transmit internally generated information, and when that happens, they become social partners in the public dialogue.

Sender/ Communicator-----MESSAGE----- (Mass media) ----- Receiver

In mass communication, the receiver of mass media messages is a dispersed public. By this, Maletzke refers to a heterogeneous and geographically spread public. Not all people read the newspaper at the same time and there are no links among individual receivers. Each person interprets the message in a distinct manner since individuals do not have the same backgrounds or interests.

From the scheme, we can notice that the message has already been formulated by the communicator

before being taken over by the media, which serve as a transmission relay. Mass media select the messages and act as a filter that can alter the information to various degrees: the messages can be conveyed ad litteram or can be reconstructed in such a manner that they do not match the intentions of the communicator anymore. Thus Maletzke's scheme of mass communication comprises three active entities: the communicator, the receiver and the media relay.

cultivation theory, formulated by George Gerbner in the 80s. By looking at the biographies of these two researchers, we can assume that they had a fruitful exchange of ideas. In 1961, Maletzke had a three-month scholarship in California, where he met Gerbner.


B. Focusing on the communicator

C. Going back to Maletzke's model, the

The field-schema of Mass Communication (Maletzke, 1963)

THE FIELD-SCHEMA OF MASS COMMUNICATION

Gerhard MALETZKE, *Psychology of Mass communication*, 1963
Feldschema der Massenkommunikation



Excursus: The complexity of communication

In order to explain public communication "in stages" we shall consider Phillip Elliot's model⁴, where he asserts that in social communication there are three autonomous, but interdependent subsystems: society as the source, mass media institutions and, again, society as the receiver:

Society as source → Mass media institutions → Society as receiver

Each of these subsystems borrows from the other what it needs to function, each has its own interests and ways to influence the others. These subsystems pursue different goals: The Society wants public compliance and integration of its members; the Receiver wants to improve the adaptation to reality by making use of the public messages, whereas Mass media are commercially oriented, viewing cultural products as goods for consumers.

Maletzke's model prefigures to some extent the

⁴ Phillip Elliot, *The Making of a Television Series: A Case Study in the Sociology of Culture*, Constable, Somerset, 1972, apud Denis McQuail, *Comunicarea*, Institutul European, Iași, 199, p. 179.

communicator is that entity which generates the content and the form of the public message depending on social, cultural and psychological factors. In other words, the messages of the communicators are influenced by their self-image, their personality, social position (both within a specific group and within society), by their social relations, by their audience, by the pressure of the public opinion, etc.

D. The message and the medium

The message reaches the receiver via mass media, in other words it is mediated by mass media. The construction of the message has to meet the requirements imposed by the communication medium Mass media, on the other hand, select the information coming from different sources and turn it into journalistic products in accordance with the public interest, but also with their internal interests. Technology has greatly influenced worldwide data transmission: not long ago, newspapers were conditioned by their daily frequency, and the topicality of subjects was rendered if the printed edition of one day reported about the events of the



previous day. The images from the field could not yet be transmitted from a distance; they had to be actually carried to the editorial office in order to be edited. It was also impossible for TV stations to broadcast unscheduled live events – accidents, catastrophes, unexpected events, etc. Back in the 1960s when Maletzke developed his theory, only radio stations could broadcast live, via telephones. Nevertheless, at that time only landlines were available. Since then, mass media technology has greatly evolved and the boundaries between transmission media have blurred. Now, when video telephony is available to any smartphone owner through Internet connection, it is hard to imagine how laborious the work in each type of media (newspapers, radio or television) used to be. The medium has also progressively impacted upon the form of messages, imposing the manner in which information is received, decoded and assimilated.

E. Focusing on the receiver

The receiver makes a selection from the mass media offer in accordance with his interests and influenced by psychological, sociological and cultural factors. Additionally, the receiver is influenced by his perception of a certain media institution. Maletzke does not include in the category of receivers only individuals, but also groups and institutions, especially when it comes to messages of public interest.

F. The relations among components

The communicator formulates the messages in accordance with their perception of the receiver and depending on the media institutions through which the messages will be broadcast to the public. This requires professionalism on behalf of the communicator who has the competencies to formulate messages appropriate for the media. The receiver will decode the message based on the image they have of the communicator and NOT based on how the message is reformulated by the media institution. In his scheme, Maletzke does not provide any information about the correlation between the form of the message and the way it is perceived. The receiver will respond to the message of the communicator by adapting their behaviour, but evading the media institution in this chain. Maletzke talks about para-feedback

when discussing the receiver's reactions to the performance of the media institution, and mentions the practice of sending letters to the editor as an illustration of poor feedback. The one-way flow of messages and the absence of real feedback had led several researchers to question whether we can still talk about communication in the case of mass communication.

The novelty of Maletzke's model lies in presenting the media as relay, and not as an autonomous communicator with own initiative and message. This model is to be interpreted only in the context of social communication. Thus, we can see the connection with the research carried out by the Munich School, whose most important representative, Hans Wagner⁵, expands upon Maletzke's theory.

Excursus: Who was Maletzke?

In what follows, we shall explain why, despite its popularity, Maletzke's model did not generate a school of thought and why the research conducted in the same direction is so poor. For this purpose we shall review biographical details and common practices from the German scientific world⁶.

Gerhard Maletzke (1922-2010) is a classic contributor to the communication field and all scientific work dealing with mass communication today refers to his model. In fact, Maletzke ranks among the five most influential authors in communication sciences, along with Paul Lazarsfeld, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Juergen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann.⁷ (This ranking may be surprising for Romanian readers since neither

⁵ Hans Wagner: *Verstehende Methoden in der Kommunikationswissenschaft*. München: Reinhard Fischer, 1999 (*apud* Ute Nawratil/Philomena Schönhagen/Heinz Starkulla jr. (Hrsg.): *Medien und Mittler sozialer Kommunikation. Beiträge zu Theorie, Geschichte und Kritik von Journalismus und Publizistik*. Festschrift für Hans Wagner. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag, 2002.)

⁶ For documentation we referred to: 1. The interview given by G. Maletzke to Professor Rüdiger Steinmetz, PhD, in 2002, which can be accessed at: <http://www.kmw.uni-leipzig.de/bereiche/medienwissenschaft/service/interview-gerhard-maletzke.html> and to the article: Michael Meyen, Maria Löblich: Gerhard Maletzke: Eine Geschichte von Erfolg und Misserfolg in der Kommunikationswissenschaft. In: *Medien&Kommunikationswissenschaft* 59. Jg. (2011), S. 563-580, which can be accessed at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272779746> (accessed 12.12.2016)

⁷ *Biographisches Lexikon der Kommunikationswissenschaft*, <http://blexkom.halemverlag.de> (accessed 12.12.2016).

Luhmann nor Maletzke have been translated. Nonetheless, the two authors have been widely cited in Romanian research, from secondary sources. Maletzke's analyses are grounded in psychology, which he studied along with philosophy and journalism at Hamburg after returning from the battlefield. The researcher's detractors accused him of being a member of Hitlerjugend or Hitler Youth during World War II. Maletzke argued that he had volunteered in order to be allowed to choose his branch and thus he avoided becoming cannon fodder in the infantry. He served for six years in the war and he was wounded three times.

In 1983 Maletzke became a visiting professor at the University of Stuttgart / Hohenheim. He had a so-called Honorarprofessor and taught communication sciences and journalism. In the 70s he also taught intercultural communication, especially during his internship in Singapore, and in the 80s he was a media expert (Medienreferent) at the Broadcast Company in Stuttgart SDR (Sueddeutscher Rundfunk). The German researcher has never acquired academic tenure; therefore, he did not have the chance to be part of a research team or to make disciples, which might be an explanation for the fact that Maletzke's theory has not generated a school of thought.


He applied for a professor position at the University of Hamburg, but he was rejected for political reasons being considered a Socialist sympathizer during the Cold War. This verdict

case of political discrimination has been considered a stain on the academic practices in Germany.

The popularity of a theory often depends on the time of its launching, on the position and reputation of its author and, of course, on the attitude of the academia. The enthusiastic or hostile reception of a theory is often determined by the social-political context, by the fashionable scientific criteria at a certain moment, and by games of power and interests. Popularity thus depends not only on the intrinsic value of a theory, but also on social acceptance.

Further research in the field

In 1997, the Viennese Professor Roland Burkart, a specialist in communication theories and political communication, further developed Maletzke's model. Burkart addressed the effects of mass communication and adapted Maletzke's model for digital communication, showing that the Internet is not part of a linear evolution of mass communication. According to Burkart, the Internet represents a new, distinct form of communication, especially due to its interactivity and instantaneous transmission of information. Burkart simplified Maletzke's model making it similar again to the original source of inspiration, namely, Lasswell's general model of communication (1948). However, he replaced the medium with the Internet.



irreversibly affected his teaching career because it negatively influenced the attitude of the entire German academia. Later on, posthumously, this

The Austrian researcher speaks about *electronic community* in opposition with the sociological standpoint according to which the



interactions of communicators on the Internet do not meet the necessary standards to transform the participants into a community. Bukart rejects the message pre-positioning separately from the medium. As stated by Bukart, the communicator delivers his message in the virtual environment and the public make the selection. The researcher refers to public messages and demonstrates that the communication structures in the virtual environment regulate the communication of social actors. The digital communication processes take place via a technological medium and the messages are not filtered by any agent.

Bukart's scheme does not specify how the medium controls the communication processes or whether interactivity, which involves the exchange of roles among participants, makes online communication different from previous forms of communication.

Final remarks

Maletzke's theory has attracted a lot of criticism with regard to methodology, more precisely to the fact that the criteria used in developing the model are not consistent and unified.

Nonetheless, many elements of Gerhard Maletzke's scientific work are to be found later on in the theories proposed by German researchers such as Niklas Luhmann, Jürgen Habermas, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and several others.

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DONALD TRUMP ON SETTING THE PRICE FOR THE U.S. FOREIGN DEFENCE POLICY – TRACING BACK THE OPINIONS OF AN ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE

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Abstract: Since 1987, Donald Trump has constantly considered in a critical manner the U.S. foreign defence policy that he understood as the use of the U.S. military for advancing the interests of foreign states. In the context of the 1988, 2000, 2012 and 2016 election campaigns for the U.S. presidency, he strongly argued that this military support should not be provided for free but only in exchange for a fair price to be paid by the states which benefit from it. This paper points out that Trump's position on the exact structure of this price is less clear and that three contrasting views on this issue could plausibly be attributed to him, with the last two ones being more prominent and explicit: firstly, the price includes both the costs for employing the U.S. military and a mark-up, secondly, the price covers only the costs for employing the U.S. military and finally, the price is made up exclusively from a share of the costs for modernising the U.S. military. A possible way of integrating all three views into the U.S. foreign defence policy is also suggested by this paper which concludes that Trump's perspective on this policy is complex and thus resistant to a simple characterization.

Keywords: Donald Trump; U.S. foreign defence policy; price of defence; cost of defence; U.S. military; U.S. presidential elections.

"If we're going to continue to be the policeman of the world, we ought to be paid for it".
(Donald Trump, *Crippled America. How to Make America Great Again*)

Donald Trump's victory against Hillary Clinton in the presidential elections from 2016 was largely a surprise¹ but his candidacy was far less unexpected given that, since 1987, he had been more or less closely associated with the election campaigns for the president of the United States (U.S.). Thus, back

in 1988 he was largely seen as a viable presidential candidate, in 2000 he ran for the U.S. presidency even if he finally abandoned the electoral campaign and in 2004 and again in 2012 he seriously considered running again for this position². As a potential or an actual candidate, Trump expressed his often unconventional views on various aspects of the U.S. policy, including on defence matters, an area where he severely criticized the U.S. decision makers for spending a significant part of the federal budget only to defend largely for free U.S. allied states whose defence was not of vital importance for the U.S. and which, moreover, were sufficiently economically powerful to afford to pay for it. This criticism, coming on the part of a very successful businessman like Trump, is not surprising because it seems natural for such a person to conceive politics in business terms and maintain that actions done for foreign states should bring back money and should not simply be acts of generosity. However, Trump's perspective on the U.S. policy towards other states raises the question of whether he considers that the economically potent allied states should pay

¹ See for example Sam Levin, Zach Stafford, Scott Bixley, *Donald Trump wins presidential election, plunging US into uncertain future*, 10.11.2016, accessed on 25.03.2017 at <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/09/donald-trump-wins-us-election-news>, David Francis, *Market Recover from Lows after unexpected Trump Victory*, 09.11.2016, accessed on 13.03.2016 at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/09/markets-recover-from-lows-after-unexpected-trump-victory/>, Karen Tumulty, Philip Rucr, Anne Gearan, *Donald Trump wins the presidency in stunning upset over Clinton*, 09.11.2016, accessed on 24.03.2017 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/election-day-an-acrimonious-race-reaches-its-end-point/2016/11/08/32b96c72-a557-11e6-ba59a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.6b3d72abcaf7.

² Justin Curtis, *Demystifying the Donald: Trump Past and Present*, 16.02.2016 accessed on 12.01.2017 at <http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/demystifying-donald-trump-past-present/>.



to the U.S. only the costs for their defence or he thinks that they have to pay the costs together with a mark-up in order for the U.S. to gain more money that it spent for providing it. This paper attempts to formulate an answer to this question and for this purpose there are examined herein Trump's views on this issue that he expressed in the context of the U.S. presidential elections from 1988, 2000, 2012 and 2016.

1. Donald Trump's view on financial aspects of the U.S. foreign defence policy as articulated in the framework of the 1988 U.S. presidential elections

Thirty years ago, in the summer of 1987, Mike Dunbar, a Republican activist from New Hampshire, visited Trump and convinced him to deliver a speech the same year in October at the Portsmouth Rotary Club as traditionally all candidates for Republican presidential nomination did³. Meanwhile, on 2 September, Trump bought one page of advertising space in New York Times, Washington Post and The Boston Globe, three of the most important U.S. newspapers, to present in the form of an open letter his critical views on the foreign defence policy of the United States⁴. This letter was created by the same advertising experts who had worked in 1984 for the successful Ronald Reagan's re-election campaign and it was entitled *There's nothing wrong with America's Foreign Defence Policy that a little Backbone can't cure*⁵.

There was, however, something unusual with this title because it contained the phrase *foreign defence policy* which did not have currency and failed to gain it since then. Trump chose to bring together the terms *foreign* and *defence policy* in order to move beyond the confines of the meaning usually attributed to the latter one in the US politics

³ Katie Keilly, *Meet the Man Who Encouraged Donald Trump to Run for President in 1987*, 12.08.2016, accessed on 08.01.2017 at <http://time.com/4448365/draft-donald-trump-mike-dunbar-new-hampshire/>, Hilary Sargent, *The man responsible for Donald Trump's never-ending presidential campaign*, 22.01.2014 accessed on 25.01.2017 at <https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2014/01/22/the-man-responsible-for-donald-trumps-never-ending>

⁴ Michael Oreskes, *Trump Gives a Vague Hint of Candidacy*, 02.09.1987, accessed on 16.02.2017 at <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/09/02/nyregion/trump-gives-a-vague-hint-of-candidacy>.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

where defence policy designated an exclusively domestic policy concerned with the structure, development, manning, training and equipping of the national military force in order to enable it to repel a potential invasion of the national territory⁶. The foreign dimension added to defence policy was designed to express the idea that this policy also covered the preparation of the US military forces for defending allied states that lacked the capacity to do this by themselves.

In the mentioned letter, Trump drew attention to the fact that the U.S. had spent and continued to spend a significant part of its own budget to ensure for free the defence of foreign states albeit some of them, especially Japan and Saudi Arabia, could afford to pay for it and, moreover, albeit they were not of vital importance for the U.S., they were not willing to help the U.S. when needed and they used the money thus saved to strengthen their economies for becoming more and more serious competitors for the economy of the U.S. Therefore, he argued that this policy enabled many foreign states to profit from the United States and to mock it because of that. Trump also maintained that, in line with this deficient policy, the U.S. were defending the states from the Persian Gulf and were protecting the shipping in that region because Japan and other wealthy states heavily depended on the oil exploited therein and not because that oil was indispensable for the U.S.

Trump equally argued that, as a result of this foreign defence policy being constantly pursued since the end of the Cold War and it being financed with hundreds of billions of dollars, the United States were confronted with serious economic problems which gravely affected large categories of American citizens, especially the farmers, the people needing medical assistance and those who had lost their homes. Consequently, Trump considered that the U.S. had to abandon such a disadvantageous policy and had to demand to the states relying on it for defence to "pay for the protection we extend as allies" which would thus spare the federal budget of the costs for providing this protection.

Trump's criticism is developed from an economic point of view which assumes that the criterion for assessing the U.S. foreign defence policy is represented by the effects that this policy has on the national economy; given that Trump

⁶ Isaiah Wilson III and James J.F. Forest, *Introduction to the Politics of Defence Policy*, pp. 4-5.



made these judgements as a businessman, it could be maintained that he considered this criterion to be valid for the assessment of any other U.S. public policy. Applied to foreign defence policy, this criterion reads that a good policy contributes to strengthening the U.S. economy, while a bad one weakens it. More exactly, a good foreign defence policy has to bring money to the U.S. budget by selling to foreign states the protection provided to them so that defence is turned into a service that could be bought at a certain price and foreign states are turned into customers, more exactly into customer states. It is unclear from Trump's letter if the foreign states should pay to the U.S. only the costs determined by the provision of this service, which could be conveniently called foreign defence service, or if the price they pay should also include a mark-up. In the latter case it follows that a good foreign defence policy is for Trump that one out of which the U.S. makes profit. His mentioning of the fact that the payments made to the U.S. by the foreign states it defends would eliminate the financial burden represented for the federal budget by the costs for defending them does not necessarily mean that Trump is of the opinion that all that the customer states should pay is the cost of this service, no mark-up being included in its final price.

The lack of clarity on the issue of the structure of the final price for the foreign defence service together with the fact that a profit oriented approach is specific for a business activity allow one to reasonably consider that the businessman Donald Trump conceived the price of the foreign defence service as including a mark-up.

Both possible views on the structure of the price of this service are incompatible with this one being provided for free to those allies who can afford paying for it and whose defence does not serve vital interests of the United States, but these views are compatible with this service being provided in this way to those states that do not have the financial resources to buy it and whose defence is of paramount importance for the United States, given that in this last case the United States pay in fact for its own defence and not for the defence of others. Irrespective of which reading of the price for the foreign defence service is upheld, its provision in exchange for a price implies that the United States should no more assure the defence

of Japan and Saudi Arabia if these states refuse to pay for this service. Considered from this point of view, the foreign defence policy criticised by Trump looks like a purely altruistic one because it consists in directing significant financial resources of the U.S. for supporting foreign states without expecting anything in return, not even gratitude. Trump's letter indirectly warns that the pursuing of such a policy entails more and more economic difficulties for the U.S. which at a certain point in the future could make the implementation of this policy extremely costly for the American society. Based on his letter, this dangerous evolution could be explained as the consequence of two simultaneous factors: firstly, the constant reduction of the U.S. budget (against the background of the U.S. economy being weakened by the economies of defended foreign states competing with it) and secondly, the constant or the increased level of the expenses for defending foreign states which lead to a more and more large share of the U.S. budget being appropriate for this purpose at the expense of the needs of the American citizens.

When later that year, on 22 October, Trump spoke before a large audience at Portsmouth Rotary Club, he reiterated his criticism towards the U.S. defence policy practiced abroad and explicitly included Kuwait among the foreign states that, alongside Japan and Saudi Arabia, benefited most as a result of it. He expressed his conviction that, through skilfully conducted negotiations, all states defended by the U.S. could be determined to pay for the defence it provided to them and this would bring to the federal budget 200 billion dollars representing its whole deficit. Trump judged this solution for equilibrating the federal budget as much better than the alternative one represented by the raising of taxes for the U.S. taxpayers and his point of view was enthusiastically endorsed by the participants⁷. It is unclear from Trump's address if the estimated money other states had to pay to the U.S. for their defence included a mark-up or represented only how much the U.S. spent for it.

Donald Trump's public positions on U.S. politics fuelled speculations that he was going to be the rival of George H.W. Bush in the Republican

⁷ Fox Butterfield, *New Hampshire Speech Earns Praise for Trump*, 23, 10, 1987, accessed on 30.03.2017 at <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/23/nyregion/new-hampshire-speech-earns-praise-for-trump.html>.



Party presidential primaries that were to decide the Republican candidate for the U.S. presidential elections from 1988. However, Trump denied his presidential ambitions after publishing his letter⁸ and equally while preparing his appearance at the Portsmouth Rotary Club⁹ and finally he did not run in the Republican elections.

2. The U.S. foreign defence policy¹⁰ advanced by Donald Trump as a candidate for the Reform Party nomination in the 2000 U.S. presidential elections

In 1999 Trump took very seriously the idea of running for the president of the United States in the 2000 elections, but this time on the part of the Reform Party, and presented his political views in *The America We Deserve*, a book published in January 2000¹¹. In the chapter dedicated to foreign policy, Trump criticised the American politicians for helping free of charge various states, including by military defending them, because in his view this generosity prevented the U.S. from concluding deals with these states which would result in them receiving a bill for the given support¹². The business language he used to express his dissatisfaction gives no clear indication about the structure of the price for the foreign defence service which thus could be said to encompass only the costs for its provision or these costs plus a mark-up.

However, Trump's ideas about how the US should conduct its foreign defence policy seem incompatible with his contention, made in the same chapter of that book, that the U.S. has to use military force exclusively to defend its vital strategic interests, no other reason justifying the resort to such an action, not even the protection of innocent foreigners who are killed abroad¹³. If this is the only case when the U.S. could make recourse to military force abroad, than the U.S. could not

⁸ Michael D'Antonio, *Never Enough. Donald Trump and the Pursuit of Success*, p. 182.

⁹ Fox Butterfield, *op.cit.*

¹⁰ Neither in this book, nor in the other texts that will be further analysed in this article, Trump uses the term *foreign defence policy* but, given its capacity to concisely express an elaborated idea, I shall continue using it with the same meaning he attributed to it in his 1987 letter.

¹¹ Justin Curtis, *op.cit.*

¹² Donald Trump and Dave Shiflett, *The America We Deserve*, pp. 141-142.

¹³ *Ibidem*, pp. 112-114.

always military defend other states in exchange for a price, irrespective of it encompassing only the costs or both the costs and the mark-up, because its vital strategic interests are not necessarily threatened each time the defence of its customer states is at stake. Within Trump's thinking on foreign policy, the lack of permanent coincidence between the vital interests of the U.S. and the interests of states it defends follows from the fact that the latter have to pay the U.S. for defending them by military means, a conditionality that would not exist if their defence were always of vital interest for the U.S.

A possible way of reconciling the two ideas is to suppose that for Trump it is in the vital interest of the U.S. to honour the defence contracts it concluded with its customer states because otherwise the U.S. would lose its credibility as a business partner and implicitly huge revenues that represent a major contribution to the federal budget and to the economic development of the U.S. Another way of reconciling the two points of view upheld by Trump is to suppose that the threshold for the use of military force applies only for the cases the U.S. pays for it from its own budget and does not cover the situations the US is paid for defending another state. The second solution seems more adequate because it allows for the vital interests of the U.S. to be clearly separated from the vital interests of its customer states, a distinction that plays an important part in Trump's reasoning. Moreover, under this solution one could maintain that, in exchange for a given price, the U.S. could use its military forces to protect against life threatening situations the innocent people from foreign countries which mean that in such a case it is possible for the US to conduct what is usually called a military humanitarian intervention.

3. Donald Trump's account of the U.S. foreign defence policy developed against the background of the 2012 U.S. presidential elections

In 2004 Trump again considered the possibility of running for the president of the United States in the elections scheduled for that year but in the end he decided against mounting an electoral campaign¹⁴. In 2011 Trump seemed more determined to enter the race for the 2012 presidential elections but, due to poor results in the polls, he opted for suspending its

¹⁴ Justin Curtis, *op.cit.*



campaign¹⁵. Despite not being a candidate, Trump released in December 2011 a new book, *Time to Get Tough: Making America # 1 Again*, in which he presented his views on US domestic and foreign policy. Here he argued that the U.S. president should be a very good international business negotiator capable to obtain from other countries important economic benefits for the U.S. According to Trump, U.S. politicians had to negotiate with foreign governments exactly like the best negotiators from the world of finance who "are hard-driving, vicious, cutthroat financial killers, the kind of people who leave blood all over the boardroom table and fight to the bitter end to gain the maximum advantage"¹⁶. From the perspective of these qualities of an ideal president, he severely criticised the outcome of the negotiations between the U.S. and two states whose defence heavily depended on the U.S. military: South Korea and Iraq. With respect to the negotiations with the former one, Trump argued that the Obama administration, despite having by far the strongest negotiating power, concluded a free-trade agreement which in fact provided more benefits to South Korea instead of securing from its ally as much economic concessions as possible.

Trump did not explicitly elaborate on the U.S. assets but in the same paragraph where he expressed his judgement over this deal he equally mentioned that South Korea wanted the U.S. to defend it against North Korea, a reference which could be read as implying that the provision of this military support had to be used as a leverage in these negotiations¹⁷. Trump equally argued that the U.S. should determine South Korea to pay it back all costs incurred by its defence¹⁸. This example suggests that Trump considers that, for the provided military defence, a state should pay to the U.S. both the costs, which have a determined value, and the mark-up whose value should be established by negotiations at the maximum possible level and which has to be indirectly paid by allied states through economic agreements which favour the U.S.

Time to Get Tough: Making America # 1 Again also includes a critical analysis of the 2003 Iraq war¹⁹. Trump mentioned that the U.S. spent around 1.5 trillion dollars and sacrificed the lives of thousands of its servicemen and servicewomen to overthrow Saddam Hussein, bringing thus freedom to the Iraqi people, and subsequently to defend Iraq especially against its neighbour Iran. Trump reproached the U.S. politicians their inability to determine the democratically elected Iraqi authorities to pay back these huge costs covered by American taxpayers as well as compensations to the wounded veterans and to the families of those killed on duty and he even argued that the U.S. was entitled to temporarily seize some of Iraq's oil reserves as a last option for getting them pay this bill. Moreover, Trump considered that, for avoiding these difficulties, the U.S. should have concluded prior to the war a deal with the Iraqi opposition abroad on the repayment of the financial and human costs for liberating and defending Iraq; thus Trump implicitly argues that the war had not to be waged in case of failure of these negotiations.

Trump's criticism reveals that in his view the Iraqi government had to reimburse to the U.S. only the costs for the use of its armed forces to oust Saddam from power and latter to defend Iraq, costs which include the compensations for the wounded and killed U.S. military personnel. It follows that the U.S. should add no mark-up to the price the Iraqi authorities have to pay to it but this conclusion stands in sharp contrast with the ideal U.S. politician as described by Trump because such a politician is supposed to gain for his country maximum financial benefits from any deal concluded with a foreign state. If all that such a politician should obtain from the Iraqi government is the reimbursement of the financial and human costs for the military operations, he would be a weak politician according to Trump's own standards because there is no mark-up for the U.S. and no "cutthroat financial killer" could be satisfied with spending a huge amount of money only for getting it back and he could not proudly present this deal as one which maximises the economic benefits for the U.S.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ Donald Trump, *Time to Get Tough: Making America # 1 Again*, p. 13.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 9-13.



4. The U.S. foreign defence policy developed by Donald Trump as candidate for the Republican Party nomination and as the Republican Party candidate in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections

In 2015, Trump decided one again to enter the race for the U.S. presidency but this time he went all the way to it and finally won the elections to become the 45th president of the United States. In his announcement speech delivered on 16 June 2015, Trump denounced the US foreign defence policy towards Saudi Arabia because its financial potential was not exploited²⁰. According to Trump, the mere existence of the fabulously rich Saudi Arabia is entirely dependent on the military defence provide by the U.S. so that the U.S. is in the right position to make Saudi Arabia "pay a fortune" for this defence; however, the U.S. politicians do not use this opportunity and they ignore that "there is so much wealth there that can make our country so rich again". Trump's wording suggests that the U.S. should obtain from Saudi Arabia the maximum possible financial benefits in return for its defence which means that Saudi Arabia has not only to reimburse the costs for the provided defence but also to pay a significant mark-up. This reading is also consistent with one idea that have been attributed to Trump in the previous chapter, namely that the U.S. politicians should turn the vital need of its customer states for the U.S. foreign defence service into an element of pressure within the process of negotiating the price for this service.

Later that year, in November, Trump released a new book on his political views which bore the title *Crippled America. How to Make America Great Again*. One of the topics considered therein is the Gulf War from the early '90 fought by the U.S. and its allies for ending up Iraq's occupation of Kuwait without any vital interest of the U.S. being thus advanced. Trump indicates that this war cost the U.S. many billions of dollars and claimed lives of its servicemen and servicewomen but that the restored Kuwait leadership paid to the U.S. nothing in return albeit "they would have paid anything" if prior to the war the U.S. would have concluded a deal with them on how much Kuwait

had to pay for its liberation²¹. In an indirect manner, Trump mentions that such a deal could include the obligation for Kuwait to make certain investments in the U.S. economy; more exactly, while criticising the inability of the U.S. politicians in relation with Kuwait leadership he expresses his indignation against the fact that some Kuwait businessmen that he personally knew did not want to invest in the U.S. and were allowed to take such a decision²².

Trump's view on how the U.S. had to negotiate with Kuwait seems to indicate that the U.S. should have used the difficult situation the Kuwait leaders were faced with in order to negotiate with them a financial arrangement maximising the U.S. benefits in exchange for its military involvement. Thus interpreted, these negotiations had to determine Kuwait to cover all costs for the military actions of the U.S. as well as to pay a consistent mark-up for them, the final price going well beyond what the U.S. spent for conducting these operations; as previously indicated, it could be said that a way for Kuwait to pay this price is by investing in the U.S.

When, in the same book Trump examines the financial benefits the U.S. should secure on the part of Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Germany and United Kingdom, wealthy states whose defence it assures, he mentions that they only have to share in the costs for supplying the U.S. military with the most technologically advanced equipment and for providing its forces with the best training in order to turn it into the most powerful military in the world²³. Trump emphasises that the share from the total costs for modernising the U.S. military that these states must pay should be a fair one. He appreciates that having an unrivalled military is of the utmost importance to the U.S. and that this is also indispensable for providing other states with an effective defence which thus gives to those states a strong incentive for paying a fair share of the total costs²⁴. It is to be observed that the costs the allied states are supposed to pay are directed towards strengthening the U.S. military, thus advancing a vital interest of the U.S. and of their own, and not towards covering what the U.S. spends exclusively for defending those states and

²¹ Donald Trump, *Crippled America. How to Make America Great Again*, pp. 32-33.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 33.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 48-49.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 32.

²⁰ Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech, 16.06.2015 accessed on 14. 03.2017 at <http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/>.



which thus serve only their vital interests. Trump equally indicates that the financial contribution paid by allied states in exchange for their defence not only enables the U.S. to better defend itself, but also helps boosting the U.S. economy as a result of the military equipment being produced in the U.S.

Therefore, by simply paying a share of the costs for improving the capabilities of the U.S. military, the allied states serve two vital interests of the United States – an economic interest and a military one – which could explain why Trump considers that they do not have to pay a mark-up to the U.S. for being defended. It is to be pointed out that the fact that the costs covered by the allied states should be fair could reasonably be read as indicating that they should pay the maximum value of these costs related to the peculiar aspects of the defence provided to them.

One could observe that Trump's book supports two different interpretations of the financial obligations incumbent to those states defended by the U.S. According to the first interpretation, which is only implicit and refers to Kuwait alone, these states have to pay back to the U.S. the costs, which have a determined value, and also a mark-up, whose value is established through negotiations. According to the second interpretation, that is explicit and refers to more states, they have to pay back to the U.S. only a fraction of the costs entailed by strengthening the U.S. military; one could reasonably argue that this fraction has to be continuously paid given the speed of the technological progress which makes necessary for new equipment to be provided to the U.S. military for keeping it the best in the world. However, it is to be remarked that both interpretations could be applied with respect to the states defended by the U.S. because Trump's ideas do not rule out the possibility that these states constantly pay a share of the costs for modernising the U.S. military and a price made up of all costs together with a mark-up for the situations in which the U.S. engages in military actions for defending them. Under this reading, Kuwait had to pay a price for its liberation and has also to constantly cover a fraction of the costs for maintaining the supremacy of the U.S. military. Trump's book does not provide enough elements for deciding which reading of the financial obligations incumbent to the states defended by the U.S. is the right one so that any of these interpretations could be given to Trump's

assertion that "If we're going to continue to be the policeman of the world, we ought to be paid for it"²⁵.

Trump further elaborated on his views on the U.S. foreign defence policy in a long interview he gave to New York Times at the end of March 2016²⁶. Here he argues that the United States assumed the responsibility to defend other states for free in a period of its history when it had enough economic strength to be able to maintain and develop by itself an extremely powerful military. Trump appreciates that the present state of the U.S. economy no more enables it to dispose of the best military and that for having even an obsolete military the U.S. is obliged to borrow money from other states like China and Japan. For these reasons Trump considers that the U.S. is "not being properly reimbursed for every penny that we spend" by the states it defends.

It is to be remarked that, as described by Trump, the defence commitments that the U.S. assumed towards other states when its economy was highly competitive, were not aimed at obtaining any money from their part, albeit there is no reason to suppose that such an objective could not have been pursued. Moreover, the fact that the U.S. has now to ask the states it defends to reimburse as much as possible from the costs entailed by their defence is presented by Trump as a resulting from its economic weakness which forces it to adopt this position. If in this interview Trump's position were that the U.S. foreign defence policy has to generate financial benefits for it, such as a mark-up, he would criticise the previous U.S. policy in this field for failing to do exactly that and would not justify in terms of the U.S. economic incapacity the need for this policy to be now changed. Consequently, in the mentioned interview Trump does not conceive the U.S. foreign defence policy as an activity that is meant to generate a mark-up for the U.S., but as an activity which, under the present unfavourable conditions for the U.S. economy, requires for its costs to be reimbursed by its beneficiaries. It is also to be noticed that here Trump no more makes dependent the achievement of the U.S. vital interest of having the strongest military on the reimbursement of the

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

²⁶ *Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views*, 26.03.2016 accessed on 02.04.2017 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html>.



costs for the defence provided by the U.S. to other states, which makes the provision of defence to them, even when they cover all costs, to look like a favour done to its partners and thus like something the U.S. has nothing to gain from.

In the first speech on foreign policy from his campaign, Trump reiterated the need for the states defended by the U.S. to "pay for the costs of this defence" and emphasized that the U.S. had to defend them no more if they refuse to pay this money²⁷. He also argued therein that a larger share from the U.S. budget should be appropriate for the defence sector in order to provide the U.S. military with the best available equipment and thus to turn it into an unrivalled military. It is to be observed that there is nothing in this speech clearly indicating that Trump considers that the states that are defended should pay a mark-up to the U.S. for it doing that but, instead, that herein he explicitly argues that these ones should cover the costs associated with the provided defence. It is equally to be remarked that Trump appreciates that the US could build up the strongest possible military by using exclusively the U.S. financial resources but one could mention that the reliance only on this source of founding presupposes that the U.S. no more defends other states as a result of them not paying the corresponding costs. In this case the financial burden bore by the U.S. for purchasing cutting edge technology is shared with no other state but, since the U.S. has to defend no foreign states, the budget for defence is not as large as when the U.S. pays in their place the costs for defending them.

Later on in the electoral campaign, in July 2016, Trump gave another interview to New York Times where he tackled again the issue of the financial obligations towards the U.S. of the states that it military defends²⁸. He argued that for the U.S. to make a good deal with these states on this sensitive topic it has to determine them to pay a significant part of the costs for their defence currently covered by the U.S. No distinct reference to the need for these states to pay a mark-up to the U.S. is here

²⁷ Donald J. Trump, *Foreign Policy Speech*, 27.04.2016, accessed on 16.02.2017 at <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-foreign-policy-speech>.

²⁸ *Transcript: Donald Trump on NATO, Turkey's Coup Attempt and the World* 21.07.2016 accessed on 03.04.2017 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy-interview.html>.

made by Trump so that all that he requires them to pay is not all costs entailed by their defence, but only a consistent share of them. Moreover, he mentions that such an arrangement represents a good deal which means that in his view one could make such a deal even without getting any mark-up.

CONCLUSIONS

The necessity for the U.S. to be paid by those states that rely on its military for advancing their legitimate interests²⁹ is the first major issue approached by Trump in 1987 when he was seen for the first time as a potential candidate for the presidency of the United States and it remained a central topic for him ever since. Trump grounded his contention on two arguments, namely that the U.S. economy, unlike in the past, can no more support these expenses and that it should no more cover them when none of its vital interests are at stake. But what exactly Trump considers that these states have to pay in return for being supported by the U.S. military is not straightforward because three positions on this matter could be attributed to him.

The first position is that such states are supposed to pay only the costs incurred by the U.S. for using its military to advance their interests, costs that otherwise would simply not exist for the U.S. budget. This position is to be found in the 1987 letter, in the books published in 2000 and in 2011, in the two interviews he gave for New York Times in 2016 as well as in his first speech on foreign policy delivered the same year. This position makes difficult to explain in the framework of Trump's reasoning why the U.S. would defend its allies only in return for the costs - and thus without obtaining any financial profit and without promoting any vital interest of its own - given that in his view the U.S. politicians have to behave in foreign policy like the best negotiators in the world of international finance and consequently they have to always strive for the maximum advantages. In line with the first position, what the U.S. politicians should only aim at is getting back the money spent in the interest of other states but such a course of action can be called

²⁹ It could be said that Trump identifies three such interests: defense of the national territory, liberation of the national territory occupied by foreign forces and the protection of the population against extreme violence.



neither a good foreign defence policy, according to Trump's standards for a successful politician, nor a good deal according to the usual standards for a successful businessmen like Trump.

The second position, which is to be found in Trump's book from 2015, reads that the states relying on the U.S. military for advancing their interests have to pay to the U.S. a significant share of the costs entailed by making the U.S. military the most powerful in the world and by keeping it that way. The costs for achieving this objective are paid by the U.S. irrespective of providing military support to other states, as indicated in Trump's speech from April 2016, which means that, by assigning this function to its military in exchange for a share of the costs for modernising it, the U.S. reduces its defence budget and stimulates its economy by financing with the money thus received the production in the U.S. of equipment for its military. Under this position, the U.S. advances its own vital interests by securing the interest of foreign states and in this way one is provided with an explanation for the U.S. foreign defence policy which accords with how Trump thinks the U.S. politicians should act in foreign policy and also with the profit oriented approach peculiar to successful businessmen. The fact that this position reads that the U.S. politicians must determine foreign states to pay a fair share from the costs for modernising the U.S. military could be equated with them being required to obtain from them the maximum possible amount of money relative to the degree of their reliance on U.S. military.

A third position, which could be identified in his letter from 1987 and in all his books, specifies that the states which advance their interest with the help of the U.S. military should pay to it a price which includes both the costs incurred to the U.S. and a mark-up whose value should be decided by negotiations at the maximum possible level in the given context. In this position, the foreign defence service is conceived as designed to bring profit for the U.S. and therefore, there is an explanation for the provision of this service with the objectives Trump thinks that are to be pursued by the U.S. politicians in relation with foreign states and which is also consistent with the profit oriented approach followed by successful businessmen.

It is not possible to clearly indicate how Trump considers that these three positions are to be all

integrated in the U.S. foreign defence policy, but one could speculate on how this could be done. To this purpose, it is first necessary to better discriminate between them by indicating that the first position refers exclusively to the costs for using the U.S. military to promote only the interests of another state (e.g. costs generated by maintaining troops and military equipment in another state or by employing them in combat), that the second position refers exclusively to the costs for modernising the U.S. military thus leaving aside the costs for using it in support of the interests of other states, and that within the third position the costs included in the price are occasioned by the U.S. military being used to further the interests of another state while the mark-up is intended to finance the modernization of the U.S. military. Under this reading, the costs for using the U.S. military to advance the interests of other states are generated only as long as the activities necessary for the attainment of this objective take place, while the costs for modernising the U.S. military are permanently generated as a result of the rapid technological progress. A state which covers a share of the costs for the modernization of the U.S. military, when it needs the U.S. military for pursuing its legitimate interests, it has to pay only the costs generated by its use. When a state which does not cover the costs for the modernisation of the U.S. military needs the U.S. military for supporting its legitimate interests, it has to pay the costs generated for the U.S. by the use of its military and also a mark-up that will be directed towards the modernization of the U.S. military. In both cases a clear financial benefit for the U.S. results from its foreign defence policy so that by pursuing it under these financial conditions a politician would comply with Trump's standards for a good politician but would also act according to the business logic of profit.

The issue of the price to be paid to the U.S. by the states it defends, despite being a prominent one in Trump's thinking about the U.S. foreign defence policy, is rather blurred and it proved to be resistant to a simple characterization. The analytical approach developed in this article serves not only the purpose of conceptual clarification, but it equally aims at providing a conceptual framework for considering the foreign defence policy that will be pursued by the Trump administration.



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THE ACTIVITY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR CONFLICT MEDIATION AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS RESOLUTION

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Abstract: *The rapid evolutions of the strategic context in the international arena have highlighted the role of international security organizations in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts and humanitarian crises. In cases of an acute crisis, when the situation oscillates between armed conflict and humanitarian crisis, it is necessary to find a middle way through dialogue to restore a fragile balance and start the reversible war-to-peace process. Finding solutions to reduce the risk of the armed conflicts, removing human suffering and having a long-term peace sustainability represent the goals of the international community that are reflected in the work of the international security organizations. This creates the premises for ensuring a global climate of security, stability and trust, based on international cooperation.*

Keywords: *international organizations; conflict resolution; humanitarian crises; international cooperation.*

INTRODUCTION

International security organizations are characterized by a constant activity of their own bodies with precise and necessary attributions, which serve the purposes for which the international organizations have been set up. International organizations are an "organizational form to ensure the international collaboration among states, in different fields, based on the free will of participants to achieve some agreed goals."¹ The permanent character of the international security organizations is one of their essential features "reflected in the existence of a component of a competent structure and permanent functioning established by a multilateral treaty with the aim of being a center for coordinating actions and harmonizing the efforts of the sovereign member states in various fields of activity on the basis of their free will agreement"².

Irrespective of the international structure we are discussing, whether we are referring to the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the international security

organizations are not a continuation by other means of the traditional domestic policies, as some theoreticians are stating, nor the expression of a process of evolution at a new level, that of the global or regional superstate³.

International organizations create the favorable context for the states to approach common delicate issues within a collective decision-making process. The spheres of competence, the rights and obligations, the legal capacity and the rest of prerogatives derive from the states agreement, recorded by the constitutive act. These entities represent an institutional form of cooperation. "Multilateral international cooperation is the foundation of a stable global system. Currently, in the field of security there is an acute need for such cooperation, given the complex nature of the threats that require a coordinated approach and the use of some resources that can hardly be provided by a single government."⁴ The role of the international organizations is essentially to provide an organized framework for international co-operation in order to mediate conflicts and resolve humanitarian crises.

¹ *Diplomatic Dictionary*, Politics Publishing House, Bucharest, 1979, p. 633.

² *Ibidem*.

³ Alexandra Sarcinschi, Vasile Popa, *Perspectives in the Evolution of the International Security Organizations*, „Carol I” National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2007, p.4.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

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The activity of the main international security organizations

The importance and necessity of international security organizations have been recognized since the nineteenth century. After 1945, their number increased significantly, both globally and regionally. The United Nations (UN) remains the only international security organization with the vocation to mediate conflicts and resolve humanitarian crises. It is also the most legitimate organization to intervene humanitarily, legitimacy conferred by the international law. The General Assembly and the Security Council are the two main UN bodies through which the decisions on humanitarian interventions are made. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1999, the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) aims to reduce human losses in a humanitarian or ecological crisis.

In December 2003, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 58/214⁵ in which the World Conference on Disaster Reduction was decided to take place. Its outlined objectives were: identifying activities aimed to ensure the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Johannesburg Implementation Plan adopted by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Disaster Vulnerability and Management; increasing the credibility and disaster availability of the agencies responsible for managing them in all regions, as set out in the Johannesburg Implementation Plan.

Worldwide, outside the International Civil Protection Organization, there are other humanitarian organizations within the United Nations (UN). The most important are: UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees; WFP - World Food Program; WHO - World Health Organization; UNICEF - UN International Fund for Emergency Situations for Children; UNCEF - United Nations International Fund for Environmental Emergencies; UNDP - United Nations Development Program; OCHA - Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The establishment of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO), its subsequent replacement by the United Nations Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the establishment of the position of Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs were designed to strengthen and improve the collective efforts of the international community in disaster relief.

Headquartered in Geneva, OCHA is the most important UN organization on civil protection. OCHA has a response network that includes the following subsystems: Disaster Response Unit (DRB), International Search-Rescue Advisers Group (INSARAG); UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC); Military and Civil Protection Elements (MCDA); Common Environmental Issues Unit (UNEP). In case of response to complex emergencies, OCHA is responsible for: monitoring / alert / alarming; perspective preparation plans; situation of agents provided by the agencies / needs assessment; the disaster response coordination mechanism; contact points and announcement. It performs in place disaster assessment and provides support for the coordination of intervention, ensuring the mobilization of the international community in providing emergency relief for humanitarian aid.

UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182⁶ defines what it means to coordinate the global humanitarian system. Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'Brien states that: "UN Resolution 46/182 remains as relevant and fundamental today as in December 1991 and the principles of Humanity, Neutrality, Independence and Impartiality continue to provide a direction for strategic, coordinated and effective humanitarian assistance for the people in need."⁷ Still viable today, the coordination mechanism has been through a constant process of adaptation to the new realities and humanitarian needs. The Emergency Assistance Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the Enhanced Dispute Resolution (PAC) and the Emergency Response Fund (CERF) have remained the core elements of the humanitarian coordination mechanism globally. What has fundamentally changed has been the

⁵ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/58/214, accessed on May 6, 2017.

⁶ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/46/182, accessed on March 10, 2017.

⁷ Stephen O'Brien in Global Humanitarian Overview 2017 available on https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GHO_2017.pdf, accessed on March 14, 2017.



increasing number of humanitarian needs, as a result of the emergence of new regional armed conflicts or natural disasters. According to an OCHA estimate for 2017⁸, over 128 million people in 33 countries around the world need humanitarian assistance. In order to face the humanitarian requirements for approximately 92 million people considered to be the most vulnerable, the international community estimates a sum of over \$ 22 billion in 2017.

The preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations are tools by which the UN carries out its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The DPA is the institution that conducts the preventive diplomatic actions in support of peace and in this respect establishes partnerships and cooperation relations with other international organizations, governmental and non-governmental, as well as with the states in the region of regional armed conflict, which to cooperate with in preventing the situations of humanitarian crisis. In 2008, the UN set up a UN Standby Team of Mediation Experts⁹ in the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) to lead the process of mediation, dialogue and negotiation in the humanitarian crisis area. These experts can be deployed either individually or in groups to support UN and special envoy actions, or to support other organizations in different regions or crises „hot spots” in the world. Preventive diplomacy is carried out through the missions of the High Representatives of the Secretary-General and through peace missions led by UN special envoy at „hot spots” around the world where situations and events with destabilizing potential are being monitored and humanitarian advice and assistance to governments and local authorities are provided to avoid crises and armed conflicts. This political-diplomatic process develops actions to enhance intercultural exchanges for intercultural knowledge, the elimination of racism and the creation of an intercultural partnership for development (such as UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation).

UN Peace and Development advisors provide

⁸ https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GHO_2017.pdf, pp. 4-5, accessed March 14, 2017.

⁹ *United Nations announces new 'on-call' mediation team to advise peace envoys in field*, ONU Press Release (PA/1), March 5, 2008. (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/pa1.doc.htm>.)

a partnership between governors and civil society and must prepare local leaders to support an internal negotiation process in support of peace and human security. These initiatives are of a strategic value and aim at reducing tensions in the complex political situations through a greater involvement of civil society and other non-state actors and their preparation to play a credible and significant role as internal and intermediary mediators in support of national or local initiatives on preventing destabilizing situations.

In order to prevent humanitarian crises and conflicts, preventive diplomacy is supported, if this is also required, by a military component, which refers to the capacity of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to plan¹⁰ a military force intervention to stabilize the crisis situations that affect the international peace and security (see Article 42 of the UN Charter). It is important to note that the UN does not have military structures of its own, but DPKO, the specialized military planning structure, can carry out the operational plans and, through a Security Council Resolution and with the military participation of the member countries of the organization, according to current arrangements, a military mission on the ground may be held within 30 days of the decision to do so.

The UN Peacekeeping Operations Department/ UN assess the situation in the conflict area. Peacekeeping operations are organized on the basis of chapter VI of the UN Charter, which governs the settlement of disputes. Peacekeeping operations include diplomatic actions: Transition Assistance - consisting of actions to install the civilian institutions of the state reconstituted on a democratic basis. In the framework of a long-term peace-building mission, the aim is to support the transition, from conflict to peace, with a political structure acceptable to the nation and the international community. An important component of peace operations involves the political missions that take place at certain stages of a conflict. In some situations, following the signing of peace agreements, the political missions supervised by the Department of Political Affairs during the peace talks have been replaced by peacekeeping missions. In other cases, the UN peacekeeping operations have turned into special political missions overseeing long-term

¹⁰ See DPKO role from the UN structure.




Figure 1¹²

peace-building activities.¹¹ Conflict prevention - includes a wide range of activities, from diplomatic initiatives, to preventive forces on the ground set up, in order to prevent the escalation of disputes in armed conflicts or in spreading disputes; Peace building – made primarily by diplomatic means; Peacemaking – diplomatic actions that support political, economic and military measures and structures developed to strengthen and consolidate the political agreements and eliminate the causes of a conflict; Diplomatic approaches to humanitarian assistance – are limited in duration and scope and may precede or accompany the humanitarian efforts of specialized civil society organizations and host country authorities (the first institutions responsible of providing aid); Diplomatic missions monitoring the defense of human rights in the theater of armed conflict aim to prevent or avoid abuses of fundamental human rights violations. Peace processes are the ones that solve conflicts peacefully, combining several methods of intervention: diplomacy, negotiation, mediation, or dialogue. Peace processes involve rebuilding relations, making efforts to reach a process of implementing the agreement, with a long-term or definitive resolution of the humanitarian crisis.

NATO has its own system of ensuring its gradual response to humanitarian crises through its command structures and some military structures of the Member States.¹²

The cooperation with other international security organizations denotes the real NATO involvement in the prevention of conflicts and regional humanitarian crises. A comprehensive approach at NATO level highlights the interest in comprehensive planning of military operations in order to direct the effort to plan and deploy actions to respond to humanitarian crisis situations in harmony with UN policies.

In August 2001, the necessary decisions for the development of the NATO Crises Management System (NCRS) were issued. NCRS is a political and diplomatic system designed to support operations to prevent humanitarian crises and manage regional armed conflicts, organized for operations of art. 5 type (non-operation 5). NCRS is a complementary and interactive operational system with the NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS), with the Operational Planning System (OPS) and The Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) system.

¹² UN Map representing the special political missions available at <http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/DPA%20USG%204561%20Oct%202016.pdf>

¹¹ See Figure 1.



The military presence in a certain area of operations determines at times hostile attitudes of the civilian population, a situation that does not favor NATO's political-military action. The Theater Engagement Center within the Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE)¹³ consists of military and civilian specialists in the multidimensional analysis of the PMESII type (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure), specialists in information, psychological, public relations and CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) operations.

The first peacekeeping operation took place on February 28, 1994, when NATO authorized the United States to attack Serbian airplanes not respecting the air strike zone over former Yugoslavia. Under UN mandate, NATO led IFOR to implement the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO was engaged in crisis management, peacekeeping, training and logistic support, surveillance and humanitarian aid missions in the event of conflicts or natural disasters, such as Katrina Hurricane emergency and 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, or the conflict in Darfour, between 2005-2007. NATO was also involved in counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations between 2001 and 2002 deployed Eagle Assist, from 2003 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), Allied Provider, Allied Protector and Ocean Shield operations in the Horn of Africa. North Atlantic Alliance forces were engaged in missions around the world, the most important being ISAF (Afghanistan 2006), KFOR (Kosovo) and SFOR (Mediterranean Sea, Horn of Africa and Somalia).

The OSCE has set a series of priorities for strengthening the humanitarian values assumed by the Member States and supporting them to strengthen the society based on democratic principles in order to promote cooperation to strengthen the regional security system. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe has been constituted in accordance with the normative text of Chapter VIII / UN Charter, the one on regional security arrangements. This pan-European organization is formed of 57 Member States and it is one of the most important regional institutions for ensuring security and stability in Europe. OSCE components, active in the field of regional security are: the High

Commissioner for National Minorities; the Center for Conflict Prevention.

The institution of the High Commissioner for National Minorities has as its objective to identify solutions for the peaceful resolution of interethnic conflicts, conflicts that endanger peace, human security and regional stability. The Conflict Prevention Center has as missions: early warning, conflict prevention, humanitarian crises management, and post-conflict peace recovery. The Conflict Prevention Center provides the planning of OSCE missions in the conflict zones, ensuring the implementation of political and diplomatic decisions to resolve humanitarian crises.

In the political and legal document of the OSCE, the Lisbon Joint Declaration on the European Security Model for the 21st Century reveals "European security requires the best cooperation and coordination between Member States and European and transatlantic organizations. The OSCE is a comprehensive organization of consultancy, cooperation and decision-making in European security matters, acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, and will cooperate with all security organizations and institutions in order to be able to respond to all threats to security in the European space"¹⁴. The cooperation with the European Union is an area of interest for the OSCE, being the regional organization supporting the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to resolve humanitarian crises. The legitimacy of OSCE missions emerges from their substantiation on the basis of the humanitarian principles enshrined in the UN Charter and in the international public law.

The OSCE has established modalities and forms of consultation to exchange information in areas of common interest: regular trilateral meetings of the OSCE - Council of Europe - UN; OSCE bilateral meetings - Council of Europe; representing, on a reciprocal basis, at different meetings. The large dimension of the international community's conflict prevention, crises management, and post-conflict reconstruction in the OSCE area is determining the pooling of international organizations' efforts. OSCE and NATO are committed to developing

¹³ Operational Structure in NATO, in 2010, which replaced the old concept of CJTF (Prague, 2002).

¹⁴ Lisbon Declaration on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the twenty-first century (2nd December 1996), available at www.osce.org/mc/39539, accessed on 10.05.2016.



political co-operation processes. Achieving good cooperation between the two organizations has produced remarkable results: a joint action on the monitoring and verification of arms control in the Balkans has been carried out. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) provided the necessary support for OSCE field operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure OSCE staff security and humanitarian assistance. The OSCE cooperates with the UN, NATO, the EU and other international organizations to resolve humanitarian (ecological) crises. Security approach in the OSCE vision is based on co-operation, to solve a wide range of issues: arms control, preventive diplomacy, increased mutual trust between states, respect of human rights, election monitoring, economic security and environmental security.

No European institution can assume its own management of the complexity of the problems faced by the Euro-Atlantic area. The OSCE is an operational instrument for the preventive diplomacy and for strengthening respect of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The OSCE will continue to play an important role in promoting a Euro-Atlantic security area. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/OSCE has as main tasks: promoting democratic elections in the Member States by monitoring the electoral process; strengthening the democratic institutions, strengthening civil society institutions; early warning to prevent regional armed conflicts and humanitarian crises. OSCE has developed a diverse range of conflict resolution missions: information missions in conflict zones; crises monitoring through the personal representatives of the Secretary-General; diplomatic missions through ad-hoc working groups for peaceful settlement of conflicts; peacekeeping operations under UN auspices.

The OSCE is currently engaged in various operations targeting South, Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia, such as missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, presence in Albania; the mission in Moldova and the OSCE coordinating project in Ukraine; the OSCE office in Baku and the Yerevan office; the OSCE center in Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek and Tadjikistan, the OSCE coordinating project in Uzbekistan. The OSCE accomplished missions

include the long-standing missions of Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the Kosovo verification mission, the mission from Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Georgia, as well as the Belarus monitoring group, the OSCE assistance center in Chechnya and the OSCE Center in Tashkent.

The European Union has strengthened its legal and administrative tools to respond to crises resulting from natural (technological) disasters and regional armed conflicts. Enhanced threats in recent decades have demonstrated the inability of European states to manage the humanitarian crises individually. The focus has been centered on common EU policies, with the development of the legal instruments to cope with a regional crisis to ensure humanitarian relief in emergency situations. There are political and strategic foundations and legal foundations of the European humanitarian operations for emergencies. Based on these, the administrative capacity for crises management is developed. According to some authors¹⁵, "the political and strategic foundations create only the soft law framework, while the legal foundations contain hard law of the institutional and operational organization. Both categories of foundations are necessary and useful in pursuing the effectiveness of preventing and fighting humanitarian crises." Legal instruments are applicable when threats materialize, and crises management requires European institutional intervention, making reasonable decisions. At the time when the threat has diminished, crisis management takes a political and strategic approach. The division between politico-strategic instruments and legal-administrative instruments is not clear in the different phases of the crises management; sometimes it is necessary to combine them in order to ensure the effectiveness of the EU humanitarian operations.

The 2003 EU Security Strategy, updated in 2008, assesses the potential threats to European security, setting the objectives for promoting EU interests, based on the core European values, the document being coordinated by the Political and Security Committee (SPC). The political-strategic foundations of European humanitarian operations in emergency are action plans that direct EU action

¹⁵ I. Dragoman, I. Vasilache, *National and International Strategies to Combat Threats to Security and Defence*, in "The Right to Good Administration" Comunicare.ro Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p.73.



in the area of human security. The EU's internal security strategy, endorsed by the European Council in 2010, defines internal security as a comprehensive concept to counteract the major threats with a direct impact on citizens' life and safety (natural disasters, technological disasters). It was created to increase the capacity of some institutions to respond rapidly to threats against the citizens of EU Member States. The Internal Security Strategy (SSI) is based on the premise of Member States' solidarity through the Permanent Committee on Operational Cooperation. The civil protection missions, as important elements of any modern security system, must resolve all stages of a crisis by implementing mutual humanitarian assistance between Member States in cooperation with other humanitarian organizations.¹⁶

The idea of developing a joint emergency response mechanism has been outlined because states do not have all the capabilities to respond effectively and promptly to humanitarian and ecological crises, without the support of the international community for limiting the effects of disasters on the civilian population. The purpose of the Community Action Program for Civil Protection is to support and supplement Member States' efforts at national and regional level by implementing a set of actions to protect the population in the event of natural or technological disasters and to facilitate cooperation among Member States.

The Decision of the European Council Nr. 2001/792 / EC of October 23, 2001 established the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in order to facilitate a viable cooperation between Member States in response to humanitarian crisis response interventions. The European Commission Decision of December 29, 2003 laid down the rules for the implementation of the Community Mechanism, setting out the responsibilities of the officials and how to use the instruments made available. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism aims at improving cooperation between partner states in the field of civil protection assistance intervention in crisis situations (natural, technological, radiological or environmental disasters that may occur within or outside the European Union). By European Council Decision no. 2007/779 / EU there has been a transformation of the Community

Civil Protection Mechanism.

At the European Union level, the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), subordinated to the European Commission, has been set up, a permanent operational structure responsible for coordinating the actions of the participating states, in order to assist a state affected by a humanitarian crisis.

CONCLUSIONS

International security organizations have successfully intervened in many conflicts with humanitarian consequences that have occurred throughout the world. The international community response was quick, efficient and generous. By the quality of this response, the international security organizations have demonstrated to the entire world the added value of synergic intervention actions in limit situations.

It is easy to note that the success of humanitarian crisis resolution operations is ensured by the application of a basic principle. The principle of cooperation with civil society, with national and international civil organizations which carry out campaigns and actions with the same objective, is to stop and alleviate the human suffering by providing humanitarian assistance. What matters the most is the way to address the problem, whether it bears the form of a crisis or other emergency situation and the means of escalating it. At the same time, the capacity of international security organizations for a global response in the event of humanitarian crises or armed conflict will likely be subject to a greater pressure in the future, given the scale and the frequency of conflicts involving the use of force and the adverse consequences for human security.

In this context, the treaties, the agreements between states, the conventions and the partnerships among various actors, both institutional and non-governmental, global and regional, acting to resolve the conflicts and humanitarian crises, will provide the opportunity to create a stronger international response capability that is more comprehensive, better coordinated, and more efficient. This will be possible by strengthening the intervention tools of the international security organizations and ensuring consistency and synchronicity among these different instruments, to the benefit of the international community coherent response.

¹⁶ *EU Strategy of Internal Security*, Bruxelles, Belgium, 2010, p.7.



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THE MODELLING OF DECISIONAL PROBLEMS

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Abstract: *The clear formulation of the problem and the construction of its descriptive model make up the main working tool for assessing the potential consequences of decisional alternatives.*

Keywords: *descriptive model; decision theory.*

The decision-making process includes the procedures used to solve efficiently and in a timely manner the problems encountered in the operation of an entity or organization, meaning an orderly sequence of logical actions, from identifying the problem to solving it, meant to trigger the system of obtaining, storing and processing information.

In order to ensure the achievement of the objectives pursued through decisions, it is necessary to include certain principles, the most important being the following:

- *The scientific substantiation of the decision*, resulting from the requirements of logic: the decision making process and its components take into account the realities of the market economy; managers must have the ability to know, understand and use market economy mechanisms, to demonstrate that they respect and take into account the laws of the market economy, the system of values and the individual and collective behavior of employees as well as the restrictions or, on the contrary, the inherent freedoms. More than in any other field of activity, the professional competence of the manager results from the harmonious blending of native qualities (intelligence, communication and relational skills, character and correctness) with the depth and continuity of managerial knowledge and skills;

- *The legality of the decision*, in the sense that the choice of the optimal variant must be made by persons legally empowered for this purpose.

The legality of the manner of acting, expressly stated in the internal organization and functioning rules, is claimed by at least two factors: the sphere or the decision-making field (the weight of the organizational structures that fall under the effects of the decision) and the decision hierarchies involved. For example, as the sphere of influence (share of affected structures) expands, so does the position (level) of the manager entrusted with the decision;

- *The decision-making option*, as a principle of decisional logic, reflects the timing of setting certain measures, depending on the correlated action of temporal and qualitative factors (the quantity and quality of similar products on the market, the evolution of competition, the business environment). A decision is only appropriate if, before being adopted, the management team has examined the costs associated with its implementation;

- *The completeness of the decision*, i.e. the possibility of examining all the factors (segments) influenced by the application of the decision. Therefore, the manager must assess in advance the social problems that may arise as soon as the decision is made;

- *The efficiency of the decision or the extent* to which the objective has been achieved by its achievement by improving the two components: effectiveness (measuring and comparing the performance with the objectives, criteria and rules established at the time of launching the decision making operational program) and decisional efficiency;

- *The coordination of the decision*, provided by the manager or management team who designed

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and implemented the line of action in which other persons with operational management responsibilities take part.

The canonical form of decisional problems

The clear formulation of the problem and the construction of its descriptive model make up the main tool for the evaluation of the potential consequences of decisional alternatives, a logical and rational approach that has to meet certain requirements, of which¹: coherence (ensuring the harmony which the normal evolution of the system depends on; correctness (the property of

set E and of the relations R, concretized in the sets E' and R', for which the correspondence and the information-decisional bonds are performed as:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 P = & \{E, & R\} \\
 \Downarrow & \Downarrow & \Downarrow \\
 M = & \{E', & R'\}
 \end{array}$$

The satisfactory expression of the model consists of an iterative process with successive improvements, more specifically from the collection and interpretation of data and information in order to know the E and R sets, as a sine qua non premise,




Fig. 1. The descriptive form of the model M²

not distorting the real character of the relations presented); consistency (the estimation of the degree to which the components of the process modeled by the links and relationships between them were identified and represented); completeness (inclusion of all component elements and relationships between them); efficiency or design of the model with minimal human and material effort.

In fact, the model is a faithful but simplified representation of reality, allowing for conscious action, based on logical reasoning. In such circumstances, a phenomenon or process (P), characterized by the set of component elements (E) and their relations (R), can be expressed sufficiently well by a model (M) consisting of a set of elements (E) and the other of the relations between them (R), if it permits the establishment of the two-way correspondence between E and E' between R and R'. Thus, the representation P = {E, R} can be considered as a general model of the examined process (P); the identification of the elements of the

of the realization and validation of the M model (fig.1).

MOperators are considered $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_x$ for the interpretation of relevant information, and $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_{k-1}$ for the representation of alternatives of the process of learning and assimilation of the model attested by the set of operators $\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_k$. The construction of the M model suggests the conceptual convergence whose canonical form of the problems to solve is a logical expression of the form: knowing r, ω must be found out, written as an abbreviation, $\langle r, \omega \rangle$. In this context, r represents the set of given conditions, and ω the purpose of the problem, achieved through a time sequence of trajectories in the state space. In the construction of the model R^s is considered the set of possible states and R^p the set of operators transferring the object to the state $r' \in R^s$.

¹ M. Andraşiu ş.a., *Managementul schimbării*, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996.

² M. Andraşiu ş.a., *Managementul schimbării*, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1996.

The achievement of the goal (solving the problem) is ensured by choosing the operator or their sequence that leads the organization in the desired state. The solution is reduced to identifying the construction and demonstration procedures of the problem in accordance with certain requirements. As the removal of uncertainty, specific to the passing of the state from the present to the future through the making of the decision, is made only in particular cases and on short term. As a rule, action is taken to reduce the degree of uncertainty when the information obtained from the environment is complete and the means of receiving and processing it do not distort its content, clarity and completeness. Particular attention in the formulation of the problem is given to the analysis of the set of conditions r and the definition of possible states ω , with the help of the logical form

expression³: „to determine ω ” $\Leftrightarrow \langle -; \omega \rangle$; as the set of conditions r is not specified, the expression becomes the objective pursued. Considering that this is incomplete to solve the problem, the next step is to establish conditions r , having the form:

giving $\langle -; \omega \rangle \langle r; \omega \rangle$ must be found, which, in turn, has the logical expression $r \Leftrightarrow \langle r; - \rangle$, called the situation. As this form does not determine a solution to the problem, the following hypothesis is formulated: being given $\langle r; - \rangle \langle r; w \rangle$ must be




Fig. 2. The logical representation of the M model after⁴

found. Thus, combining the two logical expressions $\langle r; - \rangle$ and $\langle -; w \rangle$ we can define the problem whose

³ Y. Allaine, M. Fârșitoru, *Managementul strategic*, Scientific Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 63.

⁴ E. Scarlat, *Teoria deciziei*, ASE Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995, p.16.

logical model is found in graphic form in fig. 2.

If the problem is correctly formulated, then the ways of passing from conditions to purposes are determined, consisting of identifying in the set R^p of the operators that transfer the object in the desired state $r' \in R^s$, favoring the goal ω . In other words, uncertainty is not reflected in the states of the objective R^s , but in the operators R^p . It can be noticed that the operators R^p which facilitate the passage of logical objects from one state to another are not always identified with problem solving procedures. While the set of operators concerned refers to the conditions given in the problem, the procedures ensure the choice of their set $R_0^p \subset R^p$ and the assessment of the achievement of the goal ω . Thus, the formulation and solving the problem is, in essence, an *information process*, which induces another kind of uncertainty, one belonging to the set of settlement procedures.

An issue whose solution starts from the canonical form⁵ $\langle r, \omega \rangle$ has the following logical structure: “being given X, X', Y, Z, C we must find out ω ” $\Leftrightarrow \langle X, X', Y, Z, C; \omega \rangle$ when:

- X and X' are the set of controllable and non-negative input factors and the set of uncontrollable and non-negative input factors;
- Y is the set of output factors or possible outcomes, so of the solutions depending on the controllable and uncontrollable factors;
- Z is the set of transformation operators or the transition from one physical state to another of input factors (the elements of this set $Z: X * X' \rightarrow C$ are operators or functions defined by the Cartesian product of controllable and uncontrollable factors with value in the set of solutions;
- C is the set of criteria set for choosing the crowd Z , according to the preference of the decision maker, given by the set of objectives ω .

Comparing the generic decisional issue $\langle X, X', Y, Z, C; \omega \rangle$ with $\langle r, \omega \rangle$ it is noticed that, in fact, the crowds X, X' and Y match R^s and R^p totally to r . We consider that the set of conditions encompasses the set C , but the elements that make it are of different nature (fig.3).

⁵ E. Scarlat, *Teoria deciziei*, ASE Publishing House, Bucharest, 1995.




Fig. 3. Representing the canonical form of the M model⁶

As the elements of these sets depend on the time, as it can be seen, the crowds can see X, X and the relationships between them, like the Y set, are before the set of Z solutions. That is why the component parts are written $x(t)$, $x'(t)$, $z(x+\tau)$, $z_1(t+\tau)$, $z_2(t+\tau_2)$,..., if all the solutions are not held at the same time. At the same time, in relation to the objectives, the criteria of the C set and the preferences of the decision-maker form the interface.

In this context, the criteria of the C set and the preferences of the decision-maker form the interface between the objectives ω and conditions r , criteria that are expressed in the form of rules (utility functions) by which the elements of this set are compared, which means that the preference is the most general form of manifestation of the elements of the Y-set, thus removing the uncertainty in the choice of the subset Z.

In such conditions, the optimal alternative of the decision is given by the pair $d=(x,y)$ with $x \in X$, $y \in Y$ and each alternative $d \in D$ matching a solution $z \in Z$. When the composition is unambiguous, in the sense that each alternative corresponds to only one y result and only one, it means that we are surely faced with a certain decision-making problem.

CONCLUSION

In terms of theory, the decision-making activity at the micro- and macro-social level, in which mainly actors with leadership responsibilities are involved, as well as some specialists belonging to the operational structures of execution, is mainly devoted to the correct identification and formulation

of the problems, the substantiation of the probable and possible alternatives, and the adoption of the optimal action line, based on explicit criteria.

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DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION OF THE NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT

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Abstract: *Analyzing the evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance's Strategic Concepts and highlighting the effects they have had on the international relations and on the security system allow the understanding of both the doctrinal approach that supported these concepts and the objective determination of their level of success, in terms of efficiency, and effectiveness. Such understanding ensures the identification of the possible historic repetition, namely the specific security context, and substantiates the relationship between the past experience and the current and the perspective actionable potential. The successful solution in overcoming state security risks through alliances lies not only in the cumulative effect of defense resources contributed by the Member States but also in the capacity to integrate defense planning and operational planning, when the consistent provision of the necessary resources is ensured.*

Keywords: *strategic concept; strategic capability; operational planning; efficiency; effectiveness.*

The efficiency and especially the effectiveness of a political-military alliance are determined to a great extent by how the ingenuity of the strategic concept compensates for the insufficiency of resources and capabilities by pragmatically understanding the evolutionary trends in the international security environment, by objectively covering the systemic vulnerabilities, by courageous risk management and by the harmonious use of operational and transformational processes.

The entire existential path of the North Atlantic Alliance, and implicitly that of the strategic concepts that ensured its functional success, were built on the power relationship between the Western Community and Russia, more precisely, on the need to coagulate efforts in the Western community in order to ensure the balance of power with Russia.

Even when, in 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union generated the apparent disappearance of the security risk that led to the establishment of NATO, the persistence of the strategic planners

demonstrated that the decay was temporary, that the risk itself did not disappear, and the involvement of the Russian Federation in the recent events in Eastern Ukraine, especially the action forms this involvement took, clearly show the evidence of this risk for the Central and Eastern European Member States.

On January 6, 1950, the North Atlantic Council adopted the Strategic Concept for North Atlantic Defense - DC 6/1¹ and the North Atlantic Regional Planning Guide - MC 14². Based on these two documents, the Regional Planning Groups developed and consolidated the Regional Defense Plans that they integrated into the NATO-DC 13 Medium-Term Plan, endorsed by the Defense Committee one year after NATO's establishment, respectively April 1, 1950. Even not centralized, the three documents ensured, through the interdependence of their content, the key elements of NATO's strategy.

¹ *Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area D.C. 6/1*, p. 2, Collection of documents declassified by NATO, Chapter II – *From Treaty to Organization*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/DC_006_1_ENG_PDP.pdf, accessed 13.05.2017.

² *Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500328c.pdf>, accessed 13.05.2017.

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The geopolitical analysis and the strategic capabilities of the enemy analysis showed that the USSR's intention to "*spread communism globally ...why Soviet leaders would not have hesitated to attack NATO states at the time considered appropriate*"³ would have been supported, if necessary, by both physical and non-physical resources needed to execute a set of operations⁴ involving subversive activities and global sabotage of NATO interests; maritime and air action against strategic maritime lines between the US and Europe; military campaigns in Western Europe, Scandinavia or Italy with transit through Yugoslavia, including a military campaign to occupy the Iberian Peninsula and secure the Gibraltar Strait; military campaigns in the Near East, the Middle East, and military campaigns with limited objective in the Far East.

Starting from this ratio of forces and intentions which was complicated and not at all favorable to the Western community, NATO's first strategic concept was aimed at the organization of territorial defense, simultaneously with improving the ratio of conventional forces to offset this severe vulnerability by the deterrence of any aggression against its members. The functional efficiency of this concept derives from its three directions of action, more precisely from their interdependence and complementariness.

In the sense of NATO's overall strategic objective, in case of Soviet aggression in Europe, the destruction "*through strategic counter-offensive in Western Eurasia, of the USSR and its allies capabilities and their will to lead the war*"⁵ would have been ensured complementarily by the five defense regions established on the General Defense Plan, as follows: the three defense zones in Europe (North, Central and Southern) would have taken over the main effort of the Soviet offensive, then fixed it on a steady strategic phase line, and the Canada-US Region would ensure deployment and commitment of resources for strategic counterattack and restoration of territorial integrity of the Area of Responsibility by exploiting the strategic maritime

Lines of Communication between the North American and the European continents under the responsibility of the North Atlantic Regional Planning Group.⁶

The concept decentralized the command of the actions at the regional level to compensate for the lack of a centralized command structure, exploiting the interoperability readiness level through direct cooperation on the basis of geographical proximity. The contribution of the Member States was proportional with their geographical position, industrial capacity, financial resources and already existent military capabilities.⁷

The improvement of the military power deficit in relation to the USSR was initiated immediately after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, when Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands requested mutual assistance. Based on this, the US Congress adopted the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, in October 6, 1949, where by the US President "*was authorized to provide military assistance in the form of equipment, supplies and services to those nations which are parties to the Treaty and who have requested support in this sense*"⁸ in the amount of 1 billion US dollars⁹. Under this program, supplies of equipment to Europe began on March 8, 1950.¹⁰ The program's effects were quickly felt together with the reinvigoration of the European Allies' military forces and of the European weapons industry. Resources were allocated in accordance with the necessary minimum requirements set out in the Medium Term Plan NATO-DC 13 and the implementation deadline of this plan, July 1, 1954, when NATO would have a sufficient conventional

⁶ *Idem*, pp. 61-62.

⁷ *Idem*, p. 3.

⁸ *Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 (Washington, 6 October 1955)*, Sec.101, published in *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 44, No.1, Supplement: Official Documents, American Society of International Law, 1950, <http://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1949mutualdefenseassistanceact.pdf>, accessed 13.05.2017.

⁹ *Idem*, Sec. 102 and 103.

¹⁰ *A boost from NATO*, p. 2, Collection of documents declassified by NATO, Chapter II - *From Treaty to Organization*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/#/en/encyclopedia/from_treaty_to_organization/the_means_to_build_nato/a_boost_from_the_us/, accessed 13.05.2017.

³ *Medium Term Defense Plan D.C. 13*, p. 30, Collection of documents declassified by NATO, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/DC_013_ENG_PDP.pdf, accessed 13.05.2017.

⁴ *Idem*, p. 34.

⁵ *Idem*, p. 10.



military force to balance the USSR¹¹, and when the Soviet Union could have counted on a sufficiently large radius of its long-range aviation, and implicitly on the ability to bomb targets, including nuclear nukes, on North American territory¹².

The Strategic Concept for North Atlantic Defense – DC 6/1 demonstrates not only the acute perception, at the level of NATO strategists, of a high degree of risk in terms of producing Soviet aggression on Allied territory or related to numerical inferiority in military resources to the USSR, but also related to the dependency of NATO's effectiveness on US nuclear capabilities¹³, in essence, the discouraging instrument by which the two aforementioned vulnerabilities could be overcome.

As a natural follow-up to the implementation needs of the strategic approach, the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area – DC 6/1 also included standardization and co-operation instructions between members on the organization of forces, intelligence exchange, arms construction and logistic support.

At practical level and in order to complement this strategy, in 1950, the decisional inefficiency of NATO's decentralized system over the super centralized and integrated command and control system (C2) of the USSR was overcome by: reorganizing the three European Regional planning groups under Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Rocquencourt – FRANCE and of North Atlantic Regional Planning Group in the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) – Norfolk, Va., USA; setting up the Military Standardization Agency and activating the Military Production and Supply Board and the establishment of the Financial and Economic Council.

Through the decisions adopted by the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, in February 1952, transformational measures "*representing an essential and timely step in bringing the NATO*

mechanism closer to the form that would allow effective collective action to achieve the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty"¹⁴ were adopted: the permanent Headquarters of the North Atlantic Council was moved from London to Paris, NATO Secretary General, supported by the International Staff and its own Secretariat, was generated, Permanent National Representatives of Member States or Permanent Missions to NATO leading national delegations were appointed, the augmentation of the International Military Staff was generated, with direct effects on the implementation of the North Atlantic Council decisions, on the consensus among NATO members, and on the consultation and decisional processes.

The simultaneous admittance of Turkey and Greece to NATO on February 18, 1952 directly contributed to the considerable mitigation of the unfavorable military forces ratio with the USSR and to the strengthening of the southern European flank by requiring the Soviet Union to dissipate its military effort on two Strategic directions along with the significant proximity of NATO capabilities to its vital space and, indirectly, to neutralizing the tensions between Turkey and Greece by converting a regional source of risk into a significant geopolitical advantage. Major discrepancies between Turkey and other Member States determined by the respect for cultural values, democratic principles and individual freedoms or those determined by the realistic needs and quotas from the amounts made available by the United States through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act allocated to Greece were overcome by the strategic advantage of controlling the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits or by the advanced positions for launching military actions in case of external aggression generated by Soviet Union.

The initiative act in the Revision of NATO Strategy, NATO Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Area - MC 3/5, December 3, 1952, does not differ much from its predecessor but demonstrates that, from the perspective of the strategic concept, NATO is a pragmatic organization

¹¹ *Strategic Concepts*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm, accessed 13.05.2017.

¹² *Medium Term Defense Plan D.C. 13*, p. 39, Collection of documents declassified by NATO, Chapter II - *From Treaty to Organization*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/DC_013_ENG_PDP.pdf, accessed 14.05.2017.

¹³ *Idem*, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Reorganisation of the North Treaty Organization, Note by Executive Secretary C9-D/4 din 17.03.1952*, p. 3, Collection of documents declassified by NATO, Chapter II – *From Treaty to Organization*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/C_9-D_4-FINAL.PDF, accessed 14.05.2017.



that is willing to learn from the identified lessons.

In the view of NATO strategists, the necessary and sufficient condition for Soviet Union to initiate an aggression was determined by the Russians' confidence in their ability to occupy the entire Western Europe, simultaneously with the drastic reduction of NATO's mobilization potential and strategic striking ability, which would have ensured access to European seaports in the Atlantic Ocean, air superiority and maintaining control over the occupied territory¹⁵. This hypothesis and the need to include the specific tasks generated by the expansion of the southern flank were reflected in the Strategic Guide – MC 14/1, December 18, 1952.

Complementary to the previous concept, the deterrence component included measures of diplomatic and informational engagement in order to neutralize the will of the USSR and its allies to bear the cost of a possible conflict with no chances of success¹⁶, and in order to balance the conventional force ratio according to a Development Plan to be implemented up to 1956.

In the case of the deterrence component's failure, the reactive level of the strategic concept referred to the splitting of the Soviet effort by engaging it in two directions and stopping the opponent as quickly as possible by executing some tactical delay actions on the main direction of the Soviet advance followed by strikes on the flank, concomitantly with the launch of the strategic air strike and the re-occupation of the lost territory. In comparison with the previous concept, the joint actions benefited from centralized Command and Control and from employing a superior quantitative and qualitative arsenal, as well as from the advanced positions designated for launching the strategic counteroffensive¹⁷.

This strategy was adopted under US nuclear monopoly conditions but under the pressure of the USSR successfully testing the nuclear weapon, which triggered the arms race between the two great powers and having a direct effect on the strategic concept and indirect effect on the security of the

Member States.

Exploiting the model already experienced by admitting Turkey and Greece, NATO continued the enlargement process by admitting West Germany on May 6, 1955, and thus replaced, from the terrestrial employment perspective, the advantage of engaging the enemy on neutral territory with the one of increasing the military potential by increasing the number of conventional troops, by preserving the territorial area, but also by increasing the economic support for the war effort.

The operationalization of the USSR's nuclear arsenal together with achieving the balance of conventional forces led to the paradoxical effect of concentrating the strategic approach on the nuclear effort beyond the intended effect of meeting the objectives set out in the 1952 NATO Strategic Concept. Practically, transferring the advantage from the USSR to NATO led to the adoption by the Soviet Union of compensatory measures to regain the initiative. By establishing, on the 15th May, 1955, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and Certain Eastern European Communist Governments¹⁸, as a replication of NATO, the USSR regained the numerical strength of forces and, implicitly, increased control over the resources of states inside the newly created alliance. Equally, the vulnerabilities resulting from the necessity to split the strategic effort on two directions and the deployment of NATO aviation in Greece and in Turkey led to the concentration of Soviet efforts on the numerical development of its nuclear capacity, especially of transport vectors by replacing airplanes with missiles, and by gaining control over the extra-atmospheric space. The success of these initiatives increased NATO's strategic dependence on the nuclear arsenal and led to a rapid advance of the Arms Race. In conjunction with Alexander de Seversky's assumption¹⁹ that "*the only feasible way to ban enemy atomic bombing (of the USSR) on some European targets was to destroy their*

¹⁵ *Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area M.C. 3/5*, p. 9, *NATO Strategy Documents*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a521203a.pdf>, accessed 14.05.2017.

¹⁶ *Idem*, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Idem*, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw, 14 May 1955)*, published on the site of Virtual Center for Knowledge about Europe – Luxembourg, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/b1234dbc-f53b-4505-9d86-277e4f5c20d4/publishable_en.pdf, accessed 14.05.2017.

¹⁹ Alexander de Seversky, *Air Power: Key to Survival*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1950.



*design capabilities in their launching area*²⁰, an idea strongly supported by US General Dale O. Smith, this situation led to the focus of NATO's third strategic concept on the Massive Retaliation Strategy.

Adopted in March 23, 1957, the Enhanced Strategic Concept for North-Atlantic Area Defense – MC 14/2 was accompanied by the Measures for the Implementation of the Strategic Concept - MC 48/2, the two documents mentioning the resources needed for the technological development of the medium and long range vector, especially the nuclear nukes that could be launched and transported with this vector, but also the importance that early warning systems and rapid dissemination of Intelligence systems had in their effort to compensate the Soviet advantage generated by planetary space control over the Lower orbit via satellites.²¹

Given that the ability to launch the nuclear arsenal was accessible to both sides and that *"the destructive capacity of these weapons, especially of the nuclear weapons, but also the low defense capacity against them raise completely new problems compared to those in previous conflicts, not only military, but also political, economic and psychological issues"*²², the fundamental premises of the strategic vision would have led either to the total conflict, or to the continuation of the Cold War after the engagement in indirect military conflicts or limited military operations²³, such as the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962. Since, without the immediate strategic and tactical engagement of the nuclear arsenal, the potential for preventing the rapid occupation of European territory was null, the Alliance's strategy provided for the initiative of nuclear armament use *"whether the Soviets use their nuclear weapons or not"*²⁴ and for the immediate capitalization of the advantage thus gained by conducting conventional defense reinforcement

operations in all environments²⁵. Although the engagement of a total confrontation would have generated a zero-sum nuclear conflict, time showed that the estimation of NATO strategists for concept success was one that proved to be not necessarily efficient, due to the very high costs of maintaining the arms race, but effective, once it discouraged a possible assault of USSR and ensured the territorial integrity of the Member States.

The consistent development of Soviet intercontinental ballistic capabilities, the very high cost of the strategy adopted by NATO for Berlin Crisis and, last but not least, the Cuban Nuclear Missile Crisis, October 22 - November 20, 1962, intensified the dilemma of accidentally triggering a nuclear conflict and determined discussions for a NATO strategy that included the nuclear arsenal but addressed conflict and crisis situations differently, depending on the particularities of each of them.

The official withdrawal of France from the Alliance's integrated Command Structure in 1966, the increase of nuclear arsenal states, the widening of the nuclear weapons spectrum, and the upgrading of the ballistic transport vectors led to a revision of the NATO strategy based on the doctrine of Massive Retaliation.

The move, after the adoption of the Wider Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - MC 14/3, from the doctrine based on the massive retaliation to that of flexible response brought about a balance of power between NATO and Warsaw Treaty. The NATO security threat assessment was conducted on the basis of a scenario where the USSR would have attempted to exploit any vulnerability of the North Atlantic Alliance within and outside its Area of Responsibility to strengthen world power position, using military, economic, political, propaganda and subversion resources.²⁶

The development of submarine nuclear propulsion systems concluded a series of breakthroughs with a major impact on the strategy which led to the "horizontal" development of military capabilities for both NATO and Warsaw Treaty. Thus, if the strategic surprise was almost impossible, the effectiveness and efficiency of the NATO response would have come from the timely interpretation and public disapproval of

²⁰ *The most effective pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next few Years M.C. 48*, p. 3, *NATO Strategy Documents*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a541122a.pdf>, accessed 14.05.2017.

²¹ *Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area M.C. 14/2*, pp.3-6, *NATO Strategy Documents*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a570523a.pdf>, accessed 14.05.2017.

²² *Idem*, p.8.

²³ *Idem*, p.7.

²⁴ *Idem*.

²⁵ *Idem*, p.10.

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 4.



the opponent's intentions, and from gaining the time needed to prepare and execute an adequate response simultaneously with the emergence of international political tensions. In essence, the strategy was based on two key elements: flexibility and progressive escalation, based on the ability to promptly and firmly respond to any kind of aggression against NATO states,²⁷ exploiting the advantage of the integrated decision-making system and the combined use of the nuclear arsenal and conventional forces.

As the Alliance members benefited from the sustainable economic development of the viability provided by the democracy-market tandem, NATO retained a slight technological advantage, under a equilibrated military power balance, which enabled its success in Arms Race and which, eventually, led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The functional longevity for more than twenty-three years and a clear superiority to all other strategic concepts gave the concept based on the doctrine of flexible response an indisputable asset in ensuring success, under the conditions of the Cold War.

Overall, in terms of conceptual performance, it took more than eighteen years of searches and permutations to establish the so necessary power balance to successfully fulfil NATO's basic mission and to ensure the so desired security in Europe. Despite its inefficiency, NATO's strategic concept in 1949-1990 proved to be effective, justifying the huge consumption of Member States' resources.

Following the absence of a direct and sufficiently strong threat to the security of the Member States, the three NATO strategic concepts of 1991, 1999 and 2010, transferred the functional focus from the main activity that generated the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance to the specific forms of response to asymmetric, dissymmetric or non-conventional threats. This approach led, in time, to the refinement of an integrated set of essential tasks that involves the complementarity between cooperative security, the specific and contextual management of crises and collective defense²⁸. But the same lack of a direct and sufficiently

strong threat to the security of the Member States stemming from the USSR's implosion was the one that opened the way for the reorientation of the Central and Eastern European states towards NATO and the use of NATO as a tool to protect the global security interests of Member States, including through crisis management or assistance operations to states outside its Area of Responsibility.

The period 1990-2014 brought the enlargement of NATO from 16 to 28 members, all of which were members of the peripheral sphere of USSR influence or even of former members of Soviet Union, as well as approaching some states from the vital security space of the Russian Federation, like Ukraine or Georgia, to NATO, with the declared intention of joining the North Atlantic Alliance. Such actions, despite the strictly defensive nature of NATO, seriously affected the security interests of the Russian Federation which, in the context of its economic revival and firm leadership provided by Vladimir Putin, reacted in 2008 through an offensive with limited objective in Georgia and in 2014 by launching a hybrid aggression against Ukraine, ensuring so far the control of the Crimea, its masked presence in Eastern Ukraine, and the opening of several strategic exploitation opportunities on several directions.

The adaptive measures package adopted by NATO through the Readiness Action Plan²⁹ at the Wales Summit, September 2014, their implementation, the establishment of new command and forces structures and the intensification of exercises and Air Policing missions in the Eastern flank of the Alliance provided more than the necessary but late response, the re-entry into the strategic context of the Cold War and implicitly in the descriptive scenario of the Security Dilemma defined by John J. Herz³⁰.

The relative advantage of NATO is surmounted now, slowly but surely, by the subversive actions of the Russian Federation, in the sense of a strategy aimed to destabilize the unity of decision and effort within the North Atlantic Alliance. Repeated

²⁷ *Idem*, pp. 10-11.

²⁸ *Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon*, Para. 45, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm, updated 31.07.2012, accessed 14.05.2017.

²⁹ *NATO's Readiness Action Plan*, published on the site of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_05/20150508_1505-Factsheet-RAP-en.pdf, published 08.05.2015, accessed 15.05.2017.

³⁰ John H. Herz, *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma*, article published in *World Politics*, vol. 2, nr. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950, p.157.



attempts to highlight the favorable conditions enjoyed by France or Germany in their bilateral relations with the Russian Federation, reducing the NATO capacity to respond by provoking the Air Police or Patrol Service, encouraging and amplifying disagreements between Turkey and the European Community, encouraging migrations from The Middle East to Europe by directly supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria and extremist nationalist movements in Europe, the amplification of Information and Psychological Operations, or the destabilization of the Eastern flank, are only part of the subversive action register of the Russian Federation. The withdrawal of United Kingdom from the European Union, the implications this action will generate on the Euro-Atlantic community and the authoritarian attitude of the current American president, Donald Trump, to the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole or to some of its Member States are just other risk factors to NATO's unity of effort and to its ability to respond.

All these facts prove the functional limitations of the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 and constitute arguments that support and advocate for the harmonization of Member States' national interests, as well as the identification of a new strategic concept, in accordance with the current and future features of the international security environment.

CONCLUSIONS

We are at a time when history is intensely and boldly written, where the ability to predict time horizons according to systemic trends no longer ensures sufficiency for strategic planning.

The typology of security events faced by state actors is not, in itself, a problem, but the technological progress of the last years, and especially the synergistic effect generated by the inventive, sometimes innovative, association of existing technologies with large scale social processes or phenomena, sometimes even with the applicative limitations of international law, lead to obvious transient effects on power ratios from predominantly defensive states or groups of

states, the so called "status-quo" states towards the revisionist states³¹. In such context, the strategic level doctrine cannot appeal strictly to the previous model, but cannot ignore the precedent and the advantages of the strategic concept adopted under similar conditions, either.

If, in terms of the adopted doctrine, the answer could lead to a modernist type of flexible response focused on information and cybernetic domains, the specific capabilities of this concept should be developed, not necessarily in the sense of certain functional characteristics but in the sense of very high level of adaptability to the unexpected, and self-development, simultaneously with generation and rapid assumption of contextual functional procedures. Moreover, such development requires the subsequent elaboration of operative and tactical level doctrines.

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³¹ According to the transient pattern of power - Abramo Fimo Kenneth Orgnaski în *World Politics*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1958.



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THE COMPLEXITY OF LAND FORCES ACTIONS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN INTEGRATED SECURITY SYSTEM

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Abstract: *The extended nature of the actions conducted by land forces is given by the multitude and diversity of the missions, by the capabilities of the combat equipment, and not least by the legislative dimensions concerning the use of force. Regarding the current security environment, the ratio of combining military and non-military threats has become very dynamic, so that we can state that the state of danger has become an indicator of the daily cohabitation of peace and war conditions. The hybridization of the engagement means and methods in a conflict, directly or masked under the confusion of the identity of the parties involved, cannot be classified either in the international provisions of the armed conflict or in the customs of the war.*

Hybrid actions against a state can be interpreted as actions with variable military geometry in the sense of combining the civilian and military parts so as to make it even more difficult to conduct countermeasures against them. In trying to identify a possible solution to the hybrid typology conflict, we have put in relation several concepts such as: event, state of security, action, effect and impact, resilience and consequence management. Depending on the degree of combination of the terms used to explain the conflict or the hybrid actions, we may assert the need for a military response, namely for the involvement of the land forces in the events.

Keywords: *threat; state of danger; hybrid conflict; risk; operational design.*

The multi-dimensional character of Armed Forces' actions

The complexity of the contemporary security environment is one of the most important features of everyday life under all the inter-institutional relations of the main stability-generating factors: political, social, military, economic, infrastructural, information-related or environmental. Due to the international context and to the events that characterize it, we consider that approaching security through the strictly limited prism of the military factor has become obsolete. This is mainly due to the shifts in the destructive action plan that have taken place in recent years, either in the form of terrorism or insurgency or other actions but with a strong destructive impact on everything related to the stability of the security indicators. The events in the US, on September 11, 2001, proved that a superpower can be vulnerable to an

aggressor with insignificant combat power but a very high ingenuity. Otherwise, from a different perspective with regard to security in general, it can no longer be explained in strictly military terms. Contextually, we shall refer to an extension of the concept of security to other areas impacting the daily life, such as the social domain or that of critical infrastructures. To this end, we anticipate the development of a more comprehensive security approach in the sense of redefining the roles and the interdependence relationships of all security generating factors.

Over time, depending on the political regimes, it was not infrequent that the efforts of specialized institutions from a security area were directed to other collateral security domains. We refer here to the involvement of the armed forces in some sectors of the economy, in industry, agriculture, transport infrastructure, etc. or the interventions in disaster areas, namely natural disasters or environmental accidents, as the Chernobyl case. We attribute this to the historical transformations and the redefinition of the security concept based on the most significant events with a major impact on the social and economic life in general. Thus, the armed forces through their institutional importance,

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but also through the possibility of capitalizing the potential of involving in the efficient achievement of the national or regional stability, can be actively reconfigured at least at the level of the capabilities to relate to other institutions responsible for security¹. In other words, we consider it is necessary to make an inter-institutional action correlation and to identify those areas in which the application of joint efforts increases the capacity to prevent and limit the effects of certain events with a strong destructive character such as: terrorist acts, natural disasters, ecological accidents and – why not? – hybrid war.

“The Hybrid War Theory” has become a reality, almost a permanent presence in the context of international security. The shift from a security state specific to a certain historical period of the “cold war” to another security state of “hybrid war” involves new conceptual approaches, and implicitly, resizing, role changing, inter-institutional connections and reconnections at national and even international level. The Crimean example shows how an enforcement of social changes could be replaced from outside by means of the classical war, with an “inner one” gradually built by the manifestation of actions specific to the hybrid war. This means that important changes in the decisive defeat of both military and security forces can be achieved from within the target state, by making its institutions and ideologies illegitimate. Turning from planning to implementing the hybrid-war specific actions has meant gradually discrediting the security institutions commissioned in the main sectors of power: political, economic, military, information or infrastructural, respectively environmental (in some cases) by gaining support from the population and finalizing the achievement of the goals set by the opponent in a given territory. Without the official declaration of the territory of a state as a war space, through the “hybridization of destructive actions” against it, we can observe a certain materialization of the multi-dimensional character of the “regional”-type conflict. “At peace time or in certain crisis situations², hybrid

actions approached legally are difficult to locate as compared to the potential moment of initiating open armed fight.” Therefore, until the decree of the state of war, the competence of managing the actions to counter the hybrid aggression belongs to the public order and national security institutions. For this purpose, the armed forces can participate in the initiatives led by other state institutions and implicitly plan, direct, and take over the command of inter-institutional operations involved in the hybrid conflict.

A comprehensive inter-institutional approach to a potential hybrid conflict may be a starting point for the timely preparation of a hybrid threat response. Such a response requires some early coordination, namely cooperation and complementarity between institutions bearing responsibilities in the areas of defense, public order and national security, implicitly with those similar belonging to the NATO and/or EU member states³. At the level of the armed forces, gaining success by engaging them against irregular methods of action (terrorism, insurgency, organized crime, sabotage, subversion, guerrilla fighting, etc.) can be achieved by flexible, fast deployable structures with capabilities to conduct operations in complex environments. In this context, we notice the diversification of a state’s aggression methods under the multidimensional aspect of all security factors. This involves the identification and the application of those military and especially non-military capabilities designed to resist the shock of hybrid violence and to prove the resilient potential.

To this end, the implementation of the operational art can be directed to gaining the decisive advantages and achieving integrated control of the multidimensional combat space (be it terrestrial, aerial, maritime, informational, cybernetic, cognitive, etc.) so as to ensure the timely countermeasures, respectively the decisive engagement of the opponent. The hybrid threat involves hostile action on multiple plans and sectors with security responsibilities where the role of armed forces is a decisive factor. The land forces, through the nature of their operations, can be actively integrated at the inter-institutional level to intervene in an expanded spectrum of hybrid threats, namely against the unpredictability of events with a negative impact on the population,

¹ GO no. 271/2013 for the approval of the Cyber Security Strategy for Romania and the National Action Plan on the implementation of the National Cyber Security System, Official Gazette of Romania, no. 296, Bucharest, 2013.

² Tudorel Lehaci, Marian Stancu, *Gestionarea crizelor din perspectiva nivelului operativ de comandă și control*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2010.

³ *National Defense Strategy for 2015-2019*, Bucharest, 2015, p. 17.



like terrorist attacks but also natural calamities, industrial accidents, etc. Given the nature of a state's military-generating resources, we can observe the complexity of the cooperative relationships that the responsible institutions are subjected to, as pillars of security under a political, economic, social, infrastructural, informational and environmental aspect. Therefore, the lack of close connections of mutual support to the above mentioned security pillars can lead to a certain fragility which, combined with the "poverty and ignorance" factors, determines hybrid vulnerabilities to be exploited by a potential aggressor. Redefining the internal inter-institutional relations can be interpreted as a basis for strengthening the security system, which will lead to the re-institution of the main actors as well as of the interdependencies between them. Thus, the impact of hybrid attacks on security sectors could be taken over by other structures adjacent to the affected security sector, leading to the increased resilience of the security system as a whole. For this, as an example, we will refer to the complexity of land forces operations in terms of the two action dimensions: to take over the impact of "hybrid attacks" on society and to plan the response from the perspective of consequences management.

Planning Land Forces Operations as a Coherent Sequence of Events to the Integrated Security System

The approach of land forces actions in the context of a hypothetical hybrid conflict can direct the military planner towards areas specific to armed conflict (offensive, defense, etc.) where he has to develop solutions to solve a security issue. The definition of the operational framework and the description of how institutional tasks are integrated into a unitary concept for countering hybrid threats can be initiated on the basis of the first estimates resulting from the establishment of the data bases. The degree of comprehensiveness and particularization of the data bases is directly proportional to the multitude of types of operations that land forces can perform. This results precisely in the multi-dimensional character of the land forces operations which except those belonging to the armed conflict, can also be: crisis response operations, countermeasures against a specific threat (counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency

or counter-crime operations), electromagnetic operations, Cyber space operations, military effort to peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, sanctions and embargoes, critical infrastructure protection, freedom of navigation and overflight, and so on.

A first observation on the multidimensional nature of the possible operations carried out by the land forces is that they cannot act independently, outside the operational framework of other institutions with responsibilities in the fields of security (political, economic, social, etc.). The fact that several actors with different interests can act on a potential conflict region or area, makes it of vital importance to have a description of the situation and the awareness concerning the role of each actor. In order to avoid surprise, a proactive approach is preferable to a reactive one. For this purpose we have identified the method of *correlating the action effort to the event*. We understand the event as the part of the reality that is in the process of sequential realization, where actions and counter-actions take place, and interactions between the parties involved and less involved in the event. The operationalization of the term *event* and its integration into the description of reality for a particular conflict area help us acquire situational awareness, understand the past and the present, and especially plan actions for the fulfillment of operations that will meet the objectives to the desired end state, which, as a peculiarity, is not the same as the initial state of normality.

A second observation is related to the way of describing the courses of action of a structure, respectively of developing the concept of the operation or a scenario based on the term of event. In practice, a number of indicators are nominated which help develop estimates and identify events, some of which presenting a high-risk status (weather phenomena, environmental pollution, terrorist actions, armed conflict, etc.) and leading to a certain state of danger. Also based on the notion of event, variants and ways of assessing an intervention/prevention under risk conditions are analyzed, no matter which the field of use we refer to might be. As an example, according to previous events, based on indicators and on the effects produced or expected in a given area, a series of interaction chains can be identified. Due to the specific capabilities, the military component



can be found as an action vector for influencing certain situations, as in Figure 01 of relationships between the subjects of several distinct events. On the analysis of these events, of the action-cause-effect relationships, the chains of interactions between the subjects participating in the events can be described. Depending on the share and the degree of involvement of the subjects in the event,

analysis of the tandem of threats and vulnerabilities can be made. The role of the analyst, respect, namely of the military planner, is to identify the best course of events likely to happen, so as to meet the objectives leading to the desired end state. Therefore, he will analyze one or more events and the dynamics of the relationships existing between them, based on the role of the actors involved in the




Fig. 1. Variant⁴ of the relationship scheme between subjects participating in several related events, based on the action-cause-effect concept

the results can be estimated and the situations with high level of risk, respectively state of danger, can be described.

A third observation consists in applying the notion of *event* to the time scale, of what has happened, what is happening and what is going to happen. Building a scenario or a course of action, namely the concept of an operation, can be done relatively easily starting from the notion of event. Defining or characterizing a risk, an opportunity, is also performed through the notion of event, which may or may not come to happen at a given place and moment. States can be described by means of the events and certain actions of the actors or the enemy can be estimated. The occurrence of certain events estimated to take place confirms or denies certain hypotheses or theories about a region or an actor. Therefore, the actions of the land forces can be included "in the game of events" and a spectral

studied context.

Due to the existence of the numerous factors of influence of the analyzed situations, some events are difficult to characterize. For example, an opponent's actions in a military operation can be guessed and subsequently offensive or defensive responses can be developed. However, what cannot be known is given by the impact that some events may have on the situations of the analyzed structures. The unpredictability of the impact of certain events is directly proportional to the quantity and the nature of the effects. For this, any structure involved in a military operation⁵ must raise the question whether or not it can survive the impact

⁴ Gheorghe Văduva, *Elemente de management al situațiilor de urgență și de risc extrem*, <http://iss.ucdc.ro/studii-pdf/Management%20urgente.pdf>, accessed on 30.04.2017.

⁵ Martin Iulian, *Raționament și argumentare în planificarea operațiilor*, "Carol I" National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, 2015.



of confronting the enemy or certain environmental conditions. In other words, in order to survive a particular negative event, the resilience conditions of either the structure in question or the action designed to be conducted by the analyzed structure must be implicitly formulated. The diversity and the interdependence of threats and vulnerabilities to forces involved in a conflict (regardless of its nature, classical or hybrid) highlights the complexity of the measures needed to combat and counteract the risks posed by the situation. For the relevance of the above, we will address some aspects of integrated crisis management. According to the valid documents, land forces have certain responsibilities and competencies in the field of integrated crisis management in the areas of defense, public order, counter-terrorism, cyber defense and civil emergencies. Thus, the dimensional character of the actions of the land forces becomes even more complex and the crisis management process in NATO concept can be structured in phases and sequences such as:

- Preventive options;
- Crisis response measures;
- Counter surprise;
- Counter aggression;
- Security alert statuses, etc.

Through the role that each institution plays⁶ in the crisis response plan, it contributes to maintaining the security state according to its pre-designed competencies. The problem arises when those potential vulnerabilities have not been identified and, implicitly, no means have been established for countering aggression by surprise, respectively hazard states to which one or more security factors are exposed can be generated. The integrated security system can perform situation analysis through the contribution of each designated security element. Therefore, describing the security reality through the concept of event helps us to rapidly disseminate information about a potential imminent danger, as well as the timely engagement of counter-forces. The timely awareness and evaluation of the potential causes and the effects adjacent to each possible event may lead to a decrease in the level of risk or partial control of the risk through the appropriate intervention of the security factor in the affected area. According

⁶ http://www.ipp.md/public/files/Proiecte/1-conceptual_secunitate.pdf, accessed on 04.05.2017.

to some security applications⁷, the approach of the concept can be dual: in a *restrictive* sense, specific only to interventions of the militarized structures and in a *permissive* sense, involving the intervention or support of other non-militarized structures belonging to the field of justice or not legally recognized, as shown in Figure 02.

Whatever the way to address the security concept might be, effective crisis management should take into account the level and size of the main security factor intervention on the affected sector and the means to involve other factors for mitigating the impact and limiting the negative consequences. Every possible event can generate, in the dynamics of its manifestation, other events leading to the other security sectors. Therefore, the planning of land forces operations can be regarded as a coherent sequence of events towards an integrated security system. The integrated approach to the security system from a dual perspective will involve the actions of the land forces in a much wider area of responsibility than the militarized restrictive field. In other words, the actions of the land forces can also be involved in the permissive area, of the confrontations with the non-militarized or illegitimate structures (liberation armies, guerrilla units, etc.). Without a prior integration of all the actions of the actors involved in an event, whatever that might be, the outcome of the operations or phases of the land forces operations can be severely affected. Regarding this, the overall security situation will be more difficult to control due to overlapping tasks, confusion and lack of coherence in achieving the effects.

In the context of achieving an integrated security situation, the application of the concept of event or succession of events can be beneficial only if it is done based on timely prepared plans. To prevent and counteract the effects of dangerous situations, contingency plans must be written in a collaborative manner for all actors with security-generating potential. The difficulty of designing and implementing such plans resides in the intervention of numerous random factors, the impossibility of estimating all events with a destructive impact that create the situations of potential danger. Considering the explicit action capabilities of the land forces, in the context of the possibility of an event which can pose a security threat, we developed a series of

⁷ *Ibidem*, p.3.



Actors and Systemic Approach			
Approach	Sector	State Oriented	People Oriented
Restrictive	Militarized structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Armed forces - Police - Gendarmes - Paramilitary forces - Presidential guards - Information services - Coastguard - Border police - Customs Police - Border Guards - Reserves 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local security units (popular guards)
Permissive	Structures in the field of justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Judicial institutions - Criminal prosecution bodies (if they are demilitarized) - Courts of law and tribunals - Bailiffs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Human rights committees - Lawyers - Public organizations
	Illegal structures		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liberation armies - Guerilla units - Private security companies

Fig. 2. Variant of the dual approach to the concept of security

conclusions and recommendations directed mainly towards the decision-makers.

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout this article, we have put together a series of opinions on how to systematically interpret security through the possibility of an event or a sequence of events to happen, thus generating danger situations. We have shown the possibility of approaching the actions of land forces in the context of a hypothetical hybrid conflict, in which the major role of counteraction is played by the actor whose security sector is affected. Involvement of the land forces actions in the event of a hybrid conflict is gradual and depends directly on the extent and consistency of the data bases and the ways of relating the responsible factors for the security domains.

The surprise occurrence of events with a negative impact on security can be prevented and countered by appropriate plans and measures. For this purpose it is necessary to adopt specific methodologies that can include actions of all

responsible actors, namely their orderly and efficient going into action. A first set of methods and methodologies can refer to identifying and analyzing hazards, threats, vulnerabilities and risks across the range of danger generating situations. For this, we distinguish several successive steps. The first step consists in drawing up lists of possible dangers, threats, vulnerabilities and risks (DTVR) for each security area. The second step can be to analyze each element in the first step and describe the possible relations between them. Next comes the step of examining each potential hazard, based on precedents, each threat, each vulnerability and the components of the resulting risk, assumed or just estimated (the analysis is done separately, but also in context, with the identification and assessment of the impact on each security domain, etc.). The step of determining the level of risk for each individual situation is based on the analysis and the evaluation of each category of dangers and threats correlated on vulnerability levels and depending on the involved factors of influence. Finally, to capitalize on the previous steps, estimates are made on the possibility of certain states generating events to



occur, with actual reference to the effects they can produce.

Another way to involve land forces actions in solving security threat situations is to plan operations and achieve the relation between estimated events, depending on the calculated level of danger and threat. For this we distinguish at least three components at the level of planning and engagement in the event. Preventive action planning is based on the level of danger and threat, elements deduced from the estimates for the most likely to happen events with negative impact and generating danger states. Here, we describe the actual conditions, the available forces and means, we establish the assigned resources and we develop sets of measures that are constantly updated. Depending on the time available, it is possible to develop exact interventions, on variants and levels of danger, for each type of threat and risk identified, depending on the policies, strategies, forces, means and resources specific to each designated security operator for each event. Similar to the response plans, reaction plans are also developed. In this context, the reaction is the action or actions strictly conditioned by the nature, structure, extent and manner of occurrence of the danger-generating event. In this respect, it is necessary to organize and plan not only the intervention but also the reactions implied by the event. We distinguish the intervention as being the action designed to solve a situation caused by a challenge, a danger, a threat, or to counter some vulnerability, while the reaction is an intervention determined by the on-going or already happened event.

By applying the concept of event in the case of possible hybrid actions against a state, the countermeasures can be expressed as a multitude of actions with variable military geometry in the sense of combining both the military and non-military parts, implying a high complexity of the involvement of the land forces actions.

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ISLAMIC IDENTITY, OIL AND GLOBAL INSECURITY – AFIRMING SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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*Professor Ioan CRĂCIUN, PhD***

Abstract: For more than Six decades, Saudi Arabia has suffered criticism from its citizens for indulging with the United States of America; with whom it sustains a sound military alliance since 1943. The vulnerability arising from interdependence on Oil between the two seems to make both entities insensitive to socio-political sensitivities generated by a clash between their respective ideas, values and principles. The attendant hostility from Islamist ideologists and radicals, till date remains a compelling issue to global peace and security.

This article therefore studies Oil as the key geopolitical element among other intermingling factors, interests and goals in oil rich regions with particular reference to the Middle East. It is to reveal that protracted acts of terror and consequent global insecurity drive impetus from the "do or die" struggle for access and control of oil wells and its uninterrupted supply to the global market.

Keywords: Oil; Civilization; Identity; Terrorism; Moral questions; Quandary; Interdependence.

INTRODUCTION

As postulated by Huntington, a civilization refers 'to a socio-political entity, with a people of common cultural identity, a shared history and an agreed system of values. Similarly, Melko argues that Civilizations can be characterized and distinguished from one another through the composition and the nature of relationships within them.¹ They may therefore be seen as unique cultural entities with internal political organizations to protect them from alien penetration.

The United States of America and Saudi Arabia in the above regard, hold opposing truth claims about the nature of life on Earth when viewed as distinct civilizations. Similarly, they uphold different ideas, values and principles, which form the laws guiding and guarding their respective ways of life. According to Keohane and Nye, Jr. in

¹ M. Melko, *The Nature of Civilizations*, Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969, p. 2.

their book 'Power and Interdependence', the strong military alliance and economic interdependence between the two countries have generated, since 1949, moral questions and, at times, internal revolt from their respective citizens. The Saudi citizens were concerned about the presence of people they consider infidels on holy lands and found the relationship with the Saud ruling family as a plunder on Saudi riches, corruption and dictation on its rulers, and an American instrument to terrorize its Muslim neighbors (Saudi Arabia).²

The American public on the other hand they (Keohane and Nye, Jr.) further explain sees Saudi Arabia as an oil-rich authoritarian monarchy, resistant to democracy and notorious in the abuse of human rights.³ In spite of the aforementioned sensitivities generated by this relationship in the region and beyond, the relationship between the two has been maintained due to the relevance of oil to global economic prosperity and industrial prowess. Accordingly, it seems rational that economic interdependence between the two civilizations remains superior to any socio-political sensitivity arising from it.

² R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, Pearson, 2012, p. 43.

³ R. O Keohane, J. S. Nye, *op.cit*, pp. 51-53.

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In the above scenario, it becomes feasible that the exhaustion of oil reserves and continuous decline of world output revealed by Klare, may exacerbate geopolitical frictions caused by local sensitivities in the region. Similarly, since diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral interdependence and other modern legal and economic instruments have remained incapable of ensuring the continuous flow of oil to distant areas in times of war and crises, the

and special operations) to override any socio-political and economic sensitivities arising in the Middle East as revealed by James Adams.⁶

The combination of these elements makes it possible that global security could be greatly influenced by the exhaustion of oil reserves and the ever-increasing demand for oil the world over as indicated in the Global Hubert Peak Forecast of Future Global Oil Output in figure 1 below.




Fig. 1. The Global Hubert Peak Forecast of Future Global Oil Output Source:www.daviesand.com/Perspectives/Forest_Products/Oil_Reserves/

situation leaves the use of force viable in protecting oil reservoirs from protracted assaults by those who abhor the Americans and ensure strategic dominance over the region.⁴

From an understanding of the Islamic vanguard recommended by Syed Qutb against alien penetration in Islamic societies,⁵ it is constructive to argue that acts such as suicide bombing and other forms of violence, targeted against non-combatants, carried out by a person or a group of persons identifiably Islamic, though instigated by the enforcement of Western ideas, values and principles in the region, derive significant impetus from oil politics, which combines with modern trends in warfare (terrorism

The great power struggles over oil, coupled with the "do or die" hankering over control of oil wells in the Middle East as revealed by Klare, the fact that governments lose autonomy for fear of costly effects during economic interdependence as explained by Josef and David coupled with the attendant loss of legitimacy (from respective citizens) revealed by Henry Kissinger, makes it reasonable that Islamist terrorism drives impetus from continued suppression of Islamic sensitivities by a people considered infidels. An objective understanding of this article is intended to assert the relevance of local sensitivities as compelling factors in modern geopolitical thought and global security as proposed by Social Constructivist terrorists.

⁴ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2012, pp. 20-21.

⁵ Syed Qutb Syed, *Milestones*, Kazi Publications, 1964, pp. 12-79.

⁶ James Adams, *Secret Armies*, The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988.



1. Why the Black Gold?

As revealed by Klare, Oil - the black gold - is a fossil fuel found naturally in some geographic locations around the globe. It is a natural energy resource used for various domestic and industrial purposes. Indeed, since the Industrial Revolution and the invention of petrol powered engines, oil becomes increasingly valuable due to the network effects of its uses. For the common man, it is easily observable that oil is used in virtually every aspect of human activity today. Klare citing energy expert Edward L. Morse, asserts that oil is situated at the core of modern industrial economy—a major source of energy and key driver of economic growth.⁷ In transportation, road networks, airlines, warplanes, ships, cars, oil provides 97% of all fuels used today in America. In industries, it provides energy for power plants and serves as a raw material for a wide range of products like plastic, sulphur, etc. Mechanized agriculture and mass production of food also relies heavily on it for energy. In the domestic front, the generation of electricity for heating and lighting homes and schools largely depends on fuel.⁸

Oil candidly deserves the title of “the most versatile and important raw material ever discovered” as tagged by Klare. Similarly, Amuzegar highlights that beyond its economic uses, oil plays a vital role in the national security of a country. Military equipment such as naval ships, war planes, armored vehicles and other fighting machines remain entirely dependent on petroleum.⁹ Accordingly, man’s dependence on implements powered by oil has continuously increased the capacity to consume it in both developing and developed countries. Its role in sub-urban commerce, agriculture, petrochemicals, and tourism affirms its centrality to the vigor of modern development especially in the first world countries like the USA and its European allies. Accordingly, it becomes obvious that oil forms the backbone of economic, industrial, scientific and social developments as well as military strength for all major and small economies in the world as understood by Michael and Amuzegar among

⁷ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2012, p. 7.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

⁹ J. Amuzegar, *Managing the Oil Wealth – OPEC windfalls and Pitfalls*, I.B. Taurus Publishers, 2001, p. 10.

others. The survival, growth and vibrancy of contemporary economic development and power of America in fact depend on oil as asserted by the former US Secretary of Energy Abraham Spencer (cited in Klare).¹⁰ Energy expert Edward L. Morse argues that oil is situated at the core of modern industrial economy – a major source of energy and key driver of economic growth and forms 40% of America’s total energy supply.¹¹

Sequel to the above, oil candidly deserves the title of “the most versatile and important raw material ever discovered”. Robert E. Ebel of the USA Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded since 2002 that oil is the determinant of well-being, national security and international power – it fuels military power, national treasuries and international politics. Accordingly, the global economy remains, as it was in the early 1970s, heavily dependent on the stability in the oil market. Oil trade is reported to be the single largest of global economic trade.¹² Since World War II, shortage of oil in the global market has been responsible for all major economic recessions. The Arab oil embargo in 1973-74 and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), caused severe economic contractions around the world price increases caused severe economic downturn in the global economy, leading to inflation and unemployment. In the 1990s, the Gulf War had a similar effect while oil shortages also set the lingering economic downturn early in the 21st century.¹³

2. The Never Ending Quandary

As viewed by Klare, ever since the Industrial Revolution in the early 18th century and the discovery of oil – in the mid-19th century, consumption of oil to serve the needs expressed earlier in this research exponentially increased the demand for oil as more and more countries became industrialized.¹⁴ As mentioned briefly earlier, increasing dependence on technology and

¹⁰ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2012, p.10.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

¹² A. Steve Yetiv, *op. cit.*, p.18.

¹³ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 9.

¹⁴ M. T. Klare, *Resource wars*, Henry Holt and Company, 2002, p. 15.



modern implements has created an ever-increasing capacity to consume oil in contemporary world. Because oil is efficient, powerful and abundant, it became an indispensable commodity to the life of modern 'Hydro carbon man' as dubbed by Daniel Yergin in *Yetiv*.¹⁵ The demand for oil to cope with surging economic growth in emerging economies like China and India among others has doubled oil consumption in the last 30 years. According to Klare in his book 'Blood and Oil', the use of energy driven from oil for the operation of military equipment such as naval ships, war planes, armored vehicles and other fighting machines has been responsible for the military dominance of the success of Western Civilization and its allies over others during World War II.¹⁶ Klare also mentioned in another of his books 'Resource wars' that the military capability of great armies of the world depends on high quantities of oil for their survival.¹⁷ The significant combat presence of the United States of America in South-East Asia and its other overseas commitments as reported by Klare, are supported by about as much fuel as consumed by the state of Sweden.¹⁸ The emergence of new economic dynamos during the great worldwide industrial expansion in the post-World War II era was driven by a vast cornucopia of cheap oil in the world market. According to Klare in his book 'The Race for What Is Left', realities revealed by the US Directorate of Energy in 2008 suggest that world consumption rates were the highest in the history of human development and would also rise by 31% between 2008 and 2035.¹⁹ Similarly, data available to the International Energy Agency (IEA) as published in the 2008 edition of the World Energy Outlook cited by Klare, revealed that the average daily output of world oil production is about 82 million barrels of oil per day.²⁰

Issues arising from the above reality emanate

¹⁵ Steve A. Yetiv, *op. cit.*, p.19.

¹⁶ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 28.

¹⁷ M. T. Klare, *Resource wars*, Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, 2002, pp. 29-31.

¹⁸ M. T. Klare, *The Race for what is left*, Henry Holt and Company, 2013, p. 13.

¹⁹ M. T. Klare, *The Race for what is left*, Henry Holt and Company, 2013, p. 36.

²⁰ M. T. Klare, *The Race for what is left*, Henry Holt and Company, 2013, pp. 29-31.

from the report that global reserves of oil have been in a relentless decline since the early 1970s. Major oil producers in the 1960s, for example the USA who led the world in output has witnessed a steady decline from the 1970s. USA produced about 9.4 million barrels of oil per day at its peak in 1970 but suddenly, it began a head-down decline in output. By 1985, it was able to produce only 8.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) and by the year 2000, only 4.9 mbpd. Klare observed a similar pattern from other oil producing regions- steady increase, peak and then decline. For example, Venezuela produced 3.5 mbpd in 1998 but only 2.4 in 2009. Russia also produced 12.5 mbpd to about 6 mbpd following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the North Sea, the combined production capacity of the British and Norwegian area of the region reached a peak of 6.1 mbpd in 1999 and is expected to follow suit in the head down decline. The US department of Energy predicted a decline of 2.8 mbpd by 2020 and only 2.6 by 2030.²¹ In this regard, the IEA as mentioned by Klare, collected data from historical production rates of oil reservoirs with more than 500 million barrels of oil known in the world and systematically analyzed it to determine the declining rate of oil output. The results of this exercise revealed that the world oil reserves were declining at a rate of 9.0% per year between 2003 and 2007. This is reflected to a decline of about 4.7 million barrels of oil per day out of the 82 million barrels per day of the world's daily output.²² This reality remains a course for concern to the oil industry. The ability of oil producers to meet the demand of existing industrial powers thus becomes in doubt, raising questions about the continuation of the industrial age as we know it today.²³ This reality indicates the end of the era of abundance in the oil industry.²⁴

Accordingly, it becomes obvious that the decline in the productive capacity of major oil reserves is capable of generating concern to all consumers of petroleum and experts in the industry. The need to discover additional sources of energy or find alternative sources to petroleum to compensate the demand therefore becomes

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 31.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

²⁴ Micheal. T. Klare, *The Race for what is left*, Henry Holt and Company, 2013, p. 8.



mandatory for the continued prosperity enabled by petroleum. It becomes no surprise therefore that the diminishing reserves of this vital resource in easily accessible areas heightened the vulnerability of the industrialized and even the new industrializing countries and generated a "do or die" search for new sources of oil to assure continued prosperity. The increasing scarcity of oil has among other efforts, generated a trend in the utility of unconventional oils like tar sands, extra heavy crude, shale oil etc. ignored during the surplus era. IEA has predicted that in the mid of this century, 9% of total world supply will come from these sources as against the 3% it was in 2009. These unconventional sources are however not sufficient to augment increasing demand and have no significant influence on the search for what is left. Similarly, with existing and easily accessible sources being continuously depleted, essential supplies would have to come from risky areas for reasons of geography –like remote and forbidden locations in the Arctic, Siberia and the deep oceans, which would have to be explored at a cost far exceeding any in the past. Klare rightly concludes that the world has entered an era of pervasive oil scarcity²⁵ and that the world slowly but inevitably witnesses the disappearance of several key resources upon which modern industrial civilization has long relied including oil and gas.²⁶

Evidently therefore, the search for oil in risky and hazardous locations represents a significant phenomenon in the concerted efforts by governments and resource firms to gain control over the remaining oil reservoirs in the world. The global drive to discover, control and exploit the world's final reserves is thus driven by the recognition of the inevitable depletion of energy and other resources in the not too distant future.²⁷ It is thus reasonable to argue that consumers seek to gain control over as much as possible of what remains, causing an unprecedented and complex, elusive wave of hideous struggle.²⁸ It is hardly surprising therefore that the major industrial powers as observed by Klare, have taken to an extended and calculated drive to gain control over the world's remaining reserves. Governments and their giant firms or in

partnership he added, have developed ambitious plans to explore uncharted areas and pursue legal claims to disputed territory and develop militaries that can operate in these areas.²⁹

The relationship between oil and global economic prosperity and stability is thus established. Accordingly, wherever the source of oil may be, the actors and interests of the world's major economies e.g. Russia, France, Britain, USA, China, India and Japan, remain visible in the quest for geopolitical influence and control over oil rich countries and regions. However, while diplomacy and economic instruments could be effective in promoting other economic and political goals, only the military can ensure continuous flow of oil from distant arrears in times of war and crisis. It is openly observable that most major oil suppliers in the world are reported to have noteworthy internal stress or certain emerging sources of stress that could escalate in the future.³⁰ Researchers at the World Bank were also reported by Klare in His book 'Resource Wars', to assert that countries with significant amounts of resources were four times more prone to war than those who do not have any.³¹ This assertion makes it undeniable that the Middle East is the most vivid example in this aspect as we will demonstrate in the next chapter.

3. Why the Middle East?

Countries in the Middle East possess about 60% of the total oil reserves on Earth^{32,33}. It is also home to mostly Muslim populated countries.³⁴ Accordingly, with regard to the clash of civilizations theory and the definition of civilization provided by Huntington et al. (2010) who all understand that civilizations are unique entities, with internal political organizations which serve to protect them from alien penetration and a similar understanding by Emile Durkheim who postulated that a civilization is a social milieu

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 14.

³⁰ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 20.

³¹ M. T. Klare, *Resource wars*, Henry Holt and Company, 2002, p.13.

³² J. Amuzegar, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

³³ M. T. Klare, *Resource wars*, Henry Holt and Company, 2002. p. 44.

³⁴ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 2.



that encompasses several number of nations, with each nation, being a particular form of the whole, and the whole (Civilization) being the sum total of cultural assets within a geographical location called its domain,³⁵ we could argue that the domain of the Islamic Civilization holds the vast energy resource that today forms the backbone of the economies of the Western Civilization. It also seems rational that owing to the versatility of oil and the centrality of its cheap and abundant supply to the vigor and growth of industrial economies as elucidated above, the Western economies remain significantly affected by activities in the territory of the Islamic Civilization, which seems more logical for the USA heavy military presence there.

The diminishing reserves and the abundance of oil in the Middle East, seems responsible for the desperate struggle for geopolitical control over the region. John C. Gannon the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1996 argued that "since much of the oil comes from the Middle East and since approximately 14 million barrels of petrol is commuted from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz for onward distribution to the world market every day,³⁶ the United States was compelled for this reason, to keep a close watch on events and remain engaged in the Middle East to safeguard the flow of oil". He urged American policy makers to recognize that US insecurity is proportional to the insecurity of global energy supplies. His argument led American security strategy to pay particular emphasis on oil field protection, defense of maritime trade routes and other aspects of resource security.³⁷

Analytically therefore, due to diminishing reserves and the abundance of oil in the Middle East, the "do or die" struggle for oil in the region and the involvement of great powers like the USA and Russia in political and security issues in the region seems purely predicated on their vulnerability to any interruption in oil trade and their desire to maintain a good relationship with incumbent governments as entities separate from society and not necessarily the interest of legitimate citizens. This is in tandem

with the assertion made by Nye, Jr. and Welch that Economic interdependence generates domestic sensitivities, which bear on moral concerns on practices, attitudes and wellbeing.

In the case of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America, the romance ensued between these two states, thereby affirming the supremacy of economic interdependence over any religious or moral sentiments. This is because neither of the two could do without the other in terms of oil trade and the benefits accruing from it.

In Saudi Arabia, the relationship mentioned earlier began to take effect on the balance between power and legitimacy in the country. Owing to the nature of state supremacy, in spite of the fact that the ruling family derives legitimacy from the *Ulema*, the king's decisions consequently took precedence. The *Ulema* could therefore only participate in political discussions, but could not enforce their legislations on the state of Saudi Arabia unless the King was in agreement of them. In this regard, the disagreement between the *Ulema* and the King of Saudi Arabia emanated from sensitivities regarding the compatibility of Islamic culture and in particular, *Wahhabi* puritanism and modern trends of western enlightenment. In the above regard, intercultural penetration through interdependence between the two, created sensitivities, which began to emerge from the 1920s even before the 1945 agreement commenced.³⁸ For example, in the 1960s, King Faisal Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz faced opposition when a decision was reached to use the new Television technology (obtained from America) in broadcasting within the kingdom. According to Robert Lacey, the *Ulema* contested and disagreed but to no avail: claiming that the act negates the Qur'anic injunctions and has the potential to corrupt society.³⁹ Lacey also added that several *Ulema* were apprehensive of the possibility that rapid socio-political and economic development could endanger Saudi Arabia's Islamic identity especially after the oil boom in the 1970s.⁴⁰ Similarly, the ruling class was advised to harness

³⁸ A. Boyd, Douglas, "Saudi Arabia Broadcasting: Radio and Television in a Wealthy Islamic State," *Middle East Review*, Summer and Fall 1980, p. 20.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 22-3; Robert Lacey, *The Kingdom* (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1979), pp. 369-70.

⁴⁰ Helen Lackner, *A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia* (London, Ithaca Press, 1978), pp. 172-212.

³⁵ International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations#External links

³⁶ M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, pp. 2-3.

³⁷ M. T. Klare, *Resource Wars*, Henry Holt and Company, 2002, p.6.



the modern trends of information and technology to further the course of Islam. In the same vein, they were invited to recognize that, foreign presence on Muslim soil remains a ploy to destroy the Islamic Identity through disguises such as Western model academics and sciences.⁴¹

This situation makes it obvious that the identity of the Saudi society was threatened by western cultural penetration maintained for reasons of oil trade. It should be noted however, that the *ulema* did not reject of modern trends of technology; their interest was to ensure strict management of these technologies for the promotion and protection of Islam. With developing trends of Western type modernization, coupled with violation of tax, legal and banking systems which were no longer in tandem with Islamic ethics, attracted concern from the *Ulema* and other citizens. Similarly, the spending pattern of the princesses also attracted concern on their plunder of the Kingdoms riches. The increasing discontentment of the *Ulema* led to the Islamists agitation against a socially perceived Western cultural attack, and the endless mismanagement and waste of national assets and unholy association with American infidels. This was exacerbated in 1979 with a religious uprising in Mecca; challenging the religious legitimacy of the Saud royal family and accusing it of transgressing the bounds permitted by Islam. In this regard, the nature of interdependence between the Western countries and the oil rich ones in the Middle East, it seems rational that the costly effects of interdependence between them, supersedes any socio-political sensitivity expressed by their respective citizens.

Accordingly, control over the oil rich area has thus brought together a complex set of intermingling factors: clash between ideas, values and principles of West and Islam, sectarian crises, boundary disputes, covert power play between the East and the West, etc. In this view, it seems rational that America's ties with Saudi Arabia, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the fact that 15 out of the 19 terrorists were of Saudi origin, highlight a strong link between protracted acts of terror and the struggle for control and access to oil wells in the Middle East. According to the

concept of vulnerability as explained by Welch and Nye Jr. it further seems obvious that, since interruptions in oil supply have in the past made vulnerable and proved detrimental to the vigor of global economies,⁴² the actions of the United States and other great powers in the region remain to a greater extent motivated by oil trade since oil production facilities remain the most targeted by Islamist Terrorists as opined by Yetiv.⁴³

CONCLUSIONS

What becomes clear in this article is that, loss of legitimacy by state, when met with constraining necessity and loss of autonomy to address local sensitivities, makes revolt against it, inevitable. In this regard, it becomes obvious that the identity of society becomes relevant to its security. This is undisputable because as evidenced in Saudi Arabia, Islamic cultural identity, determined what was considered unacceptable behavior and practice from the ruling family. It also expressed the reality that the violation of what is deemed acceptable by society, erodes leadership legitimacy and makes its authority and power illegal.

The heavy presence of Western and allied military forces in the Middle East in a desperate attempt to secure the oil wells and sea routes, remains necessary only to protect foreign oil installations against internally strangulated elements. Western involvement in the Middle East may thus be seen as a calculated risk taken by oil seekers with a view to ensuring the continued supply of oil from the Middle East to the global market, thereby creating commensurate impetus for Islamist terrorist action.

Our recommendation is for the evolution of the state system to include domestic ingredients beyond its contemporary predominant-realm as a unitary entity and sole referent object. This would provide a lasting solution to global peace and security by the regard it would accord to socio-political and economic sensitivities arising from global interdependence. Cultural identity within will be secured by respecting numerous cultural ontologism as against the dictated Western ontology that requires philosophical neutrality. Doing this

⁴¹ Hassan Muhammad Hassan, *Wassa'il Muqawamat al-Ghazu al-Fikri lil-'Alam al-Islami* (Mecca: Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami, 1981), pp. 79-176.

⁴² M. T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 9.

⁴³ Steve A, Yetiv, *op.cit.*, p. 19.



will make it possible for society to be conceived as a referent object in its own right and ensure that, threats to domestic identity become relevant in the formation of strategies for global peace and security.

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THE IDEOLOGIES OF BOKO HARAM AND EVOLVING INSECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY NIGERIA

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Abstract: *Social Constructivist theorists argue that identity determines (among other things), interest and set goals within a society. They also argue that ideas are at the center of every action and are privileged. However, in contrast to this thesis and in accordance to the Liberal Strategy for Global Peace and Security, Nigeria must be secured as a unitary entity and sole referent object without regard to threats posed by liberal ideas, values and principles to local identities within the state of Nigeria.*

Consequently, since 2009, The State of Nigeria has been violently confronted by a notably Islamist Terrorist network popularly known as Boko Haram. Within a span of 7 years (2009 - 2016), the violent campaign of Boko Haram is estimated to have cost more than 20, 000 lives and displaced over 3,000,000, while affecting over 6,000,000 in one way or another. The UN Security Council listed the group among other international terrorist networks in May 2014. The gravity of their actions also earned the group the title of being the 'world's deadliest terrorist group', by the global terrorism index in 2015. In this article therefore, we aim to uncover the ideologies at the center of Boko Haram Terrorist action against the state of Nigeria.

Keywords: *Security; Liberalism, identity; Boko haram; ideology; security; Legitimacy and Power.*

INTRODUCTION

Similar to other members of the great alliance of liberty, Nigeria's National Security Strategy is fashioned solely for the survival of Nigeria as a unitary entity. The Country's Security strategy encapsulates the basic tenets of the liberalists' view of order and security; to respect global norms and international law while remaining a responsible member of the international community. The vision was as stated, to make Nigeria a violence-free, safe, peaceful, self-reliant, prosperous and strong nation. Accordingly, the Nation's security strategy protects the fundamental values outlined by the liberalist equation. They include democracy within a sovereign secular state, security and welfare of the citizens, sovereignty and defense of its territorial integrity, peace, democracy, economic growth, and social justice. Other areas of interest include sub-regional security and economic cooperation and international cooperation in Africa and the world. This indicates the subservience of Nigeria's unique

issues to the grand security order in the international system.

The Liberal Security Strategy favors the adoption of liberal ideas, values and principles to guide the priorities established by states and other actors within them, thereby enforcing new ideas, values and principles and protecting their entrenchment within the domestic environment of modern states. Similarly, the liberalists developed an international security regime, encompassing all states and defining their objectives and methods of interacting with other members in the International environment. This effort is aimed at substituting anarchy with cooperation in the international system. On the strength of this belief, the liberal strategy prescribes and as revealed by Patrick Morgan in Collins.¹

Accordingly, it seems deductive to argue that with respect to the current global arrangements, being responsible invariably means organizing and running state affairs in accordance to liberal ideas, values and principles. In this regard, States that adopt the prescribed system are assigned global legitimacy and given access to international power

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¹ Patrick Morgan, *Liberalism*, in Allan Collins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Second Edition. Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 3.



in cases where internal or external aggression occurs. Similarly, those states that do not adhere to the idea and adopt the attendant liberal democratic identity are considered pariah, pirate or recluse states, for example North Korea, Iran and Cuba during the reign of Fidel Castro. Their governments are termed illegitimate, sanctioned and scolded by the international community.

Contrary to this view, Social Constructivist theorists such as Alexander Wendt, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever among others argue that, national security must be conceived in a duality i.e. in respect of both state and society. They recognize the political significance of ethno-national and religious entities and argue that while National Security is concerned with state the protection of its sovereignty as prompted by liberalism, society is concerned with the protection of its cultural identity. They explained that maintaining the state as a sole referent object emanates from the view that society refers to population as unit within a state. From this perception of the meaning of society they argue, it becomes obvious that the modern state system may impinge on societal rights and negate the progression of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion and other elements that determine the self-conception of individuals and societies found within states. Liberalism therefore becomes consequential to the ability (of such societies) to sustain and develop within acceptable conditions for maintenance and evolution of their collective identity.

Alexander Wendt, Max Weber and Giddens to mention a few also share a common opinion regarding the relevance of culture and identity in relation to security. They argue that beyond state power and its interests (which are in material terms), identity matters because it determines interest, which informs behavior and set goals. Similarly, Fredking and Alder argue that unique particularities that make up identity are constructed through a historical process made up by collective beliefs, interpretations, assumptions and social rules that make truth claims about life in general.² Alexander Wendt asserts that the ontology held by a people forms their unique ideas, values and principles, which matter in relation to security because they are at the center of their every action

and are privileged.³

Similarly, referring to the broadest form of Identity, Samuel Huntington postulated the Clash of Civilization theory to proffer explanations to arising and evolving patterns of conflict witnessed in the post-cold war era. He argued that in real terms, people are divided along cultural blocks and not by modern identities attached to nation states. The reason for his assertion he argued was because code of ethics i.e. rights and wrongs of a cultural entity are constituted through centuries of interaction between people, their environment and the objective realities of their being.⁴ He further explained that each cultural block may function only within the limits of its unique set of ideas, values and principles. He predicted that the continuing attempt to entrench western ideas around the globe may cause conflicts owing to contradictions in the meaning, relevance and application of concepts like prosperity, human rights, freedom, morality, role of religion in state affairs and many other vital concepts in human endeavour.⁵

Barry Buzan, with reference to the sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of identity, argues that the action of state, naturally fuels fear and mistrust against the principal mechanisms for restructuring of societies. In this respect, Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre argue that since any action towards security is carried out on behalf of a collectivity, society must be conceived as a referent object in its own right as doing otherwise may be challenged by strong identity and loosen the link between the state and society.⁶ In this regard, this study is concerned with issues that remain sources of conflict in modern states, where the state is the entity that must be secured without regard to how the state itself becomes a security threat to domestic forces' identity and their natural preferences. Consequently, it becomes compelling in this article, to reveal that, at the onset of the phenomenon, the term 'state' was used

² E. Adler, Seizing, *The Middle Ground; Constructivism in World Politics*. Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 234.

³ Patrick Morgan, *Liberalism*, in Allan Colins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 49.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 22.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Patrick Morgan, *Liberalism*, in Allan Colins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies*. Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 49.



to refer to an independent political entity, with sufficient authority and power to govern a clearly defined territory and the population that identify to that power, from which it derives legitimacy in accordance to the Peace of Westphalia treaties of 1648.⁷

1. The Case of Nigeria

In the case of Nigeria, from 1914 when the British unified the two protectorates and formed the colony of Nigeria, the amalgamation constitution reserved supremacy to secular legal order and made many aspects of the Caliphates structure, including some parts of the Islamic Legal System disenfranchised. The native courts proclamation act of 1900 gave legitimacy to judgments passed by the *shari'ah* courts which were hitherto autonomous to the dictates of the State of Nigeria.⁸ Consequently, the contradictions inherent in the down-grading of Native cum religious authorities, dismembered traditional power hierarchy particularly in the north of Nigeria and caused disharmony and resentment against the state. This scenario dominated socio-political activities and became compelling immediately after independence. It is believed that both covertly and overtly, the northern Muslims have since 1900 continued to assert their identity in the legal and political environment of the country. The rise of radical elements in Northern Nigeria and other violent ethnic and religious conflicts seems feasible from the above situation. The role of Islam in the routine socio-political and economic aspects of life in Nigeria especially as it relates to the secular federal government of the country (among other factors) seems to create a conducive environment for the rise of radical elements who question both the legitimacy and efficacy of the government.

The Islamists and indeed the general Muslim populace of the north, have persistently wished for an Islamic state and have considered illegitimate and irrelevant, the dictates of the secular federal government. It is revealing to note that at independence in 1960, the British handed power to a democratically elected government despite the

attendant contradictions and disharmony expressed in northern part of Nigeria – a caliphate of the Islamic civilization. The sovereign state of Nigeria as executed, prompted conflicts between the new secular law and Islamic law hitherto operated in northern Nigeria.⁹ The concerns generated regarding secularism within Islamic societies i.e. the Islamic North as a cultural entity questioned the Western call to embrace the ideas, values and principles of its unique ontology, as did other Islamic Civilizations around the globe. Apparently, the frustrations created by this attempt, became evident in the imbalance between legitimacy; which remains with the religious leaders and power, which is entrusted to the sovereign state of Nigeria. Consequently, the Muslims in the territory till date, have remained inherently sensitive to western perceptions of freedom, morality and human rights. There was from the onset therefore, disdain to adopt the liberal democratic identity prescribed by liberalism. This indication summarizes the incompatibility of the “new liberal identity” assigned to the citizens of Nigerians and the religious discontentment of the Muslim-North. It also affirms the notion that norms, culture and identity matter in relation to security because these elements guide the interest and set goals of the Muslim northerners.

The reality expressed in the previous paragraph, presents a practical demonstration of Nigeria's inability to ensure its citizen's habitual identification with post-colonial structures within its (colonially dictated) boundaries. According to Amitav Acharya's contribution on 3rd World Security found in a reader on Security Studies edited by Christopher W. Hughes and Lai Yew Meng, the reality expressed earlier leads to conflict on national identity. Amitav further asserts that, this leads to the inability of third world states to uphold viable structures for development programs against poverty and resource scarcity, these being prerequisites for domestic stability.¹⁰ The next chapter reveals the most prominent ideas at the center of Boko Haram terrorist action against the state of Nigeria i.e. those ideas that make the state of Nigeria a socially constructed threat to Islamic identity.

⁷ Henry A. Kissinger, *World Order*, Penguin Group, 2014, p.7.

⁸ S. Isaac Terwase, *Religion and the Nigerian State*, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 3, No. 2.

⁹ S. Isaac Terwase, *op.cit.*

¹⁰ Amitav Acharya in Christopher W. Hughes and Lai Yew Meng (ed), *Security Studies*, Routledge, 2011, p. 54.



2. Boko Haram and its Ideology

Boko Haram is a notably Islamic terrorist organization that refers to itself as *Wilayat GharbIfriqiyyah* meaning Islamic state of West Africa province, (ISWAP). The group was formerly known as *Jama'at Ahlas-sunnah li Da'wah walJihad*. (Group of the people of sunnah for preaching and Jihad), It operates within the borders of Nigeria and adjoining Chad and Cameroon republics. Their terrorist actions have attracted international attention especially with the abduction of over 250 schoolgirls in the northeastern part of Nigeria in 2014. It was declared international in 2015 following proven links with Al-Qaida, ISIS and other Islamist terrorist groups around the globe.

The name "*Boko Haram*" is typically translated as "Western Lifestyle is forbidden". Haram is from the Arabic "forbidden" and the Hausa word Boko Meaning secular Western Education and life style. *Boko Haram* has also been translated as Western influence is a sin and westernization is a desecration. Until the death of the founder Mohammed Yusuf, the group was also repeatedly known as Yusufiyya Northern Nigerians have commonly dismissed Western education as *Ilimin boko* and secular school as *makarantar boko*.¹¹ Accordingly, *Boko Haram* seeks the restoration of an Islamic state in Nigeria. It opposes the Westernization of Islamic Societies in Nigeria, in the same way it decries the domination of the country's resources by a small number of political elite.¹²

The ideological basis of the violent revolution recommended by Shekau (the current group leader) is to a large extent reflective of the ideas of Syed Qutb; an Egyptian scholar and a major figure in the Muslim Brotherhood organization founded in 1928, whose ideas serve as a reference guide to most Islamist terrorist networks around the globe.¹³

Boko Haram advocates the reinvention

¹¹ Alex Thurston, 'The disease is unbelief' Boko Haram's religious and political worldview, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World ANALYSIS PAPER No. 22, January 2016. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf, accessed on 10th October 2016.

¹² Philip Ostein, *Shariah Debate*, Leiden Brill, 2006, pp. 220-225.

¹³ Syed Qutb Syed, *Milestones*, Kazi Publications, 1964, pp. 16-17.

of Islamic order in the northern part of Nigeria especially. The group also presents violence as the only way of bringing the northern Muslims out of the current order, which it understands as "decades' long persecution". The group sees western institutions as damaging to the very essence of Islam. *Boko Haram* in essence calls for rejection of western ways through violence as the ultimate means to emancipation and restoration of Islamic values in society.¹⁴ Similarly, the group calls on Muslims to show their devotion to the faith of Islam and to give up their life while fighting evil in the name of Allah. The group also advocates offensive *Jihad* as a means to freeing the Muslims from worshiping leaders and their ideologies and also to live by laws provided in the *Qur'an*. The group maintains that the emancipation of man and the liberation of the Islamic societies would come only under the *Shari'ah*.

In a You Tube video, Abubakar Shekau encouraged any action taken in the defense of the fundamental values of Islam. It assures that only through *Jihad* could the Muslims be freed from servitude and destruction by the *infidels*. Qur'anic verses such as Q 12:40 - "no one rules but God" and Q 5: 51 - "Ally with them, become one of them", are quoted severally to support their claim. The group also emphasizes that offensive *Jihad* is permitted by Allah; a duty which they assign to all Muslims in Nigeria, in order to rid it of injustice and corruption.

2.1. On State Sovereignty

The first port of contention for the group similar to other terrorist networks around the globe, stems from the establishment of a modern state with the attributes ascribed to it by the Liberal Democratic Arrangements; sovereignty of the Nigerian state over Islamic legal and political institutions. Accordingly, *Boko Haram* proclaims that sovereignty belongs to Allah alone and should not be ascribed to the Federal Government of Nigeria. The sovereign status attributed to the State of Nigeria in this regard, led to the disavowal of the constitution, legislature and the entire democratic structure and institutions of the secular state system. *Boko Haram* considers other laws not

¹⁴ Abubakar Shekau, *You tube video*, available at <https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qPS8PJeixM>, accessed on 15th October, 2016.



of the *Shari'ah* as man-made. Consequently, the sovereignty attached to those laws is viewed as a machination made by man.

2.2. On Secularism

Secularism i.e. the separation of government affairs from religious biases is strongly condemned by *Boko Haram*. They consider it as a deliberate fragmentation of sacred authority aimed at destroying the very purpose of Islam.¹⁵ For *Boko Haram*, secular ways of life are anti-ethical to the Islamic faith and if allowed to flourish, would destroy Islam. The leader considers its introduction as a deliberate machination by Western interests to dismember Islam around the globe not only in Nigeria. The group also considers secular forms of society to be ignorant; living in immorality and man-made machinations. On this basis, democracy, socialism, and secular Muslim societies i.e. those built on secular governance must be reformed. Shekau's call remains in tandem with the ideologies of Syed Qutb. It saw *Boko Haram* calling on all Muslims to be mindful of the degrading effect of secular influence.¹⁶

The perceived socially constructed threat expressed in the previous paragraph, led followers of the group to condemn all other forms of administration in Islamic societies by vilifying those individuals who (in *Boko Haram's* opinion) accepted to spread an un-Islamic ideology and uphold it beyond *Shari'ah*. They accuse those who participate in secular administration of elevating the people (in the case of democracy) to the status of God. They explain that, living according to *Shari'ah* requires total rejection and rebuttal of all man-made laws and value systems, and also accepting no compromise in any aspect of human life.¹⁷ The outright condemnation of secular principles, allows *Boko Haram* to advocate for the destruction of the leadership and replacement of political power and authority all over Nigeria.

The group therefore invites all who believe in Allah to reject any form of allegiance to any law other than *Shari'ah law* in Nigeria. Political

ideologies such as democracy, materialism, individualism ignored the need of spirituality in human beings as understood by the group. They posit that democracy allows for agreement of majority to be built on error and allows multiple social evils to flourish including apostasy and other social ills such as adultery, fornication etc. which form part of freedom in Western views of life.¹⁸ They believe that democracy is the school of infidels and consider it as unbelief in all ramifications. They consider the democratic system as a disorder worse than killing and often quote the Qurán (2: 191) to support their claim.

Consequently, *Boko Haram* rejects not only the Western ways of life but also the religious leaders in the north. They refer to them as infidels and polytheists, dining with Western evil powers seeking to destroy Islam – their call.¹⁹ They also accuse the religious leaders of desecrating their thrones by embracing corrupt politicians, thereby causing a strong decline in their popular legitimacy. The hereditary Muslim rulers in the northern part of the country thus also became targets of *Boko Haram*.²⁰ They accuse the religious leaders of failing to discharge their fundamental duty of spreading Islam and urged them to stand up to their task of preserving Islamic moral order.²¹ On this basis, they kill who so ever: religious leaders, scholars, etc.

The foregoing makes it obvious that the group targets all those who accept the Federal constitution, western education even if they do so out of ignorance.²² *Boko Haram's* call for the rejection of all socio-political, cultural, economic and legal arrangements of the Nigerian Government and to reinstate the unity of religion, politics and government in conformity to Islamic ethics becomes a frantic rebuttal of the Liberal Democratic Identity assigned to the State of Nigeria. These views reflected a literal declaration of war against the Nigerian state. The continued assertion that they make no rules but only call others to imbibe the teachings of Islam also indicates their extreme

¹⁵ Abu Yusuf Muhammad, *op.cit.*, pp. 5-7.

¹⁶ Syed Qutb Syed, *Milestones*, Kazi Publications, 1964, pp. 16-17.

¹⁷ Abubakar Shekau, *You tube video*, available at https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=qPS8_PJeixM, accessed on 15th October, 2016.

¹⁸ Abu Yusuf Muhammad, *op.cit.*, pp. 64-65.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 5-6.

²⁰ Mahmood Yakubu, *An Aristocracy in Political Crisis*, Avebury, 1996.

²¹ JA'afar Mahmud Adam, *Siyasa a Nigeria*, 2003, Audio lecture.

²² Abubakar Shekau, liveleak.com/view?i=1421362369.



conviction to the new Islamic vanguard suggested by Syed.²³

Based on their exclusivist ideology, the *Boko Haram* publicly disowned the Nigerian National pledge, constitution and institutions and proclaims the Qur'an to be their constitution and source of legitimacy. They have joined the worldwide movement against Western Civilization owing to the Cultural Unity in Islam. The targets are therefore not any particular religious faithful but the collective entity and structures of the Western Civilization and also particular individuals, agencies and institutions perceived as instrumental to its agenda. Accordingly, their disdain for secular education and the repeated attacks on schools is built on the belief that the education system has a negative political impact on the teachings of Islam. They do not abhor Western education for its intellectual content; however, other teachings in secular schools that do not disavow social vices and polytheistic tendencies propagate shirk according to the group.²⁴

In this respect it is no wonder that *Boko Haram* expressed willingness to kill all secular heads Nigeria had ever had including Ahamadu Bello: the first premier of Northern Nigeria and the *Sardauna* of Sokoto; joining them with the Western leaders whom they consider infidels. From northern Nigeria to Syria, Turkey even Saudi Arabian leaders are not left out by *Boko Haram*. They have all been termed enemies of Islam needing freedom from servitude and moral degradation²⁵.

CONCLUSIONS

Judging by the ideology of *Boko Haram*, it is constructive to assert that since the collective aims of every society determine the framework of its laws, the entrenchment of Secularism and Democracy (among other ideals of the Western ontology) in Nigeria and the supremacy of the state over religion, contradict the fundamental ideas, values and principles of Islam prevalent in Northern Nigeria. These evidently pose a complex imbalance between legitimate authority and power within Northern Nigeria.

The fundamental beliefs, which give Islamic

²³ Abu Yusuf Muhammad, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

²⁴ Abu Yusuf Muhammad, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

²⁵ Abubakar Shekau, *op. cit.*

Civilization its unique identity, are to the Muslim (devout and sacrosanct) beyond the reams of political ideologies or regimes neither are they within the realm of gains of profit and power. Accordingly, it seems constructive to believe that *Boko Haram* is a radical element, arising from among the people of northern Nigeria, who question the purpose of Western enforcement of its ideas, values and principles, akin to its unique version of world order as adopted and enforced by the Government of Nigeria. *Boko Haram's* responses seem representative of larger trends around religion and identity that are increasingly seen worldwide.

In this regard, it becomes obvious that liberalism, by ignoring identity and suppressing its sensitivities, only creates insecurities. The Liberal Security Strategy also does not provide a solution to evolving threats such as Islamist terrorism and other ethnic and religious conflicts witnessed (and witnessing) in Nigeria. This seems obvious in the blatant failure of suppressive strategy adapted to combat terrorism and other identity-laden conflicts in the country.

This reality calls for a new approach in security strategies that will evolve to consider Nigeria's complex plurality, respect the peoples sensitivity through which it becomes conscious that Islamist terrorism and other ethnic cum religious conflicts are beyond ordinary acts of criminality and therefore cannot be muted by the brutal suppression of concerns eloquently presented in numerous media.

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DACIAN FORTIFICATION. PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION

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Abstract: *The Dacian fortification is an emblematic chapter of the value and creativity of our predecessors. The destinations of the settlements and their internal organization stand for original arrangements of defensive fighting systems with specific characteristic, wich provide indications of their own traditions, in an original approach but with integration in the military architecture of the antiquity. The overwall picture of the Dacian fortifications sends throughout history a modernist concept by shaping the framework of everyday life and by the military aspects used in the preparation of defense against invaders.*

Keywords: *fortification; fortified settlement; stronghold.*

Around 60 b.C., the first ancient Geto-Dacian documentary sources refer to the military actions during the great *Burebista* (82 b.C. – 44 b.C.), the founder of the geto-dacian state against the tribes *oxen* and *taurians* that he conquered through a quick military campaign when they invaded the today territory of Slovakia¹. Another proof of the strength of the Dacian state is another moment in history, shortly after the brief peace concluded with the Roman Empire, during the war of 101 a.d.-102 a.d., when *Decebal* (about 55-60 a.d.-106 a.d.), removed by the force of arms, the *iazzyges-sarmatian* who occupied the Dacian territories, from the Western plain of the current Banat². Therefore, some historians support the idea that the *Emperor Traian* (98 a.d.-117 a.d.) refused to give to *iazzyges-sarmatian*, his allies, these lands, as, according to the thinking of the winner, it was due to be theirs by conquest³.

In the study of Antiquity for the Dacian fortresses and strongholds, the location and placement of these were a serious challenge for many researchers. It is assumed that two centuries ago it was not even established the topographical

location of the Dacian capital – *Sarmizegetusa Regia*. It was believed that the *Emperor Trajan* (98 a.d.-117 a.d.) was the one who established the localion of *Sarmizegetusa*, where it existed until the summer of 106 a.d. These assumptions were determined by the lack of ancient written sources and traces that would have allowed establishing the role and chronological classification of the settlement; It turned on, by the expansion of archeological excavations and by many and conclusive evidence that *Dacia* represented a complex and well-organized system of fortifications, and *Sarmizegetusa Regia* was not a single and isolated fortress between the mountains⁴.

By good examples we can present and describe the existence in Romania of various repertoires of Dacian-Roman fortifications, with multiple resonances that have left their pregnant mark on the Dacian culture and civilization. A different approach in our research in relation to all archaeological studies could demonstrate that there can not be stated a certain typology of ancient fortifications in general, nor in the world, because much of the scientific information published is incomplete and many sites are still archaeologically unloaded and may bring further items in the development of fortifications, starting even from the manifestation of political, military, administrative, social and economic influences of a people or certain geographical area which may be organized in an uncertain shape, at a time.

¹ Strabon, *Geografia*, VII, 3, Bucharest, 1964, pp. 239-240.

² Dio Cassius, *Roman history*, LXVII, 10.

³ L. Marghitan, *Dacian fortresses and Roman*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1978, pp.11-12.

⁴ Idem, pp. 6-7.

In Romania, the crucial moment in the evolution of the ancient fortifications of the former Roman-Dacia was during the Aurelian withdrawal, at the end of 271 a.d. The Aurelian withdrawal represented the reduction of the empire's borders, by evacuating the army and administration from the Roman-Dacia. The Roman-Dacia was made up from the current provinces of Transylvania, Banat, Oltenia and Muntenia part to Rucăr. Many historians join the beginning of Aurelian withdrawal to the end of the Roman occupation⁵, because of the actions of Germanic migratory peoples at North of the Danube, as well as of the free Dacians' uprising organized in *costobocae* and *carpi*; executed in two phases, begun in late 271 a.d. and completed in 275 a.d., write down the historical sources that, following the victory of the Roman Empire against the *goths*, the Roman-Dacia was ceded to the latter, on the condition to defend at the north of the Danube the new borders of the empire. The Aurelian withdrawal is explained by *Radu Mihai Crisan* in the book *All for Christ! The Political will of Nicolae Iorga*, on pages 16 to 17, using the very

words of the great Romanian historian⁶: ...,The *Empire could not cede Traian's Dacia*, in a formal way, to the barbarians whose establishment would had been considered as outside its legal borders and representing a permanent military danger. The very notion of the state as the Romans had, would have opposed it, in the most absolute manner... These *goths* known for a long time and with which, however, from time to time, had peaceful relations could be used to defend the border itself in the sense that I indicated. Emperors used for decades for their skill barbaric legions cavalry contingent, as they sat in Gallia many German settlers that the owners of the lands close to the border were looking for their physical vigor. The systems of federations that was paid the service – that only the modern conception of prestige could make it to be considered as a tribute and the tribute as a humiliation – it was more comfortable than the expensive maintenance of the legions; they were allowed to live on the subsidies and gifts on which an agreement had been reached at the expense of residents, whom in turn was no longer required the



Fig. 1. Tabula Peutingeriana, Source: <http://www.istrianet.org/istria/cartography/history/peutinger-table.htm/>, accessed to 05.06.2017

⁵ Source: http://ro.metapedia.org/wiki/Withdrawal_aurelian, accessed to 21.12.2016.

⁶ Idem, accessed to 21.12.2016.



contribution due to the state, which, after all, was the same..."

The existence and continuity of the Daco-Romanians at the north of the Danube was established not long after the Aurelian withdrawal in 275 a.d., by publishing a Roman commercial map *Tabula Peutingeriana* in 330 a.d., since the reign of the *Emperor Constantin cel Mare* (272 a.d. - 337 a.d.). On the commercial map *Tabula Peutingeriana*, figure 1, there written down no less than 88 cities both north and south of the Danube and highlights the strong trade links of the empire with its adjacent areas⁷.

The trade itself demonstrates a permanent activity in the economic, organizational and administrative areas by the Romans areas abandoned by Aurelian withdrawal. It is when most experts and historians speak of early *romanization* and *christianization* communities North and South of the Danube; this reality is supported by the appearance of religious objects and tombs of Christian worship. None of the migratory peoples who threatened the Roman-Dacia, were Christian and thus they did not even belong geographically to these areas. The first Romanian latin name, *Peter*, was discovered on a pot made of clay, dated back in the 3rd century a.d. in the Roman camp *Capidava* (*Constanța county*)⁸.

Concerns for the study and research of the Roman-Dacia's military history have their beginnings in the XVII the century by *Luigi Ferdinand Marigli diaries* (1658-1730), the famous military expert and engineer in the army of *Emperor Leopold I* (1640-1705).

During the wars with the Turks in Transylvania, Muntenia, Oltenia and Banat, he researched, during the year 1689, the ruins of the Roman cities, roads and camps. These surveys and polls were translated into detailed plans of the fortifications and presented in an outstanding work: *Danubius Pannonico-mysicus obervationibus geographicis, astronomicis, hydrographicis, historicis, phisicis, perlustratus Hague-Amsterdam, 1726, volume II, reprinted under the title Description du Danube, etc., The Hague, 1744, Volume II*⁹.

⁷ Source: <http://www.descopera.ro/cultura/-cum-au-uitat-romanii-un-mileniu-de-istorie>, accessed to 22.12.2016.

⁸ *Idem*, accessed to 22.12.2016.

⁹ Col. dr. Cristian M. Vlădescu, *The roman army in Dacia inferior*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1983, pp.15-16.

The researches have continued in the first half of the nineteenth century by the ban *Mihalache Ghica* (1801-1872) between 1832-1842 in Oltenia, major *Dimitrie Papazoglu* (1811-1892), *Cezar Bolliac* (1813-1881), *August Trebnoiu Laurian* (1810-1881), *epigrapher Carol Torma* (1815-1862), the Prussian consul in Bucharest, *J.F. Neigebauer* (1783-1866), *Vasile Pârvan* (1882-1927) and many others who are part of the the pioneering study of the ancient fortifications in the research of modern fortress.

Much of the literature written and analyzed describes a broad and detailed archaeological inventory for each location and fortification studied over time. It would be useless to focus our research on an identity that draws only the historical value and the typology of elements in a detailed record, the uniqueness of a site in a given period of antiquity. These are generally signs that mark everyday life in antiquity, but also the possibilities regarding the applied technique in the implementation and execution of the fortifications.

We can not move on without treating the issue of the architecture of buildings, the materials used, the urbanization of a group of civils which formed and represented the city life, often insufficiently, with underground constructions, tunnels and secret passages rescue and reorganization against the invaders.

During the war in 105 a.d., when the Dacian troops withdrew at Decebal's order (about 55-60 b.C.-106 b.C.), although the Romans sent troops in pursuit of them, the existence of underground roads gave time to Decebal to change on the spot the situation of the war by regrouping of the forces and providing a new space for maneuver. Some authors argue that in addition to betrayals among its leaders, it moved combat to the south of the Danube, even on the Roman territory, bringing significant losses to the Roman army due to the existence of secret underground passages. Not expecting such a change of situation, during winter that would have made even more difficult the movement of the Dacian army in such a short time, *Emperor Trajan* manages to capture the retreat of the Dacians towards *Sarmizegetusa Regia* and ordered the blocking of tunnels,¹⁰ including the

¹⁰ Emil Străinu, *Foray into the underworld*, Triumf Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, pp. 30-31.



destruction of water pipes supplying the city¹¹.

We will not stop to the presentation of technical details regarding the sizes and dimensions of such categories of works, the strategic position occupied for an isolated location, but our research focus, besides military and civilian buildings, by analogy and extensive comparison, on the internal organization and principles which preserve the capabilities and performance of ancient fortification. During antiquity, to build fortifications there is no rule of homogeneity, uniformity of the functions as a destination, as their plane geometry. The conduct and their positioning on some form of relief, valley, mountain, hill or stream, represented the choices of the military strategist who investigated the possibilities of achieving the purpose according to the geographical area that determined a certain fluidity and mobility of the military systems and operations. *Decebal* skilled in combat and strategy, did not have the military superiority of the Roman Empire, but was favored by fighting on own land that highlighted all the advantages given by the known land; assimilated with genistic arrangements or forms dominated by the heights of the land, determine the need to ensure a certain degree of protection¹². Forest and mountains occupied a considerable area of Dacia and had a significant impact on the combat because of the unlimited possibilities to identify the advantages of creating superiority and mobility regardless of direct attack or surprise of the opponent. The spread of forests and the percentages of their occupation in antiquity is an impossible issue to restore today in detail, in Dacia¹³. A living testimony of the Dacians' military strategy and of their military victories is confirmed in the writings about the art of war, of general *Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)*: „*the country to be crossed by many valleys and to be inaccessible, due to mountains or forests and wetland, because of the nature of crops.*”¹⁴ Therefore, many studies have

tried to define the concept of ancient fortification including by extension the Dacian fortifications, according to certain criteria which seem to have no concept or rule, at their turn, based on well-defined criteria.

The first classification criterion was the *chronological* one, determining the physical state of fortification, the emergence and evolution of the common elements of composition, formation of complex military defense, taking into account the level of development, social organization, administration at a certain time. These defense systems were: *developed or less developed*¹⁵. Development through reuse and rebuilding of fortifications on the same site shows an objective look, of rearrangement and permanent recovery, depending on the performance of defense items and of the used construction materials. Occupying the high landforms conferring military advantages in the way of attack, is the first consideration viable in the definition of ancient fortification, adding to it multiple possibilities to cover or to ensure convenient battle positions against invaders. The Dacian fortifications were built and modeled depending on the configuration of the land, an aspect that determines the orientation of the entire settlement¹⁶. There are not analyzed in the researched studies the establishment and the revealing of the cronology of a fortification, the multiple capabilities to create offensive, strategies or operative tactics on defense or mitigation of military action; the described structure is simple, limited to the archaeological site studied without comparative references to other geographical areas of the world, enabling expanding their vision. Therefore, we consider in our research, the use of a *chronological* classification of fortifications as incomplete and not leading to any finality. I would add a further key reason, resulted from the analyzed archeological studies, related to water sources of ancient fortifications, which, exceptionally, were not in the area of fortified settlements¹⁷. Some places are found in closed areas, to the first sources of natural water, confirming once again our

¹¹ Source: http://adevarul.ro/locale/hunedoara/enigmele-cetatile-dacice-bijuteriile-ingineriei-lumea-antica-ajuns-conducte-apa-drumuri-pavate-asezarile-lux-culmile-muntilor-1_56acde205ab6550cb8475627/index.html/, accessed to 20.04.2017.

¹² Col. dr. Gheorghe Tudor, *Army geto-dacian*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1986, pp.12-13.

¹³ Ioan Glodariu, *Dacian architecture, civil and military*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1983, pp.59-60.

¹⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On war*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, pp. 451-452.

¹⁵ Hann Felician, *Brief history of development in Romania permanent fortification*, Military Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1958, pp. 5-7.

¹⁶ Nicolae Branga, *Urban Roman Dacia*, Facla Publishing House, Timișoara, 1980, pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ Ioan Glodariu, *Dacian architecture, civil and military*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1983, pp. 59-60.




Fig. 2. Map representation typology type fortifications quadriburgium. Source: <http://apar.archaeology.ro/bondoc.htm#valuri/>, accessed to 03.01.2017

conclusions that in the choosing of the placement of a fortification counted more the defense military principles of occupying an advantageous point for the battle, which is not related to a certain period, in shaping the decision for site selection.

Some authors and researchers of ancient fortified systems send us to another approach in determining the classification, *their geometric shape*. The references related to these types are determined by uncertainties referring to topography, complex reconstruction plans in 3D digital, embodiment of the fortifications and of each type of building or their components. And these new framings are limiting because they refer, according to some researchers, just to the fortifications in the southern part of Danube, specific to the *Emperor Diocletian (284 a.d.-305 a.d.)* and *Emperor Constantin the Great (307 a.d.-337 a.d.)* times, finding them under the name *quadriburgium*¹⁸ (details the figure 2).

Fortifications belonging to the typology, after the geometric shape in plan rather than by purpose, is decisive in determining the strategy and tactics of defense. Such classification is shown simplistically

recalling the description of the structural form: *fortification type castra* quadrilateral shape with corner towers protrude from the enclosure, *the fortification type quadriburgium* consisting of new construction, of a quadrangular corner towers squares, round, *triangular fortification* with round corner towers protrude from the walls, the *fortress of polygonal*, irregular large and *fortification an observation and signaling towers* with small, non-defensive¹⁹.

We will continue with the multiple analysis of the archeological studies and epigraphic writings which develop, from other points of view, the issues of classifying ancient fortifications without reference to a classification in terms of time or geomtrice form. We distinguish another approach in classification of ancient fortifications, for the historical period of the 2nd century a.d. and the 1st century a.d. Even if the descriptive principles in the selection and establishment of fortifications, offered by the natural configuration of the land are obeyed. The ancient fortifications did not have a high level of security against an attack, thus requiring a permanent restoration against fire or the use of means of destruction. It can be appreciated that

¹⁸ Sursa: <http://apar.archaeology.ro/bondoc.htm#valuri/>, accessed to 03.01.2017.

¹⁹ Idem, accessed to 03.01.2017.



the level of safety of a fortification was different depending on location and it was conditioned by decision making in establishing safety measures against the attackers. Some researchers have classified for the period above mentioned three types of fortifications namely: fortified settlement specific to the fortification where the settlement and population extend outside the fortified space, the *stronghold*, a specific location where they conduct an attack and fortification only joint military or independent fortification situated in areas where to protect certain regions or roadways²⁰. These categories regarding the classification and definition of types of Dacian fortresses refer only to a short period for a certain historical period studied. It is based on the general principles for constructing fortification, based on archaeological sites studied, the findings being established „only from the role, purpose and character of fortification of any kind, independent of nature, crowd, the size of fortification elements and the area fortified”²¹. Here comes the fact that the evolution of fortification is strictly related to urban and social development of settlements. In addition to the military aspect which is significant in ensuring the permanence of settlements, regardless of its size in a geographical area, the occupation of an important position in economic exchanges, made the development of the fortifications to be a difficult one to characterize, and a certain typology not to be determined only based on historical perspective.

We can not refer only to a historical period of ancient Dacian fortresses in the classification. The principles of the embodiment differs in position and location, and a classification thereof, in our point of view, can be made only after the *elements that make up the fortification*. We believe that any analysis, no matter its level of detail, on the space of the ancient Dacia, at any time we find structures and basic elements that define and determine the performance and security against attackers; and presentations and details in a list can not go beyond the frame of a simple enlisting that may define and classify, by formation, a certain type of fortification, mingled with the dangers and threats of invaders.

In our research we have established, although some researchers try to continually redefine this

concept, in terms of classifying the fortification, in determining the correct description and placement in history remain *chronological* and *elements that make up the fortress*. Any archaeological object that can date processing technologies of materials, type and diversity of tools, religious objects and weapons discovered, can not replace the ability and mastery in policy defense system that is rediscovering the stone walls, stone towers, civil engineering, and secret underground passages built that establish again reorganization and change of strategy of the fight against imminent attack.

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²⁰ Ioan Glodariu, *Dacian architecture, civil and military*, Dacia Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 1983, pp. 49-50.

²¹ *Idem*, pp. 49-50.



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